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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis looks into the relationship between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since the PRC regained its IMF membership in 
1980. It initially analyzes the China-IMF relationship with socialization theoretical 
framework, attempting to explore how the IMF has socialized China into accepting neo-
liberal international economic norms. The research borrows Alastair Johnston’s 
‘microprocesses’ of socialization to assess the processes of IMF socialization via 
financial assistance, technical assistance, and surveillance and policy advice for China. 
The research shows socialization has taken place to a moderate degree, as IMF programs 
have had some impacts on China’s domestic economic and financial liberalization. Yet 
no evidence shows the IMF has convinced China to fully redefine its economic principles 
and norms. Socialization turns out to be an inadequate analytical approach to analyzing 
the China-IMF relationship in the long run.  
 
The research continues with a supplementary theoretical framework: principal-agent 
theory. Principal-agent theory overcomes some of the technical deficiencies in 
socialization theory, and helps us understand more thoroughly China’s role in the IMF 
and the governance of international financial economy in general in the long run. China is 
regarded as the principal, and the IMF as China’s international organization agent. Driven 
by its objective of acquiring a larger influence in the governance of international financial 
economy, China delegates several tasks to the IMF so that the Fund can accomplish these 
tasks more efficiently than if China took other cooperative or unilateral approaches. 
China-IMF interactions are assessed following a four-stage analytical approach based 
upon the key concepts of principal-agent theory. China’s and the IMF’s institutional 
features and functions are examined as important factors of the China-IMF relationship. 
They include China’s preferences regarding IMF operation, China’s role in IMF 
governance, and China’s impact among IMF staff. Based on this examination, the 
consequences of China’s delegation of tasks to the IMF are assessed.  This dissertation 
indicates that the IMF plays a limited role in assisting China to access larger influence in 
the governance of international financial economy, because of the IMF’s western-
dominated staffing rules, unbalanced governance structure, preference deviation from 
China, inadequate resources, and China’s incapability to facilitate strict controls on the 
IMF. 
 
The thesis contributes to the so far thin literature on the China-IMF relationship with 
selected case studies such as IMF Article IV Consultation for China, China’s role in IMF 
quota and voting share reforms, IMF staff with Chinese nationality, and so on. The 
research provides a model for analyzing the relationship between China and international 
organizations with a combination of socialization and principal-agent theoretical 
frameworks. Last but not least, it extends the research subject of principal-agent theory in 
international organization Studies to include an emerging market economy state as the 
principal, which correctly implies the increasing influence of emerging market economies 
in the governance of international political economy. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
 
When the Managing Director  (MD) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Christine 
Lagarde attended the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference in China on April 7 2013, 
she started her speech with a passionate response to the Chinese president Xi Jinping’s 
ambitious proposition of ‘China Dream’. She said, ‘The IMF is your partner in this 
endeavor. Just as China is changing to fulfill its dream, we are changing too—so that we 
can be even more effective in our support. We believe that we have a lot to give—our 
global experience and technical expertise.’1(IMF 2013a) This statement proposed an ever 
growing ‘partnership’ between the IMF and China.  It reflected the Fund’s faith in 
China’s economic growth, and the Fund’s prospect for its own role in the blueprint of 
China’s future expansion.  
 
In recent years, the IMF has repeatedly emphasized China’s contribution to strengthening 
the international financial economy; meanwhile, it has also demonstrated a strong 
intention to consolidate a mutually beneficial relationship with the Chinese government. 
The IMF’s rhetoric has become increasingly obvious since the global financial crisis that 
started in 2007 had deepened. The then-IMF MD Dominique Strauss-Kahn said in late 
2009 that China was ‘helping to design the global priorities for the future and devise 
solutions to global problems’, and he added that it was a good opportunity for China and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 She also later extended this concept to ‘Asia’s dream’, and shared her idea about how Asia would 
maintain growth and fulfill its dream. 
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Asia to contribute to shaping the post-crisis global economy. (IMF 2009a)  
 
The IMF encouraged China to revalue its currency Renminbi (RMB) and increase 
domestic demand in order to contribute to rebalancing the global economy. Meanwhile, 
the Fund was probably even more enthusiastic about convincing China to contribute 
heavily to IMF financial resources in order to help it through the crisis period. Strauss-
Kahn said to China’s Caijing (Finance) Magazine in 2008 that China should answer 
positively to the proposals of injecting capital into the IMF. (Li 2008) China did not let 
the IMF down, as it signed with the IMF an agreement on purchasing up to Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR) 32billion (around US $50 billion) in IMF notes in September 
2009. It was the first note purchase agreement in the history of the IMF. (IMF 2009b) 
When Lagarde took her first official trip to China as the MD of the IMF in 2011, she 
confirmed China’s leading role in the global economy and especially in the IMF. She also 
called on the Chinese government to make decisions to help the troubled Europe, because 
‘no country and no region can go it alone. We are bound together by our economic 
success or failure’. (IMF 2011a)  
 
The IMF’s enthusiasm for a stronger partnership did get corresponding answers from the 
Chinese side. Chinese policymakers, academics and media have also given increasing 
attention to the IMF. There was a voice in China encouraging reliance on the IMF to help 
China gain more power in the governance of the international financial economy. The 
most explicit example was the Chinese Central Bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan’s 
advocacy of a diversified international monetary system based on the IMF’s SDR to 
 12 
replace the US dollar dominated system. (Zhou 2009) Zhou’s proposal was backed by the 
then-Chinese president Hu Jingtao. In his speech at the G20 Cannes Summit, Hu called 
for reforms of the international monetary system in a steady manner, including expanding 
the use of the SDR of the IMF, reforming the SDR currency basket, and establishing an 
international reserve currency system with stable value, rule-based issuance and 
manageable supply. (Xinhua 2011) Chinese officials also called on the IMF to strengthen 
surveillance of the financial markets of advanced economies, especially the main 
international reserve currency issuer countries. Hence China’s policymakers expected the 
IMF to play the role of a fair referee as well as a stabilizer. They particularly hoped the 
IMF would take into account of the emerging market economies’ interests and create an 
international financial environment that is friendlier for these countries.  
 
The policymakers’ propositions received some positive feedbacks from the academics. 
For example, Qiao and Xu argued for strengthening the IMF’s role as the global central 
bank that coordinates regulations among all countries. (Qiao and Xu 2011) In 2010, the 
Renmin University of China hosted a ‘Commemorate 30 Years Anniversary of China’s 
regaining IMF Membership Discussion Symposium’ and invited China’s leading scholars 
and current and former policymakers to review China’s IMF membership and more 
importantly to discuss the current and future significance of the membership.2 The most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Speakers at the Symposium included Cao Tong (Deputy Director of the China CITIC Bank and Director 
of the International Currency Research Centre of the Renmin University of China), Xiang Songzuo (Deputy 
director of the International Currency Research Centre of the Renmin University of China and Chief Editor 
of the Global Finance journal), Zhang Zhixiang (former Chinese Executive Director at the IMF), Guo 
Qingwang (Head of the School of Finance at the Renmin University), Robert Mundell (Professor at the 
Columbia University), Chen Yulu (Dean of Beijing Normal University and Professor in the Financial 
Policy Research Centre at the Renmin University), Wei Benhua (former Deputy Director of the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange), Zhao Xijun (Deputy Head of the School of Finance at the Remin 
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essential topic at the symposium was how the IMF could reform the single currency 
based international monetary system, and create a favourable environment for 
internationalization of RMB and for China to play a more significant role in the 
governance of the international financial economy.  
 
However, some other evidences have showed that the relationship between China and the 
IMF is far from reaching a strategic partnership. First of all, China has an inadequate 
quota and voting share in the IMF. In order to be an influential player in the IMF, a 
member state needs to have a large share of decision-making power in the Fund, which is 
measured by the member state’s quota and voting share in the Fund. The IMF has an 
unbalanced internal governance structure where decision-making power is concentrated 
in the Fund’s advanced economy member states. The US and other advanced economies 
have the majority of IMF quota and voting shares, while the fast growing emerging 
market and developing countries are underrepresented. Some scholars argued that the 
IMF’s western-dominated nature and the consequential legitimacy issue caused its 
incapability to efficiently look into and solve problems in the emerging market and 
developing world. The IMF’s poor policy advice failed in several financial crises in the 
emerging market and developing economies in the 1990s. Hence the emerging market 
economies and developing countries gradually lost trust in the Fund and chose alternative 
solutions when they face macroeconomic difficulties. (Chin 2010; Woods 2001; Woods 
and Lombardi 2006)  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
University), Zhang Jie (Deputy Head of the School of Finance at the Remin University), and Lee Il Houng 
(IMF Senior Resident Representative for China).  
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The Fund has realized the legitimacy issue and initiated several rounds of governance 
reforms.  The recent rounds of reforms in 2006, 2008 and 2010 respectively included 
shifts of quota and voting shares from its developed to emerging market and developing 
country members. However, these reforms have not improved the emerging market and 
developing economies’ voices sufficiently enough to match their fast increasing real 
shares of the world economy.  The 2010 reform- including quota and voting shares shifts 
and total increase of quota amounts- was expected to be implemented by January 2013 
the latest. Yet while the Fund kept pushing some major states, especially the US, to pass 
the reform proposal domestically, a US government document showed that by April 2013 
the president had not even sent the request for the extra appropriations involved to the 
Congress by then. (US House of Representatives Committee of Financial Services, 2013)   
 
In addition, even after the 2010 reform is implemented, the US and the EU countries 
added together still maintain veto power in the Fund. Although China will have 
approximately 6.39 per cent of total IMF quota and 6.07 per cent of total voting share, 
which made it the third largest member just after the US and Japan, its total decision-
making power in the IMF does not earn it sufficient governance power to challenge the 
US or other advanced economies together. Chinese officials have urged the IMF to 
implement the 2010 reforms in almost all Fund meetings and activities since 2012, yet it 
has not been done by the time this thesis is submitted.3 
 
Neither did the IMF respond with a satisfactory answer to China’s request for an IMF-led 
reformed international monetary system where the US influence should be greatly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This thesis is submitted in January 2014.  
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restricted. The IMF did not respond directly to Zhou’s proposal of creating a super 
sovereign currency based on the SDR. Yet Strauss-Kahn said in 2009 that the current 
system had proven resilient during the recent crisis and that he expected the dollar to 
‘remain the principal reserve currency for some time.’ (IMF 2009a) Not long after Zhou’s 
proposal, Chinese scholars and policymakers also seemed to have dropped the idea of 
enlarging the use of SDR and the influence of the IMF; instead, they have been 
promoting the idea of ‘RMB internationalization’ and attempting to get more market 
shares without the IMF’s assistance.  
 
With regard to the significance of IMF membership, Chinese scholars and officials have 
various opinions.  These opinions include a few pragmatic thoughts that hope the IMF 
would enhance China’s economic strength and influence, such as China needs the IMF to 
maintain international financial stability; participating in the IMF shows China’s 
capability in governing international economic affairs; the IMF plays an important role in 
securing China’s financial assistance to the crisis-hit countries (for example some EU 
countries during the Eurozone crisis); participating in the IMF is one of China’s means to 
access international cooperation. However those who are less optimistic argue that the 
IMF needs China more than China needs the IMF because of the increasing capital flows 
from China to the IMF, rather than the other way around. (Yu 2006; Gao 2011; Interview 
with a Chinese official in Beijing4)  
 
Considering the controversial evidences of China-IMF interactions, despite the rhetoric 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The interview was conducted in Beijing. The interviewee (Interviewee 1) is a government official who 
works closely with the IMF in a Chinese Financial Institution.  
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about a robust China-IMF partnership, what is the actual relationship between the two? If 
the rhetoric does reveal the true nature of the China-IMF relationship, why did the Fund 
not confer to China real leadership in Fund governance? If the rhetoric is true, how has 
China achieved such a prominent influence in a western-led Bretton Woods institution 
within 30 years? If not, how do we explain the increasing interactions between the two in 
the past three decades including IMF technical assistance, IMF surveillance and policy 
advice, multilateral consultations, China’s participation in various IMF programs such as 
the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) and the General Data Dissemination 
System (GDDS), increasing Chinese contribution to IMF financial resources, and so on? 
What are the consequences of these activities? What does China’s pragmatic government 
aim for via interactions with the IMF?  
 
In order to solve these puzzles, I intend to analyze comprehensively the relationship 
between the IMF and China since China regained its IMF membership in April 1980. 
This is also the main task of this thesis.  
 
1    Research Objective  
1.1    Research Scope 	  
This thesis analyzes the relationship between China and the IMF since 1980, when 
People’s Republic of China regained its IMF membership. It also explores the driving 
force behind the advancement, and/or decline, of the China-IMF relationship. Although 
more attention has been given to China-IMF related policy decisions in the recent years 
 17 
(as introduced above), the acceleration in activity over the previous decades requires 
academic analysis. A systemic analysis of the relationship between China and the IMF 
enables us to obtain a thorough understanding of related policy decisions and 
consequences. It includes examinations of China’s and the IMF’s objectives, functions, 
structures, institutional rules, and practices that lead to specific interactions that define 
the relationship between the two. In addition, the contexts of the interactions, in this case 
the international and regional economic development trends and short-term events such 
as financial crises, also require appropriate assessment as they largely determine the 
actors’ intentions and actions.  
 
When China joined the IMF, it did not have much knowledge about how the IMF and the 
international financial economy were functioning. This was due to Communist China’s 
decades of isolation from the mainstream international society up till the reformist 
leadership decided to open the borders and embrace the concept of economic 
interdependence in the late 1970s (yet in a cautious and incremental style). Since then, 
China has participated in a growing number of IMF activities, the details of which are 
analyzed in the thesis. Through participating in these activities, Chinese officials have 
accumulated experience and expertise in handling Fund-related international economic 
affairs. More importantly, the Chinese government has further specified its objectives in 
the governance of international financial economy via its participation in the IMF. For 
instance, one essential objective was introduced above: becoming a larger shareholder of 
a reformed international monetary system. The Chinese leadership has had growing 
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objectives since it joined the IMF in 1980, which will surely be analyzed with details 
later in the thesis.  
 
1.2   Research Design 	  
Through the analysis of the China-IMF relationship, the thesis intends to illustrate how 
China attempts to achieve its objectives via participating in IMF programs and the 
consequences of participation. Since China was previously unfamiliar with the rules and 
practices of the international financial economy, while the IMF was an influential 
international organization with well-established rules and firm institutional norms, the 
analysis naturally starts from exploration of the IMF’s impacts (especially those in the 
earlier stage of China’s IMF membership) on China’s domestic economy.  
 
The thesis adopts the essence of socialization theory to analyze China’s relationship with 
the IMF in the early stage since it joined the IMF. It borrows Alastair Johnston’s 
socialization framework to analyze the IMF’s impacts on China’s domestic economy. 
Johnston’s three microprocesses of socialization-mimicking, social influence, and 
persuasion- are used to explain how the IMF socialized China into accepting neo-liberal 
international economic norms. (Johnston 2008) By using the microprocess approach, we 
can specify how the IMF exerted influence in China’s domestic economic policy-making 
via interactive mechanisms such as IMF financial and technical assistance and 
surveillance and policy advice. It also specifies the extent to which the Chinese 
authorities change their interests and norms under such influences. The IMF’s impacts on 
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China’s economic norms contributed to its economic liberalization progress, as well as 
helped China further its goal in economic development.  
 
However, the limitations of socialization theory prevent the analysis from revealing a full 
picture of the China-IMF relationship, especially that in the late stage and recent years. 
For instance, socialization theory undermines the importance of states’ intentions (states 
are not simple norm takers) and their impacts on the international organizations they 
participate in; it also overstates the legitimacy of international norms in guiding state 
policies. Hence, a supplementary theory is brought in: principal-agent theory. 
 
Principal-agent theory focuses on delegation: in this case, states delegate authority to 
international organizations so that the latter can perform the delegated tasks to benefit the 
former. (Hawkins et al 2006) In the case of China-IMF relationship, China is regarded as 
a member of the IMF’s ‘collective principal’, and the IMF is China’s international 
organization agent. This theoretical framework reveals the essence of the China-IMF 
relationship: how China could achieve its objectives in the governance of international 
financial economy via participating in the IMF. Based on the basic features of principal-
agent theory, I propose a four-stage approach to analyzing the relationships between 
states and international organizations. The approach is applied to explain the interactions 
between China and the IMF in the three following chapters.  
 
Firstly, I will identify China’s principal objectives and related governmental structure, 
and the IMF’s agent interest and institutional structure. Secondly, I will explore the 
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motivations for China’s delegation to the IMF. They are based on the IMF’s outstanding 
functions that enable the Fund to help China achieve its objectives, for example the 
IMF’s specific expertise and information advance, its agenda setting power and 
multilateral decision-making mechanisms, and its capability to solve the controversial 
issues that cannot be solved by China on its own. Based on the IMF’s functions, I will 
analyze each task China delegates to the IMF, for example technical training, policy 
analysis and advice, multilateral consultation on global imbalances, lending risks 
assessment and contract design, and reforming the international monetary system. Thirdly, 
the factors that have impacts on China’s delegation actions will be examined. They 
include China’s preferences compared to those of the IMF and other members of the 
Fund’s collective principal, China’s share of the IMF’s formal and informal governance, 
and China’s influence among IMF staff. Fourthly, which is also the most important stage 
of the approach, I will assess the consequences of China’s delegation to the IMF. Based 
on the analysis undertaken in the first three stages, I will assess if the delegation 
generates satisfactory consequences that may lead to ‘re-delegation’; or undesired 
consequences, that is agency slack, which may lead to ‘de-delegate’. The causes of 
agency slack will also be examined.  
 
Via this four-stage approach, some key issues in the China-IMF relationship will be 
analyzed. For instance, China’s effort in pushing forward IMF quota and voting share 
reforms and the unsatisfactory results are analyzed as a consequence of the western-
dominant governance rule of the IMF, as well as a cause of undesired delegation 
consequences for China. Another example is the IMF’s policy advice for China being 
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rejected, which is analyzed as a consequence of unsuccessful delegation. By revealing the 
key facts in China-IMF interactions and causal relations among them, principal-agent 
theory enables us to understand why China gets involved in some IMF programs, but not 
others; why some IMF activities generate satisfactory consequences for China, but some 
do not; and why China participates in IMF programs at the same time as it attends other 
regional and international institutions with similar functions. The analysis eventually 
leads to the conclusion on whether or not the IMF plays the role of a good agent in 
assisting China to achieve its objectives in the international financial economy.  
 
It is also worth mentioning that, although principal-agent theory analyzes the China-IMF 
relationship from a different perspective compared to socialization theory, they do not 
fundamentally clash in this research. Principal-agent theory usually recognizes the strong 
influences of international organizations, for example Hawkins and Jacoby argued 
international organizations use ‘agent strategies’ to influence states’ decisions on 
delegation. (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006) Hence in the case of the IMF, its strong 
influences on China’s domestic economy that are emphasized by socialization theory are 
also approved by principal-agent theory. Moreover, socialization theory focuses on the 
normative influence of the IMF, which according to principal-agent theorists is based 
upon the IMF’s ‘organizational culture’ that comprises the staff’s common interests and 
working principle and the Fund’s institutional rules. While socialization theory analyzes 
the process of IMF influencing China’s domestic economy, principal-agent theory takes 
into account the original causes of IMF exerting influences on China- that is China’s 
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objectives in the governance of international financial economy- and examines how the 
IMF assists China to achieve its objectives.   
 
After all, application of an appropriate theoretical approach to analysing the relationship 
between China and the IMF is crucial. It should correctly reflect the Chinese 
government’s intentions including its preferences and objectives, because they 
significantly guide China’s policy decisions in the international sphere. It should also 
include careful scrutiny of the IMF’s institutional features including its governance 
structures and rules, because they largely affect the Fund’s policy orientations. Finally, it 
should enclose the influences of external environment and third party actors. Hence, 
using an appropriate theoretical framework to analyse the China-IMF relationship is 
another research objective of this thesis.  
 
1.3   Research Questions 	  
The thesis has the following major research questions:  
 
1. How does socialization theory explain the IMF’s influences on China’s domestic 
policy?  
 
2. Why did China get engaged with IMF programs? What are China’s objectives in 
the governance of international financial economy?  
 
3. How has the interaction between China and the IMF progressed? 
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4. What is China’s governance role in the IMF? How has it progressed?  
 
5. How does the IMF assist China to achieve its objectives in the governance of 
international financial economy? How does principal-agent theory explain it? 
 
These questions will be answered in the course of this thesis.  
 
2   Literature Review  	  
2.1   Literature on the IMF and China’s participation in the IMF  	  
Literature on the IMF includes a very limited amount of works that directly focus on the 
Fund’s interaction with China, mainly because the PRC did not gain its membership until 
1980 and not grow into an important Fund member until even later. Therefore the broad 
literature on the IMF does not tell much about China’s participation in the Fund, yet it 
provides us with details of the IMF’s structure, functions, norms and evolution along the 
years, which sheds light on what the IMF can do in influencing member states to change 
policy in general. It thus provides a contextual background for China-IMF interaction and 
especially the IMF’s influence in China’s economic policymaking.  A large part of 
literature on the IMF highlights the Fund’s most crucial functions: lending, technical 
assistance and policy advice, among which discussions on lending are usually undertaken 
along assessments of procedure and effectiveness of conditionality. Via conditionality, 
the IMF attempts to generate policy change in borrowing countries, and this illustrates 
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why the significance of IMF lending is beyond short-term problem solving. Some 
scholars focus on the complexities of operational issues in the IMF, they explore various 
IMF programs and the evolving institutional structure of the Fund. Some scholars 
(especially constructivists) focus on the Fund’s norms that embrace the essence of 
neoliberalism, or so called ‘Washington Consensus’, and examine the degree to which 
IMF policies and practices under such norms can effectively solve member countries’ 
balance of payments difficulties and guide them through financial crises. In addition, due 
to several major changes in the international financial architecture since the Bretton 
Woods institutions were established, scholars and policymakers have elaborated the 
IMF’s evolving role in global financial governance. (Woods 2006; Vreeland 2003; Park 
and Vetterlein 2010; Moschella 2010; Gould 2006) Among this rich literature, I want to 
highlight the following works that contribute to the research undertaken for the thesis.   
 
In her book The Globalizer: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers, Woods 
developed a mechanism of how the IMF influences borrower countries’ domestic 
economic policies, highlighting the three forces that determine the Fund’s performance: 
the Fund’s most powerful member countries; the Fund’s fundamental economic ideas, 
fashions, and orthodoxies; and the Fund’s bureaucratic. In this mechanism, powerful 
states set the boundaries; within which professional economists and staff draw up the 
contents based on the economic ideas, fashions and orthodoxies. While the staff coerce or 
persuade borrowing countries to undertake prescribed measures, their work serve the 
interests of power members as well as the institution itself. However, the results of such 
‘coercion’ and ‘persuasion’ depend largely on the ‘configuration of political institutions 
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within borrowing countries.’ (Woods 2006: 82) In particular, successful persuasion is 
achieved upon 1 the Fund’s strong bargaining leverage in enforcing ‘Washington-
prescribed medicine’, 2 sympathetic interlocutors in borrowing countries that share 
economic ideas, technical expertise, and methodology with IMF staff, 3 less democratic 
regimes in borrowing countries where economic decision-making is efficiently controlled 
by a small amount of elites, and 4 supportive interest groups in borrowing countries. 
(Ibid: 65-83) These conditions of successful persuasion shed lights on the IMF’s 
influence in China’s domestic economic policymaking.  
 
Woods argued that the IMF’s work is affected by the preferences of their most powerful 
members (mostly the US), their own bureaucratic motives, and by politics within member 
countries. (Ibid: 179) Thus the coordination among these three factors are extremely 
important. After analyzing three case studies of IMF missions in Mexico, Russia and 
Africa, she pointed out that the IMF focuses too much on politics and interests of the 
creditor governments and the Fund itself; on the other hand borrowing countries’ needs 
are often neglected. This explains why the IMF has lost its legitimacy, especially among 
its developing country members. Woods advocated for radical reforms for the IMF to 
‘redirect its research and policy so as to play an advisory ad standard-setting role in a way 
that would better advantage its borrowers’. (Ibid: 185, 188) Woods’ suggestion is 
compatible with China’s constant advocacy for IMF governance reforms that will be 
discussed in details in the later chapters.   
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Vreeland’s book The IMF and Economic Development also focused on the IMF’s 
function and its influence in borrowing countries.  In particular it discussed if the IMF 
should play the role of promoting economic growth in borrowing countries, which was 
not Fund’s initial goal when it was originally established but became one when the Fund 
switched its policy focus from regulating currency to managing balance of payments 
difficulties (mostly in developing countries). (Vreeland 2003: 9) In order to solve this 
puzzle, Vreeland assessed the effectiveness of IMF programs, by defining the 
determinants of IMF program participation and examining consequences of such 
programs for economic growth.  
 
As mentioned above, IMF loans to countries with balance of payments difficulties are 
often attached with conditionality that entails fiscal austerity, tight monetary policy, and 
devaluation. (Taylor 1993) Borrowing countries that are required to live up to the 
conditionality are considered as sacrificing economic sovereignty, and thus they are 
usually reluctant to do so. Why would they still do it? He used the data that cover 135 
countries from 1951 to 1990 to assess the IMF’s impact on member countries’ economic 
growth. Eventually he found out that governments engaged in IMF programs not just for 
economic reasons but also for political reasons, and that these programs hurt economic 
growth and exacerbate income inequality.  It is because IMF policies ‘dampen the effects 
of bad economic performance by redistributing income upward and thus rewarding 
elites… IMF programs hurt doubly the least well-off in society…’ (Vreeland: 152) 
Governments of borrowing countries sometimes enter the programs and agree to accept 
conditionality because they can blame the IMF for such unpopular policies. (Vreeland 
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2003: 13-15, 152) Vreeland’s finding further proved that borrowing countries’ political 
objectives and preferences significantly determine the result of their participation in IMF 
programs. Although China has not been a borrower, it has been influenced by IMF 
policies through different channels other than financial assistance- such as technical 
assistance and policy advice- hence Vreeland’s finding indicates that we should take into 
account of Chinese government’s political objectives and preferences while examining 
the IMF’s influence in China’s economic policymaking.  
 
Another prominent work in the literature is Moschella’s book Governing Risk: The IMF 
and Global Financial Crises, in which the author explained how ideas drove 
policymaking in the IMF, and specifically how different ideas around major financial 
crisis periods generated policies that advocated different levels of financial liberalization. 
Similar to Woods, Moschella also pointed out that IMF policies are shaped by various 
actors, such as state representatives, economist and private actors (Moschella 2010: 26), 
yet the difference was that she accentuated the significance of ‘ideas’ as the core driving 
force of Fund policies. She developed an agent-centered constructivist framework, named 
‘evolutionary theoretical framework’, to describe the complex procedure of 
transformation of ideas into policies in the Fund. Ideas of outside (influential member 
countries and sponsors) and inside (staff) are both important; these ideas are not static but 
constantly ‘contested and contingent’ according to Katzenstein (1996: 3) and 
continuously challenged by the changing environments. The ideas need to eventually 
reach ‘legitimacy’ among involved actors to form effective policies. Hence Moschella’s 
work explored the complex inner workings of the IMF and especially how staff’s ideas 
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‘walk their way’ into the Executive Board; most importantly, it highlighted the 
significance of ‘ideas’ and ‘legitimacy’ in IMF policymaking. (Moschella 2010: 1-34)  
 
Park and Vetterlein’s edited book Owning Development: The Creation of Policy Norms 
at the IMF and World Bank further emphasized normative factors in IMF policymaking. 
The authors of this book traced evolution of different norms in the IMF’s policy areas, 
and examined the degree to what these norms shaped the Fund’s policymaking. (Park and 
Vetterlein 2010) The authors also identified three stages of policy norm change: emerge, 
stabilize, and wane, in order to reveal a dynamic development of norm circle; as well as 
three measures of policy norms’ strength: formal validity, social recognition, and cultural 
validity, in order to acquire a more nuanced understanding of policy norms’ varying 
influences. (Ibid: 6) The authors agreed that the IMF (and the World Bank), rather than 
the borrower countries,  ‘owns’ the norms and policy; and that these norms and 
consequential policies are based on the core neo-liberal economic model, or ‘Washington 
Consensus’. (Ibid: 9) This norm-based constructivist view of IMF programs supports the 
core of ‘socialization’ approach to analyzing relations between the Fund and its member 
countries that will be discussed in the later chapters.  
 
These works have looked into several key issue areas of the IMF. Although they did not 
specifically focus on the interactions between the IMF and China, they identified various 
key actors in IMF programs, discussed the complex policymaking procedures within the 
Fund, assessed the IMF’s impacts on borrowing countries’ domestic economy, examined 
the importance of neo-liberal ‘ideas’ and ‘norms’ in IMF policies, updated theoretical 
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frameworks for analyzing various IMF activities, and therefore formed a contextual 
background for the research undertaken is this thesis.  Most of the works in the literature 
recognized the essential dominant role played by the Fund’s western advanced country 
members, and they discussed the relations between these countries and the Fund. A large 
part also examined the implementation of IMF policies in borrowing countries, yet they 
did not dig deep to look into the political and social environments of the borrowing 
countries. China is neither a traditional dominant power of the IMF nor a big borrower; 
hence it is not difficult to understand why the literature on China-IMF relationship is thin. 
However, due to China’s rapid growth in the international financial economy, and its 
increasing participation in international financial governance (some examples were 
already mentioned in the beginning of this introductory chapter), the literature needs to be 
enriched to include an enhanced systemic analysis of China-IMF relationship, and it is 
also one important purpose of the research undertaken for this thesis.  
 
Although the existing literature on China-IMF relationship is thin, one significant 
contribution needs to be highlighted- Jacobson and Oksenberg’s book China’s 
Participation in the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT in 1990. It came out as a pioneering 
research of China’s participation in international economic organizations in the 1980s. It 
was also one of the first research works that looked into China’s interactions with 
international organizations. The book revealed the stories of how the IMF and China 
initially got connected, and how initial connections developed into a formal negotiation 
over China’s re-entry into the IMF. It also analyzed the crucial international political and 
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economic environment in the 1970s that affected both the Chinese government’s and the 
IMF’s decisions to engage with each other.  
 
The research investigated China’s early participation in IMF programs and the 
consequential impacts on China’s officials, government departments, and macroeconomic 
policies.  The authors pointed out that IMF (and World Bank) staff’s policy 
recommendation and advice proved to be influential, yet not the only, source of the 
Chinese government’s policy reforms toward a market-driven economic system. The IMF 
and the World Bank had also affected China’s economic policy processes, and led to 
greater cooperation between the IMF’s functioning departments and China’s financial 
sector. (Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990: 139-150)  
 
Jacobson and Oksenberg’s research had significant impacts on the later works on China- 
international organizations relations. Like Jacobson and Oksenberg, later scholars 
focused on the impacts of international organizations on China’s domestic policy 
domains. Although Jacobson and Oksenberg also mentioned about some adjustments in 
international economic organizations due to China’s participation, they were less 
remarkable compared to international economic organizations’ impacts on China’s 
domestic regime. It was because China was still an inexperienced member with few skills 
in handling international affairs and little influence in the international political system in 
the 1980s. It explains why this research starts the analysis of China-IMF relationship by 
examining the Fund’s impacts on China’s domestic policymaking, using a socialization 
theoretical framework. Alastair Johnston highlighted the impact of Jacobson and 
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Oksenberg’s research in his own work on international security organizations’ 
socialization of China into accepting their norms. He said ‘…their [Jacobson and 
Oksenberg’s] book anticipated some of the concepts of interests to constructivists’, 
especially ‘they described processes of change in Chinese diplomacy that are variants of 
mimicking, persuasion, and social influence’. (Johnston 2008: xxiii)  
 
However, the comprehensiveness and depth of Jacobson and Oksenberg’s analysis was 
limited, as the research was undertaken before 1990. Since then, the relationship between 
China and the IMF has evolved drastically, which requires more updated academic 
attention. 
 
Some later works have also emphasized the IMF’s impacts on China’s domestic 
policymaking. Pearson interpreted the interactions between China and the IMF as ‘the 
IMF engaging China’. She argued the changes in China’s macroeconomic policies were 
consistent with IMF guidelines, which prove successful ‘engagement’. She argued the 
Chinese economic leadership had accepted the neo-liberal international economic norms 
because: these norms had been applied to the domestic economy; China carried out 
enormous numbers of economic transactions on the global markets; and China had not 
tried to disrupt the norms of the major international economic organizations they 
participated in. (Pearson 1999a: 222-223) Feeney (1998) discussed the IMF’s 
contribution to China’s economic reforms via various channels; especially its influence in 
China’s foreign exchange regime. He argued the IMF membership had ‘greatly aided 
China in achieving and managing its new status as a major trading nation and an 
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emerging superpower in the global economy…’ (Feeney 1998: 245) Lardy also 
emphasized the IMF’s role in advising China on its exchange rate policy. He specifically 
pointed out that many of the most important Chinese decisions on exchange rate policy 
had been announced within a few weeks after IMF Article IV Consultations. (Lardy 
1999) 
 
Kent emphasized the changes in China’s domestic political sphere due to (or partly due 
to) interactions with the IMF, for example, various institutional and legislative 
implementations such as the measures adopted by the People’s Bank of China (PBC) to 
increase the flexibility and credibility of its monetary policy, and implementation of the 
Commercial Bank Law, the Law of the PRC on the PBC, the Guarantee Law of the PRC, 
the Insurance Law of the PRC, and the Price Law etc. (Kent 2007: 134-135) In addition, 
she also pointed out an issue that was not included in the previous works but has caught 
increasing attention recently, that is China’s underrepresentation and lack of decision 
making power in the IMF.  
 
Some of these researches were undertaken in the 1990s, and thus excluded the recently 
developed China-IMF interactions. In addition, since most of these analyses of China-
IMF relationship were a mere fragmentation of the general discussion of China’s 
relationship with international economic institutions, they often neglected specific 
interactions between China and the IMF. For example, none of these works revealed the 
dynamic changes of China’s decision-making power in the IMF. They did not look into 
the Chinese government’s preferences regarding IMF activities. Neither did they explain 
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how IMF Article IV Consultation works for China and why the Chinese authorities 
agreed to submit information to the program. These factors that had been overlooked 
significantly determined the relationship between China and the IMF. Therefore, again, 
the thesis aims to provide a more comprehensive investigation of the interactions between 
China and the IMF to fill in the gap in the literature.  
 
2.2   Literature on Relationships Between China and International Institutions 	  
The literature on relationships between China and international institutions refers to a 
wide range of international organizations. However, since China did not become an 
active member of international organizations until recent years, the literature of China’s 
participation in international institutions is relatively thin compared to those of other 
countries’ experience in international institutions.5 Existing literature includes analyses of 
China’s participation in environmental institutions such as the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biodiversity, the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP)/Global Environment Facility (GEF), a few standards 
under the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and so on. (Economy and 
Oksenberg 2000; Kent 2007; Economy 1998; Ross 1999)  Anne Kent conducted some 
researches on China’s approach to international human rights regimes, among which she 
specifically investigated China’s relationships with the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) and the UN Committee against Torture. (Kent 1999, 2002, 2007)  There is also a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Since China has a rather unique role in the international political society that is different from both 
western developed and other developing states, I do not compare China’s relationships with international 
institutions with other countries’ experiences in the thesis.  
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small number of works on China’s participation in the international security regime, 
including the Conference on Disarmament, the ARF, the Council on Security 
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, and so on. (Johnston 1998, 2008; Kent 2002; Johnston 
and Evans 1999, Swaine and Johnston 1999) The literature also includes research works 
on China’s participation in international economic organizations such as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO), the World 
Bank and the IMF. (Pearson 1999a, 1999b; Lardy 1999; Feeney 1998; Hempson-Jones 
2005; Chou 2006; Kent 2007; Magariños, Long and Sercovich 2002) Among all the 
works on China’s participation in international economic organizations, a large amount of 
them focus on the interactions between China and the WTO, because compared to 
China’s interactions with the IMF and the World Bank, the negotiation for WTO 
membership was the most complex and long-lasting, and China has been more involved 
in the international trade rather than financial system. However, it does not mean the 
relationships between China and the other two institutions are less important, and in fact 
they have become increasingly important in the post-crisis era. 
 
China is more engaged with some international organizations than others, for example 
China’s compliance with international economic institutions tends to be easier than with 
international security institutions due to China’s rigid stance on sovereignty and security 
issues. Among international economic institutions, the negotiation for WTO membership 
was the most complex and the longest, as China was required to carry out enormous 
numbers of reforms in the domestic economic system in order to meet the conditions for 
entry. Although the works mentioned above showed significantly different forms, causes, 
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and impacts of China’s participation in different international organizations, most of them 
evaluated the costs and benefits for China to participate and examined (or attempted to 
examine) the consequences of China’s participation in international organizations. The 
thesis is affected by such an analytical approach that focuses on the motivation as well as 
actual consequences of participating in international institutions. Therefore, the 
objectives of China’s participation in IMF programs, the effectiveness of the interactions 
between China and the IMF, and the consequences of such interactions are assessed in 
the thesis.    
 
Within Chinese academia, the study of international institutions became popular in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, under the influence on Western (mostly neo-classical) 
economic theories. (Su 2006; Pang and Wang 2013) Among China’s early IR and 
International Studies scholars, Ni Shixiong was the first one that introduced the concept 
of ‘international regime’ to China in 1992 (Ni 1992), and Wang Yizhou was the first one 
that brought forward the concept of ‘global governance’, in 1995. (Wang 1995)  Pang and 
Wang pointed out that Chinese scholars had hold different opinions about the role of 
international institutions. (Pang and Wang 2013) Liberals recognize international 
institutions’ role in promoting international cooperation, for example they acknowledged 
the UN’s role in maintaining peace and promoting development (Zhang 1995; Fang 
1995), and Asian regional organizations’ role in promoting regionalism and multipolarity. 
(Gao and Lu 1994; Liu 2004) On the other hand, realists argue international institutions 
are controlled and manipulated by the most power nations, usually the US and its western 
allies, to fulfill these nations’ interests. (Jian and Ding 2002; Men 2001) In addition, Pang 
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and Wang pointed out that a small number of Chinese have adopted critical perspectives 
on international institutions, for example Li used neo-Gramscian approach and argued 
that international institutions are part of the global economic class structure, and they 
fulfill the interests of the center of the global economy at the expense of the periphery. 
(Pang and Wang 2013; Li 2010) Chinese scholars also question the legitimacy of 
international institutions, criticizing that in institutions like the IMF and World Bank, 
emerging market economy and developing countries are severely underrepresented. (Jian 
and Ding 2002) The imbalanced power distribution within the IMF has threatened its 
policy effectiveness in emerging market economy and developing countries; therefore a 
governance reform has been advocated by not only Chinese but also Western IPE 
scholars. This issue will be addressed with details in later chapters.  
 
In particular, Chinese IPE scholars have paid increasing attention to China’s role in the 
global financial system, especially since the global financial crisis. Wang and Chin 
suggested the global financial crisis drove Chinese IPE scholars to focus on four themes:  
 
‘(1) The shortcomings of the existing international monetary system and currency 
internationalization; (2) the source of global financial instability; (3) variations in the 
impact of the global financial and monetary systems on different countries; and (4) the 
rise of new forums for economic decision-making and international governance, such as 
the G20, the Financial Stability Board and the BRICS grouping’. (Wang and Chin 2013: 
1258-9)  
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Triggered by PBC governor Zhou Xiaochuan’s advocacy in 2009 for enlarging the use of 
SDR as the world’s super-sovereign currency and strengthening the IMF’s surveillance of 
major reserve issuing countries, Chinese scholars promoted the idea of diversifying the 
international monetary system and internationalizing RMB. (Zhou 2009; Zhang 2009; 
Wang 2009a, 2009b; Qiao and Xu 2011) However, while acknowledging the potential of 
RMB in the international monetary system, several Chinese IPR scholars also stressed the 
risks of RMB internationalization and warned that China was not ready for a completely 
liberalized currency. (Gao and Yu 2010) In general Chinese scholars’ views of China’s 
participation in the international financial system are rather Sino-centric, self-protective 
and cautious, which is understandable considering China is relatively inexperienced in 
the system. (Wang and Chin 2013: 1262) Meanwhile Chinese IPE scholars have stated 
that China should further engage in the international financial system and play an active 
role in rebuilding a system that is diversified from US dominance and more tolerant to 
China’s domestic-focused incremental financial reform policies. (Li 2009; Zhang 2010)  
 
2.3   Literature on socialization theory 	  
Socialization is a central concept in social constructivism. There is a considerable amount 
of research works on socialization in sociology, such as Peter Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann’s Sociology and Sheldon Stryker and Ann Statham’s ‘Symbolic Interaction 
and Role Theory’ in the Handbook of Social Psychology (Berger and Luckmann 1966; 
Stryker and Statham 1985). International Relations (IR) scholars also adopted the concept 
of ‘socialization’ to explain the internalization of international norms and values 
(Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990).  
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IR scholars used socialization approach to assess if international organizations socialize 
states into accepting their norms. One prominent sign of successful socialization is that 
states have fundamentally changed their principles and believes toward the international 
organizations’ preferences and eventually internalize the international organizations’ 
norms in the states’ own regime and making policies accordingly. Yet it is sometimes 
difficult to judge if states have accepted international organizations’ normative values 
and changed their identities and believes accordingly, or just changed their behaviour 
temporarily due to short-term pressure from the international community. In the literature 
of China’s relationship with international regimes, socialization scholars usually focus on 
how China can be socialized (or not) to be a responsible status quo actor in global 
governance arenas; whether China will play by the existing international rules, want to 
modify them, or seek to radically change them and establish new institutions, rules and 
norms.  
 
In an ADB working paper, Archaya explored socialization effects of Asian regional 
institutions, taking China, Vietnam and India’s experiences as case studies. He 
emphasized that socialization refers to peaceful and non-coercive norm transmission and 
leads to long-term and stable changes in behavior rather than short-term adaptation. 
(Archaya 2011: 9) He also brought forward five institutional conditions for successful 
socialization. On China’s case, Archaya argued that ASEAN has socialized China into 
accepting multilateral approaches to regional security issues, which is evident in China’s 
participation in multilateral talks with ASEAN on the South China Sea disputes leading 
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to a Declaration on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. He also argued that 
China’s normative and behavioural shifts are irreversible. (Ibid: 12-13)  
 
Ba’s paper ‘Who’s Socializing Whom?’ assessed the conditions of successful 
engagement between the ASEAN and China, by which ASEAN could socialize China 
into accepting its norms. In the paper, Ba pointed out that ASEAN successfully 
persuaded China to adopt more cooperative and multilateral approach towards 
neighbouring countries and grow positive expectations and ideas about its ASEAN 
relations. (Ba 2006: 170) She argued the successful socialization is mostly due to 
ASEAN’s ‘complex engagement’ strategy, referring to ‘a social, interactive process 
aimed at transforming how actors conceive themselves in relation to others’. Via 
‘complex engagement’, ASEAN and China sought to generate ‘non-coercive and open 
exchanges at multiple levels and over multiple issue areas’, ‘strategic pursuit of 
cooperative relations based on common understanding’, and opportunities to find ‘new 
areas of agreement’. (Ibid: 160- 161) Ba also pointed out that socialization between 
ASEAN and China was a ‘two-way’ process- while ASEAN socializes China to regional 
norms, China also sought to influence the way ASEAN views and handles regional 
matters. Therefore, its open and inclusive style of engagement enabled ASEAN to 
persuade China to reconsider its views towards regional multilateralism and ASEAN. 
(Ibid: 168-9) 
 
However, some other socialization scholars are less optimistic about the effectiveness of 
international organizations’ socialization of China. Han denied China’s engagement in 
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globalization is a result of socialization, as globalization has not caused a fundamental 
change in Chinese worldview; moreover, ‘China negated the learning to internalize the 
principles of multilateralism and precluded the process of socialization from reaching to 
the substantial level’. (Han 2007: 51) Instead, China’s increasingly engaged in global 
economy in order to deepen and widen economic interdependence with the outside world, 
and eventually to promote its own national competitiveness and to ‘buttress the 
legitimacy and leadership of the Chinese Communist Party’.  (Ibid: 53)  Han argued three 
factors determined globalization could not effectively socialize China into accepting the 
norms of the current international regime: 1 Chinese leaders restrains the impact of 
globalization within the field of economy; 2 China’s globalization is driven by internal 
political objectives rather than external pressure; 3 Chinese people, including scholars 
and policymakers, maintain realpolitik Weltanschauung. (Ibid: 51-57)  
 
Lynch’s book Rising China and Asian Democratization discussed how and to what extent 
has the global rational-liberal culture socialized China, Thailand and Taiwan. Lynch 
criticized world-polity theorists’ view that global culture will reconstitute all states as 
liberal-rational entities, and argued that China ‘while open to some forms of socialization, 
rigorously macromanages the process to prevent reconstitution at the level of collective 
identity.’ (Lynch 2006: 13) Being socialized into liberal-rational global culture means 
China will have to be de-centered from the world political system, which is not accepted 
by the Chinese Communist Party and other elites. Therefore, the Communist Party 
‘makes selective use of such global culture values as rationalism and science to pursue a 
different kind of re-centering based on massively increasing Chinese comprehensive 
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national power.’ (Ibid: 17) Instead of being socialized into global culture, Chinese leaders 
seek to establish an alternative global center based on principles antithetical to American-
defined ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’; and remain committed to ‘world plurality’, 
‘rejecting liberal solidarism as a cloak for US hegemony.’  (Ibid: 18)  
 
Johnston’s Social States: China in International Institutions: 1980-2000 explains how 
international security organizations such as the UN’s Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and associated regional multilateral security 
dialogues, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the anti-personnel landmine 
regimes ‘socialized’ China into accepting their norms. (Johnston 2008) Most importantly, 
he introduced three ‘microprocesses’ of socialization- mimicking, social influence, and 
persuasion- that provided a good approach to analyzing how international organizations 
and states practice socialization. (Johnston 2008) Compared to the other works in the 
literature that focus on the conditions of socialization, Johnston’s work offered a 
distinctly useful mechanism by which one can analyze the actual processes of 
socialization and its consequences in the China’s domestic regime. Therefore, in this 
thesis, I will borrow Johnston’s ‘microprocesses’ of socialization to analyze the China’s 
participation in the IMF and the IMF’s impacts on China’s domestic economic 
policymaking in the early stage. Johnston’s concept of socialization is reviewed with 
more details in the first half of Chapter 2. The second half of the chapter discusses the 
limitation of socialization approach, especially when it is applied to analyze the 
interactions between China and the IMF.  
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On the other hand, Chinese IR and IPE scholars have mostly adopted Marxist and liberal 
approaches in their studies of international affairs; and the development of constructivism 
has merely started around a decade ago in China. (Wang and Blyth 2013) Chinese 
scholars have different views on the debate of whether or not China has been socialized 
into the international rules and norms of the existing world order. Just to give a few 
examples, Qin argued China has been socialized into and willingly complied with 
international rules and norms through increasing interaction with other states. (Qin 2003) 
Similarly, Meng argued that via frequent interaction with the international community, 
China has increasingly recognized the importance of having a positive image within 
international institutions (in order to further its national interests) and acquired more 
positive perception of international institutions. (Meng 2005) Wang stressed Chinese 
socialization into Western neo-classical economic theories, especially via international 
economic organizations like the WTO, has largely shaped (or liberalized) its foreign trade 
policy. (Wang 2011)  However, these works did not indicate how ‘socialization’ worked 
and most importantly how China modified its identity and interests and accept 
international norms.   
 
2.4   Literature on Principal-Agent Theory  	  
Principal-agent theory was derived from agency theory in the field of microeconomics. 
(Spence and Zeckerhauser 1971; Holmstrom 1979; Shavell 1979) It further developed in 
the studies of American and comparative politics. (Shepsle 1979, 1986, 1989; Weingast 
and Moran 1983; Weingast 1984; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Miller 2005; Downs 
and Rocke 1994) When it is applied in the studies of international organizations, the basic 
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framework of the theory refers to member states (as the principal) hiring an international 
organization (as the agent) to perform some functions that will benefit the members. 
(Nielson and Tierney 2003; Hawkins et. al 2006)  
 
In this thesis, principal-agent theory is applied as the primary theoretical framework to 
analyze the interactions between China and the IMF in the later and recent years. The 
review of the literature on principal-agent theory is combined with the discussion of 
crucial definitions, concepts and causal relations in principal-agent theory in the first half 
of Chapter 4; hence I will not expand the details of the literature here. The discussion will 
focuses on the concept of delegation, reasons for delegation, and features of the main 
actors in the framework: principal, agent and third party actors. It also includes the 
concepts of a few important terms in the principal-agent framework, such as agent 
autonomy, agency slack, principal control, and so on. The discussion aims to help 
develop a systemic analytical tool to assess the interactions between China and the IMF 
in the principal-agent theoretical framework. 
 
In addition, I should stress here that the theoretical framework adopted in this thesis is a 
combination of socialization and principal-agent theory. Socialization explains China’s 
relationship with the IMF in the early stage, where the IMF sought to convince the 
Chinese officials to liberalize its economic policies and policymaking processes. 
However, due to both China’s domestic political obstacle and the Fund’s inadequate 
surveillance, socialization is proved to have taken place moderately in the early stage via 
technical assistance and policy advice.  Later, as China became a strong economic power 
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and an increasingly proactive member of the Fund, it not only showed dissatisfaction 
with the IMF’s neo-liberal policy advice that ignored China’s domestic economic factors 
but also gradually developed its own economic developmental strategy as well as 
objectives in the global financial system. Therefore, instead of being socialized into 
accepting the IMF’s existing norms, China became more prone to utilizing interactions 
with the IMF to achieve its own objectives. Hence the relationship between China and the 
IMF is not only about the IMF’s influences in China’s domestic economy but also the 
other way around- that is China’s influences in Fund organization and programs.  
 
Chin interpreted this kind of reciprocate influences as ‘two-way socialization’ (Chin 
2013), in particular, he used the case study of China successfully persuaded the Bank to 
agree to new procedures that recognize China as co-donor as opposed to its established 
rule of having bilateral donors accustomed to following the lead of the Bank. In addition, 
Chin pointed out that from the Memorandum6 (MOU) signed between China’s Eximbank 
and the World Bank, we could see the compromise between the two banks on their 
distinct lending principles. The Eximbank aims to establish economic profit- based 
strategic partnership with loan receiver countries, while the World Bank usually attaches 
more political conditions to its loans. However, the compromises made by the both banks 
show that China has been ‘reshaping the norms, rules and principles of the international 
institutions, and perhaps, gradually, reshaping the system more broadly.’ (Ibid: 215) Ba 
also argued that ASEAN’s socialization of China is a two-way process: while ASEAN 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation between the Export-Import Bank of China and 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	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persuades China to accept its norms, China also influences the way ASEAN deals with 
regional matters. (Ba 2006) 
 
In the case of China-IMF relationship, I am rather skeptical about China’s intention as 
well as capacity in ‘socializing’ the IMF into accepting China’s values and norms, 
because there is no evidence showing that China has changed the Fund’s deeply 
embedded neo-liberal norms and way the Fund implements its norms. However, I do 
recognize China’s unique objectives in the governance of international financial economy 
and its intention to use the IMF to achieve its objectives in the recent years. Therefore, 
here, principal-agent theory is the most suitable approach to analyzing the China-IMF 
relationship in the later stage, especially in the post-crisis era, when China became a more 
proactive participant of not only the IMF but also the governance of the whole 
international financial economy.  
 
Socialization and principal-agent theory do not necessarily contrast with each other. In 
fact, some scholars have previously argued for the commensurability of rationalist and 
sociological frameworks. For example, Nielson et al. suggested an approach to analyzing 
the effectiveness of institutional reforms, a combination of ‘top-down’ rationalist 
Principal-agent model with the ‘bottom-up’ sociological constructivism. (Nielson et al. 
2006) They argued that institutional reforms are more effective when the information 
asymmetries between the principal (management team) and the agent (staff) are 
minimized, in other words when the principal has better quantity and quality of 
information about agent actions. In this case, the organization reformers can manipulate 
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the incentive structures to redefine staff expectations and thus direct changes in the 
institution. (Ibid: 111- 112) However, this is not a sufficiently condition to successful 
institutional reforms, and the other condition focuses on the sociological aspect of the 
institution, because institutional reform refers to ‘transformation in ideologies, norms and 
appropriate standards of behaviour’. (Ibid; Barnett and Finnemore 2004) Therefore, 
Nielson et al. argued that institutional reforms are more effective when the organization 
reformers propose changes that are adjacent to the prevailing organizational cultural 
(including norms, ideas and values). (Nielson et al. 2006: 112-115) The incentive-based 
and norm-based conditions are both crucial, without either of the two, institutional 
reforms cannot undertake effectively. In addition, Jupille et al. identified the gaps 
between ‘rationalist’ and ‘constructivist’ institutionslisms: ‘the starting point for (many) 
rational institutionalists is self-interested agents engaged in strategic choices; for (many) 
constructivists, it is other-regarding agents engaged in deliberative dynamics’. (Jupille et 
al. 2003: 1) However, they attempted to develop middle-range social scientific 
approaches, in particular, four models of theoretical dialogue between two theories.  
 
3   Research Method  
	  
 
The research is based upon a combination of qualitative methods: document research, 
other secondary data collection, tertiary material reading, and elite interviews.  
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3.1   Document Research 	  
Documentary evidence provides first-hand information about the issuer institutions, and 
thus provides significant research materials in this thesis. As argued by Burnham et. al, 
official documents offer the political researcher ‘a much more reliable starting point than 
biographies, published diaries and memoirs’. (Burnham et. al 2008: 94) The documents 
consulted for the thesis include official publications issued by the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the 
PBC, the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) (of the IMF), and the 
IMF. Among them, the documents from the IMFC and IMF are most frequented 
referenced. As mentioned before, the literature on the China-IMF relationship is rather 
thin, thus the IMF’s China-related documents significantly enriched the empirical 
evidences of the interactions between China and the Fund. IMFC documents include the 
Chinese representatives’ (usually either Governor or Deputy Governor of the PBC) 
statements at both spring and autumn IMFC meetings in the time period from 2000 to 
2011. The statements included the Chinese government’s opinions on IMF operation, 
which directly reflected its perceptions and preferences regarding IMF policy decisions 
and practices.  
 
IMF documents consulted in the research contain various categories, including IMF Staff 
Reports, Press Releases, News Briefs, Speeches of IMF Senior Officials, Reports of 
Resident Representative Office, Staff Paper, IMF data (for example, quota tables), Online 
Reports (made by the external department), IMF Country Reports on financial stability, 
Article IV Consultation Country Reports, Public Information Notices (PIN) for Article IV 
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Consultation, and IMF Diversity Council Reports (made by the Diversity Council). Most 
of the documents are available on the IMF’s official website 
(http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm). Some documents such as the Article IV 
Consultation reports for China are available at the IMF Resident Representative Office in 
the People’s Republic of China in Beijing.  I paid two visits to the Resident 
Representative Office in Beijing in summer and winter 2011, respectively, for interviews 
and reading documents.  
 
3.2   Other Secondary Sources 	  
Other secondary sources include Chinese and international newspapers and periodicals, 
for example, the Xinhua News Agency (Xinhua) the official press agency of the Chinese 
government. Xinhua is subordinate to the State Council and it reports to the Propaganda 
and Public Information Departments of China, hence the news articles published by 
Xinhua are consistent with the government’s opinion. The other important newspaper is 
the People’s Daily; since it is a part of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China, the news articles published by People’s Daily could be regarded as a form of party 
voice. Other Chinese newspapers and periodicals include the Shanghai Daily, Chinese 
Economic Weekly, Diyi caijing ribao (First Finance Daily), Jingrong shi bao (Financial 
Times)7, Caijing (Finance) Magazine, Shijie Zhishi (World Knowledge), and the 21 shiji 
jingji baodao (The 21st Century Economic Reports). The Foreign newspapers and 
periodicals referenced in the thesis include Financial Times, Bloomberg, Wall Street 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 It is not the same as the ‘Financial Times’ issued in the UK.  
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Journal, Lianhe Zaobao8, Reuters China, and Wall Street Journal. The news articles and 
comments consulted are both in Chinese and English languages; the information obtained 
from the articles in Chinese is translated into English when it is referenced.  
 
A large amount of the secondary sources could be accessed on the Internet, the 
convenience of which significantly helped pushing forward the pace of the research. In 
addition, I have also obtained important information from the official websites of the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), the PBC, the State Council Development 
Research Centre, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) (especially its 
Institute of Economics and Politics). The former two are government departments, and 
they usually publish their external annual reports, important data, policy changes and 
other related information on their websites; the later two are research centres and they 
publish selective research results on their websites.  
 
3.3   Tertiary Sources 	  
Tertiary sources include books, academic journal articles, published and unpublished 
conference papers and talks. They contain the literature on socialization theory and 
principal-agent theory in IR and other disciplines including microeconomics, comparative 
politics, and sociology. The also contain research works on international organizations, 
China’s domestic political economy, China’s relationships with international and regional 
institutions, China’s bilateral relationships with other states, and the IMF including its 
history, institutional structures and programs. The consulted works are in English and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Lianhua Zaobao is the largest Singapore-based newspaper in Chinese language.  
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Chinese languages; the information acquired from the works in Chinese language is 
translated to English when it is referenced.  
 
Most of the Chinese scholars whose works are consulted in the thesis are conducting 
research in China’s leading universities, research centres and think tanks. Their 
arguments represent China’s top-level intellectual opinions and expertise on the country’s 
economic policies. Their research products and policy advice have also become an 
increasingly important part of the policymakers’ considerations when they make critical 
policy decisions. Hence, consulting the works written by China’s leading scholars 
significantly contribute to the comprehensiveness and depth of the analysis in the thesis. 
 
3.4   Elite Interview 	  
Semi-structured elite interview were conducted between September 2011 and October 
2012. Elite interview is an effective way to obtain information about decision makers and 
decision-making processes. Elite interview refers to the situation in which the balance of 
knowledge and expertise is usually in favour of the respondents because of their high 
levels of knowledge of the subject matter. (Burnham et al 2008: 231) According to 
Leech, elite interviewing ‘can be used whenever it is appropriate to treat a respondent as 
an expert about the topic in hand’. (Leech 2002: 63)  
 
During this research, twelve separate interviews were conducted in Beijing and 
Washington, D.C. All respondents were promised that their names would be kept 
confidential. The interviewees include one Chinese financial government official, four 
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Chinese scholars of international and domestic political economy, four IMF staff 
members, and one Chinese economy expert and one IMF expert in a US think tank. 
Questions to the interviewees focused on China’s interactions with the IMF, its currency 
policy, and its regional governance role.  The interviews were conducted in Chinese and 
English languages (all were in the interviewee’s working language).  
 
3.5   Importance of using a mixture of research methods 	  
No single research method could sufficiently support a comprehensive and in-depth 
research project. Every single research method has its deficiencies. For instance, 
newspapers reports are time-specific; while they offer a specific view from the past based 
on the then-lifestyles, preoccupations, consumption and worldviews, they may suffer 
adaptability problem with regard to the current issues. (Wilkinson 1994) Since the media 
are never truly neutral, researchers should also consider the political preferences of the 
newspaper owners while consulting their reports. Scott questioned the documentary 
sources in general, especially their authenticity, credibility, representativeness and 
meaning. Regarding the first two issues, the sincerity and accuracy of the author of the 
documents are questioned; hence the researchers need to consider the conditions under 
which the documents were produced. The other two issues refer to the problem that the 
available (and prevailing) documents may not be the most representative ones. (Scott 
1990: 19-24) Hence researchers are encouraged to use a wide range of documents from 
different sources.  
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Elite interview is not problem free either. The interviewees may reveal some inside 
stories or offer some distinguished opinions that may lead to interesting and incisive 
writing; yet they could be highly biased or reserved to express their real opinions at the 
same time, which may lead to incorrect research results (especially when the number of 
interviewees is small). Hence, multiple research methods are applied in this thesis.   
 
4   Contribution of the Thesis  
 
The thesis has three major contributions. 
 
1. It enriches the so far (very) thin literature on the China-IMF relationship. It is 
done by investigations of a wide range of historical events between China and the IMF 
and assessments of current policy issues regarding the two. The empirical research looks 
into the IMF’s assistance programs for China, especially in the technical aspect. A 
distinguished case study applied in the thesis is IMF Statistical Department’s training 
programs for the Chinese officials from a wide range of domestic financial government 
departments. It also looks into IMF Article IV Consultation for China, especially the 
effectiveness of the Consultation vis-à-vis the sensitive and rigid Chinese authorities. The 
empirical research also contains investigation of China’s participation in IMF Multilateral 
Consultation on Global Imbalances and China’s recent contribution to IMF financial 
resources.  Moreover, the research explores the reasons why China expects the IMF to 
reform the US-dominated international monetary system; and the concerns of many 
Chinese policymakers and scholars are taken into account in this part of the research. The 
 53 
Chinese representatives’ statements at IMFC meetings (2001-2011), which reveal the 
Chinese government’s propositions, are also analyzed in the thesis. In addition, the 
efforts China made and the consequences China faces during several rounds of IMF 
quota and voting share reforms are examined in the research; as well as China’s relatively 
weak influences in IMF informal governance (forums and negotiations outside the 
Executive Board (EB)). Finally, the proportion of IMF staff with Chinese nationality, and 
the problem of underrepresentation are examined.  Through empirical research of these 
events, the thesis provides an analysis of the China-IMF relationship that is more 
comprehensive than the previous ones in terms of both time frame and range of issue 
areas. 
    
2. The thesis extends the research subjects of principal-agent theory to include an 
emerging market economy state as the principal. Principal-agent theory has previously 
been used to analyze the relationships between advanced developed countries and 
international organizations. It is because advanced developed countries are usually the 
most powerful members in international organizations, and in many cases they even 
participated in designing and founding these organizations.  However, since the emerging 
market economy states are becoming more influential in the international political society 
with clear goals and policy preferences, they should not be excluded from the ‘principal 
group’. In fact they are usually counted in the collective principals of international 
organizations, although they may not be as influential as those advanced developed state 
members. Regarding emerging market economy states as principals help us better 
understand their objectives and actions in international organizations and related issue 
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areas.  Regarding emerging market economy states as eligible and legitimate principals is 
also consistent with the advocacy of improving their representations in international 
organizations in order to improve the latters’ legitimacy. The analysis conducted in the 
thesis could (hopefully) motivate academic interests in studying emerging market 
economies as principals of international (and regional) organizations. By recognizing the 
emerging market economies’ increasing controlling power in the global governance 
scholars can effectively adjust (or correct) the traditional western-dominated international 
political theories and establish an updated theoretical framework that responds to the 
rising capacity of emerging market economies.  Accordingly, it can enable the scholars to 
provide appropriate advice for the policymakers on global governance issues.  
 
3. Undoubtedly, China is an eligible principal whose principal features and role have 
yet not been analyzed previously. Hence the research framework developed in the thesis 
has a high level of originality. Compared to the US and some western developed states, 
China is a less influential principal, yet its influence in the Fund has already significantly 
grown. China would become a stronger principal, if IMF governance reforms moved 
faster, if the preference differences between China and the IMF got smaller, and if China 
obtained more efficient controlling tools. Therefore principal-agent theory provides a 
dynamic approach to analyzing the relationship between China and the IMF. Similar 
frameworks could be applied to analyze the relationships between China and other 
international (and regional) organizations, which will lead to a new definition of China’s 
role in the international political society that is consistent with its objectives of expanding 
international influences in the global governance.    
 55 
 
5   Thesis Outline  
 
The thesis has eight chapters. The introductory chapter indicates the research context, 
research structure and main questions to be answered in the research, a review of the 
literature, and methods of analysis.  
 
Chapter 2 is the first theory chapter, in which socialization theory is discussed in the 
context of the China-IMF interactions. The first half of Chapter 2 reviews the main 
concepts of socialization theory in international organization studies. It firstly introduces 
two themes in the relationships between states and international organizations that fulfill 
the conditions for the socialization framework. It then illustrates the concepts of 
processes of socialization based on Alastair Johnston’s three microprocesses of 
international organization socialization: mimicking, social influence and persuasion. The 
second part of Chapter 2 discusses the limitation of socialization theory, concluding with 
a proposal of using socialization theory to analyze the relationship between China and the 
IMF since 1980.  
 
Chapter 3 implements the socialization theoretical framework in analyzing the 
relationship between China and the IMF, combined with an extensive investigation of the 
interactions between the two in the selected crucial IMF programs. It firstly assesses the 
historical and institutional contexts of the early engagement between China and the IMF, 
and whether they fulfill the two themes introduced in Chapter 2. Then, it examines 
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whether mimicking, social influence, and persuasion took place in three major 
interactions between China and the IMF: financial assistance, technical assistance, and 
surveillance and policy advice. The limitations of socialization theory are further 
specified in the context of China-IMF interactions, which led to the need for a 
supplementary theoretical framework.  
 
Chapter 4 introduces principal-agent theory in IR studies. It starts from reviewing the 
most crucial concept and causal relations in the theory: delegation and reasons for 
delegation. It also illustrates the features of the main actors in the theory: principal, agent 
and third party actors, including their preferences and institutional structures. Based on 
the basic features of principal-agent theory, an analytical approach is proposed to analyze 
the relationships between states (as principals) and international organizations (as 
agents). Finally being emphasized in the chapter are 6 distinguishing characteristics in the 
China-IMF relationship, illustrating the originality of applying principal-agent theory in 
analyzing the relationship between China and the IMF.  
 
The three following chapters apply principal-agent theory in analyzing the relationship 
between China and the IMF. Chapter 5 explores China’s features as a principal and the 
IMF’s features as China’s international institution agent. Based on the IMF’s outstanding 
functions, the chapter explains why China delegates authority to the IMF. According to 
each reason for delegation, the analysis explores the tasks delegated from China to the 
IMF.  
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Chapter 6 explores three important factors that affect China’s delegation to the IMF: 
China’s principal preferences, which are demonstrated through Chinese representatives’ 
statements at each year’s IMFC meetings; China’s decision-making power in IMF 
governance and activities including both formal and informal governance power; and 
China’s influence through IMF staff. Chapter 7 links together the analyzes of China-IMF 
interactions conducted in Chapter 3, 5 and 6 and examines the consequences of China’s 
delegation of multiple tasks to the IMF, and reveals the reasons for ‘agency slack’. It 
concludes with the IMF’s role in assisting China to achieve its objectives in the 
international financial economy. 
 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and briefly proposes possibilities for further research. 
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Chapter 2 - Theoretical Approach (I): Socialization 
 
 
1   Introduction 
 
Socialization is used in IR to describe one of the most important processes of 
disseminating norms, customs and ideologies in the international political society. It 
refers to the powerful hegemons and established international institutions with 
authoritative influence disseminating their norms, customs and ideologies to the new 
members of the international political society. Via socialization, the hegemons and 
international institutions hope to lead the new members to accept and internalize the 
existing norms, customs and ideologies and become their consistent allies or members. 
(Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990: 289-290) The Socialization approach focuses on the 
normative impacts of international organizations, reflected in the changes in the states’ 
principles and norms rather than superficial modifications in the states’ practices.  
 
In this thesis, I intend to explore the relationship between China and the IMF from the 
period dating back to 1980, when the PRC regained China’s legal IMF membership that 
was previously held by Taiwan. Both China and the IMF went through a significant 
transitional period in the 1970s, marked by the switch of the policy focus from its 
developed to developing country members in the IMF and the leadership transformation 
and a series of political and economic reforms in China. By the time China was 
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negotiating with the IMF about the potential membership in the late 1970s, it was getting 
ready to enter an unfamiliar international economic sphere where the Chinese officials 
were exposed to new tasks and challenges. It is marked by an economic regime that was 
established and developed to promote liberal markets and trade and investment activities 
under minimum administrative controls. It was a regime where the prevailing norms, 
customs and ideologies started to drift away from China’s communist economic 
principles. These conditions put China into a situation where it needed to learn the new 
techniques, practices and ways of thinking to handle international affairs, as well as to 
push forward the domestic reforms in a liberalization style. This learning process is 
explicitly explained by the concept of socialization. Hence, I start to examine the 
relationship between China and the IMF from the very beginning (when China regained 
IMF membership in 1980) by using the socialization approach, aiming to find out how 
the IMF has affected China’s domestic economy via various ‘channels of socialization’. 
As the analysis deepens, it will gradually reveal whether the socialization approach 
performs as a suitable framework in the long run based on which the China-IMF 
relationship could be comprehensively assessed.  
 
Before they are applied to the analysis of the China-IMF relationship, the essential 
concepts and conditions of socialization theory are reviewed and discussed in this chapter 
in order to provide the readers with a clear image of the socialization theoretical 
framework. The following two sections examine two crucial aspects of the socialization 
theoretical framework: conditions in the state-international organization interactions that 
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fulfill the socialization theoretical framework (in Section 2), and the processes of 
international organizations socializing states into accepting their norms (in Section 3).  
 
The conditions comprise the international organization’s institutional and normative 
superiority that enables it to disseminate its norms, and the state’s unfamiliarity with the 
environment of the new international organization that encourages it to learn. They help 
define a research scope where processes of socialization can take place and thus where 
socialization theory can be used to examine the relationships between states and 
international organizations.  
 
Exploration of the actual process of socialization is the most important part of the 
socialization approach. Accurate assessment of socialization processes distinguishes the 
socialization approach from general social constructivist approaches, by bringing in 
significant empirical evidence to prove the interactions between states and international 
organizations. As mentioned in the first chapter, several scholars previously adopted 
socialization theory to analyze the relationship between states (China) and international 
regimes, yet their works mostly focused on the ex ante conditions of socialization and 
causes and/or consequences of successful or unsuccessful socialization, while the actual 
processes of socialization were not accentuated. (Han 2002; Ba 2006; Chin 2012; 
Acharya 2011; Lynch 2006). However, Alastair Johnston introduced three 
‘microprocesses’ of socialization: mimicking, social influence, and persuasion, which in 
order reveal a sequence of international organization socialization. (Johnston 2008) 
Mimicking is the simplest process of socialization, since it requires merely ‘doing what 
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others do’. Social influence refers to the process by which states change their behavior 
because of the pressure of social reward or punishment. Persuasion indicates the process 
by which states are ‘persuaded to’ redefine their norms and values toward those of the 
international organizations’. Johnston analyzed these three microprocesses of the social 
interaction between the Chinese government and a number of international and regional 
security organizations. Obviously China’s interaction with the IMF is distinct from those 
with security organizations, yet the social interaction processes of which are rather 
similar. Therefore, I will borrow Johnston’s ‘microprocesses’ of socialization to analyze 
the interaction between China and the IMF. Each of these microprocesses is examined in 
this chapter; and in the next chapter, they are applied to examine the extent to which 
socialization takes place between the IMF and China.9 
 
However, the socialization approach suffers a number of limitations that weaken its 
capability to explain the interactions between some specific states and international 
organizations. The limitations include difficulties in measuring the consequences of 
socialization, those in separating normative impacts of IOs from the material ones, 
interference from the impacts of domestic institutions and other international institutions 
rather than the targeted ones during research, and the incorrect assumption of states as 
simple norm takers. These limitations may prevent the socialization approach from 
accurately explaining the interactions between China and the IMF in the long run, and 
they will be assessed in the next chapter. In this chapter, we focus on socialization theory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 It also reveals whether or not the socialization approach can accurately and comprehensively analyze the 
relationship between China and the IMF.    
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itself, and how it interprets the relationships between influential international 
organizations and their relatively inexperienced state members.   
 
2   Socialization Approach and Relationships Between States and 
International Organizations  
 
‘Socialization’ is a central concept in social constructivism. Based on the general social 
constructivist analysis of the normative structures of institutions, ‘socialization’ further 
emphasizes the processes by which norms are transmitted to, and internalized by the 
agents10 of the institutions. In the studies of international organizations, ‘socialization’ is 
used to explain the process by which social interactions between the staff and participants 
of the international organizations lead the participants to endorse the organizations’ 
predominated norms. The participants vary among different international organizations; 
and they include individuals, corporations, public sector agencies, state governments, and 
other regional and international institutions. Before the study of ‘socialization’ was 
developed in the International Relations field, it was applied in a broad range of social 
science studies.  
 
In Berger and Luckmann’s 1966 work on Sociology, they defined socialization as ‘the 
comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into the objective world of a 
society or sector of it.’ Based on this definition, they emphasized that socialization is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 ‘Agents’ refer to the actors who participate in the international institutions including state governments 
and other governmental and non-governmental entities. They are different from the ‘agents’ in principal-
agent theory that will be discussed in later chapters, which specifically refer to international organizations.  
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aimed at creating membership in a society where the inter-subjective understandings of 
the society become ‘objective facticity’ that is taken for granted. (Berger and Luckmann 
1966: 44, 129)  In Lindzey and Aronson’s book about Social Psychology (Lindzey and 
Aronson 1985), Stryker and Statham defined socialization as ‘the generic term used to 
refer to the process by which the newcomers- for example, the infant, rookie, and trainee 
- become incorporated into organized patterns of interaction.’ (Stryker and Statham 
1985:325) These works particularly emphasized the characteristics of the ‘newcomers’ 
who were unfamiliar with the existing rules.  
 
Political scientists accepted the basic definition of socialization and further refined it in 
various contexts. Ichilov described political socialization as ‘the universal processes of 
induction into any type of regime.’ (Ichilov 1990:1) Beck and Jennings refer to political 
socialization as a process by which adolescents acquire political orientations from their 
families and from major socio-political forces and events in formative periods (Beck and 
Jennings 1991: 743) IR theorists also adopted the concept of socialization to explain the 
internalization of international norms and values. Ikenberry and Kupchan pointed out 
‘hegemons’ in the international political society, together with their norms and values, 
accelerate proliferation of international norms and emergence of international regimes. 
They defined socialization as the process of ‘learning in which norms and ideas are 
transmitted by one party to another,’ by which states ‘internalize the norms and value 
orientations espoused by the hegemon and, as a consequence, become socialized into the 
community formed by the hegemon and other nations accepting its leadership position.’ 
(Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990: 289-290) Acharya added that socialization should be 
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pacific and non-coercive; and it should lead to long-term and stable changes in behavior 
rather short-term adaptation. (Acharya 2011: 8-9)  
 
2.1   Conditions of Socialization 	  
In the studies of international organizations, socialization explains the relationships 
between international organizations and their participants, especially the newly joined 
members and organizations’ policy targeting members.  Two specific characteristics of 
such relationships enable the application of socialization approach in analyzing 
international organizations.  
 
International Organizations with Prevailing Norms 
 
First of all, international organizations have unique founding principles and goals. These 
principles and goals are initially determined by the founding members of the international 
organization- either a single superpower state (the US in most of the cases) or the 
superpower state together with its allies. In the latter case, the founders usually believe in 
the same norms and values that guide the international organization’s founding principles 
and goals from the beginning; if they initially have dissimilar beliefs, their beliefs 
converge via negotiations at the preliminary stage of the establishment of the 
organization. The evolving principles and goals of the international organization 
contribute to the international norms of the related field. For example, the international 
human rights organizations, such as UN Human Rights Commission and UN Convention 
Against Torture, call for recognition and respect of the inherent dignity, equal rights and 
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fundamental freedom of all humans. The international economic organizations such as 
the IMF, World Bank, and WTO promote international neoliberal economic norms that 
are based on free trade and investment without political interference. Meanwhile, under 
the guidance of these principles and goals, the management team gradually develop their 
working rules, mechanisms, and environments into an ‘organizational culture’, which 
becomes a part of the international norms.  
 
International norms are diffused in the international political society via various channels, 
among which the social interactions between international organizations and their 
participating members are the most direct and effective ones. Intergovernmental 
organizations require their potential member states to agree to accept the organizational 
rules prior to accession and to follow the organizational regulations afterwards. The 
enlarging international membership of the organization further consolidates its 
legitimacy, authority and the prevailing international norms. Pro-norm behaviour is 
usually deeply internalized to the point where it becomes automatic, unquestioned, and 
taken for granted. Anti-norm behaviour may incur severe punishment from the 
international organization, and cost member states a degraded international reputation, 
and in the worst case, isolation and exclusion from international society. Therefore, most 
member states would choose to comply with the regulations of the international 
organizations once joined.  
 
With their influence, international organizations facilitate the creation and diffusion of 
international norms. International organizations socialize states into accepting the 
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international norms via various mechanisms. Robert Keohane hypothesized that 
participation in international organizations leads states to change their interests in terms 
that correspond with treaty norms. (Keohane 1998: 470) According to Finnemore, 
international organizations teach values and construct domestic institutions and 
procedures inside states that reflect existing and emerging international norms and 
practices. States then are expected to adhere to these norms and practices even when 
these seem inconsistent with their material welfare or security interests at the time.11 
(Finnemore 1996) Abram and Antonia Chayes explored the ‘great contributions’ made by 
international organizations to the socialization of participating states.  They argued that 
international organizations and their treaties not only ensure transparency, cut transaction 
costs, build capacity, and enhance dispute settlement, but also persuade states to “explore, 
redefine and sometimes discover” their own, and mutual interests. (Chayes and Chayes 
1995: 1-33)  Ann Kent further extended the role of international organizations to 
subjecting states to a process of interaction and mutual pressure for consensus that helps 
regulate their conduct.  By doing so, international organizations could lead states to 
redefine their actual interests, renegotiate sovereignty and accept costs of participation. 
(Kent 2002: 343) Due to the different functions of international organizations, 
interactions between international organizations and member states take place in various 
forms.  Consequently, international norms are internalized by the states to different 
degrees.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 However, I do not intend to assume that pro-normative behaviour prevail without exogenous incentive 
(or disincentive), especially when the member states have clear intentions and goals.  While emphasizing 
the role of institutional ‘socialization’ in influencing and changing state domestic policy-making, I do not 
exclude the impacts of other domestic and international actors.   
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New State Members 
 
Secondly, international organizations often have new members joining them. The new 
members are usually states that were previously ‘outsiders’ of the relevant international 
system. They maintained political principles and policy practices that were different from 
the ones advocated by the international organizations in the relevant fields. The new 
members were initially unfamiliar with the rules and regulations of the international 
organizations before joining them. In order to maintain the current international order, 
international organizations approach potential member states, aiming to include them into 
the normative ‘inner circle’, or at least the effective policy range.  
 
Although the new members had different political principles and policy practices before 
joining, they are neither completely ignorant nor heavily opposed to the international 
norms advocated by the international organizations. New members are very rarely forced 
to join the international organizations; in fact, they sometimes, although not always, take 
the initiative to approach the international organizations. They usually have done some 
research about the international organizations that they would potentially engage with, 
and developed a considerable amount of knowledge about the organizations’ principles 
and goals. Their decisions to engage with international organizations are based on the 
basic understanding of the international norms; while their own political principles and 
goals must have converged with those of the international organizations to a certain, at 
least minimum level, before joining.  Such convergence is established upon the 
appreciation of both material and non-material benefits of the memberships of 
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international organizations. 12  The level of convergence increases during the initial 
contacts and membership negotiations between states and international organizations, 
which eventually leads to successful joining.  
 
Once the new members have joined, international organizations start to socialize them 
into accepting the international norms via various interactive mechanisms designed by 
the organizations. (Acharya 2011) Mechanisms vary among different international 
organization-state interactions; and the degree to which international norms are 
internalized by the states depends on the effectiveness of the interactive mechanisms and 
the states’ willingness and capability to approve and implement the norms. States may 
fully approve the norms that were previously alien to them and implement them in 
domestic and foreign policy practices; or they may hold doubts about the norms yet still 
implement them in domestic and foreign policy practices13.  In both cases, socialization is 
proved to have taken place successfully. On the other hand, if states refuse to approve 
and implement the international norms in policy practices, socialization has failed. 
However, one circumstance could make the assessment of socialization difficult: when 
the state agrees on the correctness of the international norms yet fails to implement them 
in policy practices. In this case, the state government is often constrained by other, 
usually domestic political concerns that are regarded more important than obeying the 
international norms. Hence even if the state admits the general correctness of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Classic studies of socialization think pro-social norm behaviour under the impact of material incentive 
(dis-incentive) should be strictly separated from that under the impact of socialization. However, in 
practice, it is usually difficult to separate the impacts in this way. (Johnston 2008: 22)   
13 This happens because the states learned that the international norms are approved by the majority of the 
international system; and failing to apply them to policy practices would incur severe punishment from 
international organizations and/or their dominant members.  
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international advice, as long as implementing it violates the interests of powerful 
domestic political actors, the international norms cannot be adopted internally.  
 
3   Processes of Socialization 
  
Several scholars have discussed the processes of socialization in different contexts. Beck 
and Jennings discussed three socialization processes whereby adolescents acquire the 
political orientations of their parents: parents provide social identities that bring with 
them political interests; power and affect relationships establish certain communication 
patterns in the family such that parents influence the political personalities of adolescents; 
or the political features of parents are transmitted through a process of inheritance or 
mimicking (Beck and Jennings 1991: 744). Ikenberry and Kupchan argued that 
socialization between the hegemonic power and secondary states can occur through three 
mechanisms: 1, internal construction, taking place as exogenous influences lead to elite 
transformation in a state; 2, external inducement, taking place as external material 
inducements lead to the internalization of norms that were once adopted for instrumental 
reasons; and 3, normative persuasion, or transnational learning though direct inter-elite 
contact. (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990: 290-292)  
 
Alastair Johnston discussed three processes of socialization to explain why and how 
member states of international organizations change their behaviour in pro-normative or 
pro-social ways: mimicking, social influence, and persuasion. He argued that the speed, 
uniformity, and effectiveness of norm diffusion depend on what kind of institutional 
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social environment leads to what kind of ‘socialization microprocess.’ (Johnston 2008: 
23) He mainly used these three microprocesses to explain how international security 
organizations- such as UN’s Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the ARF and 
associated regional multilateral security dialogues, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
and the anti-personnel landmine regimes- socialized China into accepting their norms. 
These three microprocesses explicitly illustrated the interactions between important 
international security organizations and the Chinese state. They could be further applied 
to explain the socialization process between other international organizations and the 
Chinese state government.   
 
3.1   Mimicking 	  
Johnston defined mimicking as ‘a microprocess whereby a novice initially copies the 
behavioural norms of the group in order to navigate through an uncertain environment.’ 
(Johnston 2008) It is a relatively simple and straightforward process compared to the 
other two. Via mimicking, pro-group behaviour is merely a function of the desire to 
survive in a novel social environment. When a novice enters new social environments, 
especially where the prescriptive norms are unknown or uncertain to the novice, it is 
natural (and safe) to mimic what others do.  By mimicking the novice gradually gets 
locked into procedures, behaviour, norms, and language characteristic of the social 
environment, of which the cost of violation becomes increasingly high. To apply such 
logic in the studies of international organizations, it explains why and how a new member 
state simply mimics what the organization staff and other member states do when it has 
just joined an international organization; and later it is gradually locked into the 
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procedures, models, behavioural norms, and languages of the international organization. 
The lock-in takes place in three ways.  
 
3.2   Social Influence 	  
Social influence is ‘a microprocess whereby a novice’s behaviour is judged by the in-
group and rewarded with back-patting or status markers or punished by opprobrium and 
status devaluation.’ Rewards include psychological well being, a sense of belonging, a 
sense of well-being derived from conformity with role expectation, status and so on. 
Punishments include shaming, shunning, exclusion and demeaning, or dissonance derived 
from actions inconsistent with role and identity. (Johnston 2008: 24-25) To apply the 
concept of ‘social influence’ in the studies of international organizations, it refers to a 
process that embodies positive feedback loops, where approved behaviour leads to back-
patting from other member states of the international organization, which reinforces the 
likelihood of further approved behaviour in the future. (Ferdinand and Wang 2013: 896) 
However, conformity achieved via social influence is not necessarily accompanied by 
private acceptance of the rightness of a particular action: Johnston cites with approval 
Festinger’s phrase about ‘public conformity without private acceptance’. (Johnston 2008: 
25)  Conformity achieved via social influence is motivated by the member state’s 
interests in maximization of status and image (through the accumulation of back-patting 
benefits) in the international organization and the wider international political society. 
Pro-social behaviour motivated by status maximization reflects the member state’s 
egoistic pursuit of social rewards and avoidance of social sanction. (Baston 1987: 35)  
However, it does not mean the member state is ignorant of the value and meaning of the 
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norms being placed on the social status; the understanding of such norms is shared- yet to 
different levels- by both the international organization and the member state.  
 
Different institutional designs of international organizations lead to differences in the 
likelihood and degree of social influence. Johnston expanded Rogowski’s research of 
domestic institutions, and suggested four conditions for effective back-patting and 
opprobrium in the microprocess of social influence. (Johnston 2008: 94) To apply the 
conditions to the social environments of international organizations: (1) larger 
international organization memberships usually enable maximized accumulation of back-
patting/shaming markers, and therefore generate effective social influence.  (2) 
International organization decision rules are majoritarian or where reasons for supporting 
or opposing consensus are on record, as the consistency effects are stronger in this case. 
(3) The mandate is negotiation. (4) Member states have low autonomy, since persuasion 
effects are less likely to work in this case, and they are more likely to transmit the back-
patting and opprobrium messages directly back to the international organization. 
 
In addition, effectiveness of social influence also depends on the political traits of the 
member state. Effective social influence usually happens when the member state cares 
about their status in the international organizations and the international political society; 
and when the related domestic political institutions and/or policymakers have 
homogenous political preferences toward the state government’s international reputation. 
On the other hand, if the member state, or the majority of its powerful domestic policy-
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making institutions do not care about the state’s international reputation, effective social 
influence is unlikely to function.  
 
3.3   Persuasion  	  
Persuasion is ‘a microprocess whereby novices are convinced through a process of 
cognition that particular norms, values, and causal understandings are correct and ought 
to be operative in their own behaviour.’ It refers to a process in which agents are 
convinced to change minds, opinions, and attitudes about causality and affect in the 
absence of overtly material or mental coercion. (Johnston 2008: 25-26) Persuasion is 
regarded as the ultimate political strategy, as it involves ‘mind-controlling’ power. Mutz 
et al refer persuasion to the core of politics, and the ‘central aim of political interaction’. 
(Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody 1996:1) Gibson even argued that politics is all about 
persuasion, as ‘real politics involves arguments; it involves people drawing a conclusion, 
being exposed to countervailing ideas, changing views, drawing new conclusions’. 
(Gibson 1998: 821) To apply this concept in the studies of international organizations, it 
refers to the process by which the member state does not only adopt pro-norm behaviour, 
but also genuinely agrees with the international norms and implements them in other 
related policy practices and activities. The member state eventually adopts the 
international organization’s ideology, identity, culture, values, and norms as its own.  
 
Different institutional designs of international organizations and features of member 
states lead to differences in the likelihood and degree of persuasion. Besides Johnston, 
several other scholars discussed the conditions that are conducive to persuasion, which 
 74 
could be applied in the discussion of international organizations’ socialization of state 
members. (Johnston 2008: 159-160) (1) The member state is highly cognitively 
motivated to analyze counter-attitudinal information (for example, a very novel 
organizational environment). 2. The international organization is highly authoritative and 
it involves a small, intimate and high-affect membership.  3. The state has few prior 
ingrained attitudes that are inconsistent with the international norms; and it perceives few 
threats from the international organization. 4. The member state is relatively autonomous 
from the international organization. 5. The social environment is less politicized or more 
insulated from public opinion and pressure.  (Johnston 2008; Checkel 2005; Zurn and 
Checkel 2005)  
 
4   Limitation of Socialization Approach 
 
The socialization framework proves to respond to two essential themes of the 
relationships between international organizations and their state members: authoritative 
international organizations create and diffuse international norms among their members 
via interactive mechanisms; and member states that are initially unfamiliar with the 
international norms are socialized into accepting such norms via participating in the 
interactive mechanisms designed by international organizations. The study of 
socialization processes in the international organizations further enables us to understand 
how international norms are transmitted to states.  
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However, the socialization approach reveals merely one, yet not all aspects of the 
relationships between international organizations and states. The socialization approach 
suffers some deficiencies that prevent it from generating a comprehensive analysis of the 
relationships between international organizations and states. Just to give some examples, 
it simply assumes international organizations are the providers of the international norms, 
and states are the takers, which underestimates the influence of states in international 
organizations. It inadequately explains the importance of the states’ preferences and 
intentions, which underestimates the states’ impact on international organizations. The 
socialization approach tends to take international norms as given, which overestimates 
the appropriateness, universality, and adaptability of the norms. Such ‘underestimation’ 
and ‘overestimation’ indicate there are some aspects of the relationships between 
international organizations and states that cannot be accurately assessed by the 
socialization approach. Here, I want to point out four deficiencies in the socialization 
approach when it is applied in the studies of international organization- state 
relationships.   
 
First of all, the consequences of socialization are difficult to observe and assess. This is 
because the socialization approach focuses on the changes in the states’ values and 
norms, which are mostly concealed and ambiguous. This problem has been brought up 
many times in the criticism of constructivist theories, yet not solved in the socialization 
approach. Kent attempted to solve the measurement of international socialization.  In her 
paper ‘China’s International Socialization: the Role of International Organizations’, she 
proposed three indices to measure the international socialization for China. They are 
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China’s readiness to redefine its actual interests; China’s preparedness to renegotiate its 
sovereignty in response to organizational and treaty pressure; and the degree to which 
China shows a readiness to shoulder the costs, as well as enjoy the benefits, of 
organizational participation. (Kent 2002: 349-358) However, while leaving the terms 
such as ‘actual interests’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘costs/benefits’ undefined, the proposed 
qualitative measures were too generic and vague to assess the precise normative impact 
of international organizations. Among Johnston’s three microprocesses of socialization, 
the consequence of mimicking is relatively obvious to observe, but those of social 
influence and persuasion are more opaque. It is particularly difficult to assess the 
consequence of persuasion, because we cannot easily tell if the state has adopted the 
international organization’s values and norms as its own. One way to do it is to 
investigate if the state’s participation in all the other related activities reflects the same 
values and norms, which is practically difficult.   
 
Secondly, the socialization approach focuses on the international organizations’ 
nonmaterial impacts on the states including the changes in their political principles, 
values, and norms that are reflected in the later practices. In practice, it is highly 
unrealistic to separate nonmaterial from material impacts on the states’ policy practices, 
especially in the cases of international economic organization programs, where some 
member states receive continuous financial assistance. Take the IMF as an example, it 
provides the member states that have balance of payments difficulties with loans. These 
loans are attached with conditionality, which require the loan beneficiaries to carry out 
domestic political and economic reforms under the guidance of economic liberalization in 
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order to secure the succeeding issuance of loans. The socialization theorists argue that the 
international neoliberal economic norms are transmitted to the member states via IMF 
lending conditionality. I agree with this incremental process of norm transmission; 
however, I want to point out that material incentive, that is the financial benefit, is the 
primary motivation for the state’s engagement in IMF lending mechanisms. The norm 
transmission process would likely be cut off if the state found a lending source that is 
more tolerant toward its domestic political environment. Therefore, in some, if not the 
most cases, the nonmaterial impacts are built upon the material impacts.  
 
Thirdly, international organization socialization is not the only- may not even be the 
primary- influence of the changes in the member states’ political principles, interest, 
values and norms. The consequences of international organization socialization are often 
reflected through the state’s institutional changes and policy practices.  However, we 
cannot easily judge if a certain domestic change is due to the socialization of a specific 
international organization that the state participates in, because the state’s institutional 
changes and policy practices respond to various internal and external factors.  
 
Internally, policy-making in one area could be influenced by several different individuals 
and governmental departments. Therefore if the individual/department that collaborates 
with one specific international organization has less influence in the domestic political 
system than those who hold opposite preferences14, the international organization may 
fail to convince the state to make policy decisions in a way that is preferred by the 
organization. In this case, although the international organizations may have socialized 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 They may, or may not, be influenced by the socialization of other international organizations.  
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their correspondent individual/department in the state into accepting its advocated norms, 
it likely fail to have effective influences on the state’s final policy decisions. Therefore 
international organization socialization may have mixed and complex impacts on the 
states.  
 
Externally, one state could be a member of several international organizations that 
maintain different norms. Although these international organizations may not have 
fundamentally contrasted norms, they could sometimes become competitors, for example, 
the international development banks/funds versus regional development banks/funds.  In 
this case, the impacts of socialization by different international organizations vary 
according to the exogenous environment. For example, many countries in the Asian 
region are not closely tied up with the IMF especially because of the disastrous Asian 
financial crisis and the lame IMF rescue plan, thus their participation in Asian financial 
cooperative institutions has diverted them away from IMF socialization. In this case, their 
inactive engagement with IMF programs is caused not only by doomed unsuccessful 
socialization, but also by their participation in regional financial integration as a 
substitute solution. In addition, the state’s institutional changes and policy practices may 
also be influenced by bilateral interactions with other states, the general political 
environment, the market (in the cases of economic issues), and so on, which would also 
lead the state to redefine their norms; or simply by some unexpected factors, which does 
not usually lead to norm redefinition.  
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Fourthly, the socialization approach simply assumes the international organizations are 
the providers of the international norms, and states are the takers. It works in the short 
and medium terms, but not in the long term. According to the studies of socialization 
processes, the new member state joins the international organization without having 
comprehensive knowledge of the organization’s rules and regulations in practice; 
therefore it just follows the organization’s instructions step by step. It may copy the 
behaviour of the international organization and other members, simply because ‘this is 
what everyone else does’. The first-step practice is explained by the microprocess 
‘mimicking’ by Johnston. It may also do what as it is told to in order to gain approvals 
and avoid punishments from the authoritative international organization and other 
members in the system.  This is explained by the microprocess ‘social influence’.  Later 
on, further participation in the international organization may lead the state to redefine its 
interests toward the norms that are advocated by the organization. It is described as 
‘persuasion’. All these microprocesses focus on whether the state accepts, or does not 
accept, the norms from the international organization.  
 
In the short and medium terms, the socialization approach explains the social interactions 
between the international organization and the new member state, and their 
consequences, because the state is unfamiliar with the organizational environment and 
thus more easily to be influenced by the international organization. Nevertheless, even in 
the short and medium term, it underestimates (or ignores) the member state’s intentions 
and preferences that drove them to engage with the international organization.  Member 
states are not simple norm takers in many cases, especially when they have relatively 
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strong influences in the international political society, because in this case they would be 
able to promote their own norms in the international community. Moreover, states are not 
simple norm takers when they have explicit goals to achieve via participating in 
international organizations, because in this case their determined goals will guide them 
through the interactions. Last but not least, states are not simple norm takers when they 
have uncompromising political interests and values, because in this case international 
organizations are less capable of convincing states to redefine their interests and values.  
 
In the longer run, it is even less likely that these member states would be easily 
convinced to accept and implement international norms. Acharya argued that 
socialization should lead to long-term and stable change instead of short-term adaption 
(Acharya 2011: 9); therefore it is doubtful if the socialization approach could be applied 
to fully explain the relationships between international organizations and their member 
states in the long run. In particular, for the following reasons:  
 
(1) As the member state gets more familiar with the organizational environment, it 
develops specific strategies to handle the international organization, and hence not just 
does what it is told to. Such strategies include a better assessment of the cost/benefit of 
cooperating with the organization, alignment with other members who hold similar 
preferences, and a better use of the voices in the organization’s decision-making 
committee. On the other hand, rather than being socialized into accepting the 
international organization’s norms, the state’s participation in the international 
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organization may lead the organization to redefine some parts of its own interests and 
values.  
 
(2) When a state develops its strength in various aspects, its status and controlling power 
in the international political society increases. As a result, it is less subjected to the 
threats of punishment from the international organization and other states in the 
international political society. It may also gradually develop other options rather than 
participating in the international organization, either by engaging with other international 
and/or regional organizations, or by bilateral cooperation, or even by taking the 
domestic/unilateral approach.  
 
(3) Norms of an international organization are not static.  They may grow to universal 
norms; and in this case, it is difficult to tell if the later changes in the state are due to the 
socialization from the international organization or the general environment. They may 
also fall behind the development of the political environment and become unsuitable for 
guiding states’ policy practices over time; and in this case, it is not appropriate for the 
international organization to continue to socialize its member states into accepting its 
norms.  
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5   Conclusion: Using Socialization Approach to Analyze the China-IMF 
Relationship 
 
The socialization approach has been used to assess the relationships between 
international organizations and China. It was mentioned briefly earlier that Alastair 
Johnston explored three ‘microprocesses’ of socialization- mimicking, social influence 
and persuasion- and examined how these microprocesses illustrate China’s participation 
in a selection of international/ regional security institutions.  
 
He discovered that the Chinese diplomats’ participation in some of the first major 
international arms control institutions, such as the Conference on Disarmament, led 
China to adopt certain habits, language, and even organizational models of arms 
controllers in these institutions. He argued that the Chinese government realized that it 
needed to adopt some of the common forms of participation (in these institutions) before 
it developed a specific security ‘interest’ and further purposeful participation in the 
international security regime. China’s participation thus reflects Johnston’s proposition of 
‘mimicking’ process of socialization.  
 
Moreover, he found out that when China signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty and Protocol II of the Conventional Weapons Convention, it was not induced by 
material (dis)-incentives. He reckoned the Chinese leadership weighed heavily the benefit 
from minimizing opprobrium costs by making these agreements. It thus proved 
Johnston’s proposition of ‘social influence’ microprocess.  
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In addition, Johnston argued that the participation of Chinese diplomats, scholars and 
analysts in the ARF and related Track II security dialogues helped create a constituency 
of protomultilateralists who internalized a view of security that placed less stress on 
unilateral security and more on cooperative security strategies. It consequently proved the 
‘persuasion’ microprocess. Finally, he came to the conclusion that ‘there is considerable, 
if subtle, evidence of the socialization of Chinese diplomats, strategists, and analysts in 
certain counter-realpolitik norms and practices as a result of participation in these 
institutions’. (Johnston 2008: xiv)  
 
Kent also used the case studies of China’s interaction with many international and 
regional organizations to test the consequences of socialization. She used the examples of 
China’s participation in the Conference on Disarmament, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to explain 
some moderate changes in the related domestic practices. She further described China’s 
participation in some international organizational activities, such as supporting the 
deployment of the International Force in East Timor, cooperating with the ASEAN in 
drafting a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, joining several human 
rights organizations and ratifying treaties, and removing a large degree of state control 
over domestic economic activities in order to meet WTO entrance requirement. These 
examples proved that the Chinese government was prepared to renegotiate the boundaries 
of its sovereignty. In addition, she also used the examples of China’s acceptance of costs 
in its interaction with the Conference on Disarmament and in its negotiations to join the 
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WTO. These facts proved three consequences of international organization socialization: 
redefinition of interests, renegotiation of sovereignty, and acceptance of costs. (Kent 
2002)  
 
The socialization framework proves to be a valid approach to analyzing the relationship 
between international organizations and China. The communist Chinese government has 
gradually joined an increasing number of international organizations since the 1970s, 
mainly due to regime and leadership reforms in the domestic political system. Up till 
then, China had been isolated from the international political society for decades. 
Therefore, when China joined the international organizations- that were mostly 
dominated by the western developed countries- it was unfamiliar with the environment 
and policy practices of most of these international organizations. It created a possible 
condition for the international organizations to teach the policy practices and related 
implementation methods and techniques to the new member China. There were some 
doubts in mainstream western society then worrying that China’s communist propositions 
and values might ‘pollute’ western norms in these international organizations. The 
international organizations themselves were also quite wary about this problem, and 
therefore they often cautiously ran their programs with China to make sure China would 
follow their regulations and rules. They also consciously included China into their 
activities, hoping the involved Chinese representative officials would gradually accept 
the international norms and pass them to their authorities, so that the Chinese government 
would eventually implement these norms in the domestic policy practices. This process is 
defined as ‘socialization’ according to the theoretical framework analyzed in this chapter.  
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China’s relationship with the IMF, especially the early engagement, falls into this 
category. Hence, I intend to explore the China-IMF relationship in the socialization 
theoretical framework. I shall firstly look into the context of China’s engagement with the 
IMF and see if it fulfills the two themes of the conditions for the socialization approach: 
1. Based upon their authoritative influence, international organizations legitimately seek 
to diffuse international norms via various interactive mechanisms with participating 
members. 2. States with the political principles and policy practices that are different 
from those of international organizations’ join international organizations because of 
material and nonmaterial (dis)-incentives; and later they are socialized into accepting 
international norms via various interactive mechanisms with international organizations.  
 
I will then investigate the interactions between China and the IMF, mainly focusing on 
IMF financial and technical assistance, and policy advice for China. Via these 
interactivities, I intend to find out whether, and how, the three microprocesses (borrowed 
from Johnston)- mimicking, social influence, and persuasion- have evolved. This 
investigation is based on a considerable amount of empirical materials from IMF and 
Chinese government documents. Various case studies of IMF programs, such as IMF 
Statistics Department trainings for Chinese officials and IMF Article IV Consultation for 
China, will be discussed in order to examine the processes of socialization.  
 
Finally, the analysis of the relationship between China and the IMF with socialization 
approach may reflect some of the limitations of the socialization theoretical framework. 
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To recall such limitations, the consequences of socialization are difficult to observe and 
assess; it is difficult to separate the international organization’s non-material and material 
impacts; international organizations may not be the primary cause of changes in the 
states’ political principles, interest, values and norms; and the socialization approach 
simply assumes international organizations are the providers of norms, and that states are 
the takers, which is a less valid assumption in the long run. Based on these limitations, I 
will assess the extent to which the socialization theoretical framework explains the 
relationship between the IMF and China. 
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Chapter 3 - China joins the IMF: Socialization or Else 
 
 
1   Introduction 
 
China regained its IMF membership in April 1980. Initial contacts between IMF staff and 
China’s central government officials started in 1973. The preparation for China’s access 
to IMF membership developed in the second half of the 1970s; and before that China was 
resistant to the idea of joining the international organizations that were led by the western 
capitalist states. The whole decade between 1970 and 1980 was crucial for both the IMF 
and China. Triggered by the Nixon administration’s decision of unpegging the US dollar 
from gold in 1971 and the following transformations in the international monetary 
regime, the IMF’s role dropped significantly among western economies.  The Fund later 
switched the focus of its lending mechanisms from the western developed country 
members to the developing country members in the rest of the world. During the same 
period of time, China experienced the first major change of central leaders since 1949 
due to Mao’s death in 1976; and the new leaders initiated a whole series of domestic 
economic and political reforms. The reformist leadership initially focused state policies 
on economic development in the post-Mao era, later as they accumulated more 
experience and administrative skills, they were determined to transform China’s economy 
from a centrally planned regime to a free market-based one. Since then, China’s long-
closed border has been gradually opened up to the world economy.  
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The context of China regaining IMF membership and the general international political 
environment in the 1970s and 1980s satisfy the conditions for international ‘socialization’ 
to take place. In the case of China joining the IMF, the IMF saw the possibility of 
enlarging its influence by including China in its programs, such as financial and technical 
assistances and policy advising. Via these programs, the IMF could guide China to adopt 
the technical approaches and policy practices that meet the international standard, and to 
eventually accept the neoliberal economic norms and internalize them in its domestic 
policy-making. On the other hand, China carried out a series of dramatic domestic policy 
changes in the 1970s, including eliminating the Cultural Revolution leadership, pushing 
forward liberalizing domestic reform, ending decades of isolation and self-reliance, and 
legitimizing the concept of economic interdependence. China was motivated to join 
international economic organizations in order to get international resources for its 
domestic economic development, as well as to improve its international image and 
reputation.  
 
Both the IMF and China conceived potential benefits for cooperation with each other. 
This convergence of preference for international cooperation created a favourable context 
for the IMF to ‘engage China’. Pearson used the word ‘engage’ to explain how the major 
international economic organizations brought China into the core of international 
economic society and encouraged it to play by the ‘rules of the game’. (Pearson 1999: 
207-234) The concept of ‘engagement’ is similar to what ‘socialization’ indicates; yet the 
latter implies more hierarchical relationship between international organizations and 
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China.  Socialization also puts more emphasis on the normative impact of international 
organizations: how and to what extent international organizations transfer the 
international norms to states and whether these states internalize the norms. In other 
words, participating in IMF programs would possibly lead China to change its political 
interests and adopt the political principles and policy practices that were fundamentally 
different from the communist orientations yet consistent with neo-liberal international 
economic norms.   
 
Based on such contexts, this chapter uses the socialization approach to analyze the 
interactions between China and the IMF. It investigates three main IMF programs that 
China participates in: financial assistance, technical assistance, and surveillance and 
policy advice. These interactive programs can be regarded as mechanisms of IMF 
socialization, via which the Fund’s neo-liberal economic norms are transferred to China. 
China has never been a major borrower of the IMF, yet it has become one of the Fund’s 
largest technical assistance receivers. IMF technical assistance takes various forms 
including training courses in IMF institutes, IMF experts’ and lecturers’ visits in China, 
and periodical posts in IMF headquarters for the Chinese officials sent by the state’s 
financial institutions. IMF technical assistance programs provided China with significant 
information in formatting and processing financial data and policies with internationally 
formalized methods. IMF surveillance and policy advice for China is mostly carried out 
via the Fund’s annual Article IV Consultation. This has tackled some critical issues in 
China’s financial economy, such as the measures of the exchange rate of RMB, the 
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problem of under-valued RMB, lack of transparency in China’s financial management, 
the urge for more fundamental reforms in China’s financial system, and so on.    
 
Through investigation of the interactions between Chinese officials and IMF staff in the 
activities of financial assistance, technical assistance and surveillance and policy advice, 
the research intends to find out whether or not the processes of socialization, that is 
mimicking, social influence, and/or persuasion, took place and the extent to which they 
were accomplished.  Frequency and depth of socialization between China and the IMF 
indicates the effectiveness of socialization theory as an approach to the China-IMF 
relationship. If socialization is proved to have increasingly and continuously taken place 
via IMF programs for China in the long run, it means socialization theory can effectively 
explain the relationship between China and the IMF. If socialization between China and 
the IMF is limited by some permanent obstacles, it means socialization theory as an 
analytical approach may lose its explanatory power in the long run.  
 
The research result shows that the sequence of socialization processes has not been 
accomplished due to some fundamental elements in China’s and the IMF’s political and 
institutional factors that may stay unchanged in the long run. Hence, while admitting that 
socialization theory explains China’s relationship with the IMF in the early stage, I also 
argue that socialization theory cannot support the analysis of the China-IMF interaction 
in the long run. The investigation of China-IMF interaction in this chapter reflects the 
limitations of the socialization approach in analyzing the China-IMF relationship that 
corresponds to the last part of the previous chapter. It specifically points out that the 
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socialization approach pays little attention to China’s initiatives and intentions in 
participating in IMF programs, and thus overlooks China’s objectives in the governance 
of international political economy. It also overestimates the accountability of the neo-
liberal economic norms and ignores the fact that China may actually want to participate 
in the international financial economy in a different way. The chapter finally calls for a 
supplementary theoretical approach that better reflects China’s objectives and the 
relationship between China and the IMF in the later years: principal-agent theory.  
 
2   Initial Contact and Engagement  
 
The context of the international political economy and China’s domestic political changes 
largely stimulated the early engagement between China and the IMF. They also help us 
understand how the China-IMF interactions fulfill the conditions for IMF socialization.   
 
2.1   The IMF 	  
The IMF was established in 1944, together with the World Bank, comprising the 
functioning institutions of the Bretton Woods System. It was founded under the initiative 
of the US and UK, aiming to bring back international economic order after World War II. 
The Fund’s original purpose was to promote institutionalized international monetary 
cooperation, to facilitate growth of fair international trade, to maintain exchange rate 
stability, to assist in the establishment of a free multilateral payment system with no 
foreign exchange restrictions, and to assist the member states with balance of payment 
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difficulties (IMF Article I, Section iii of IMF’s Articles of Agreement). In the first two 
decades after its establishment, and together with other international economic 
organizations such as the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), the IMF was mainly involved in policy-making and practices of the countries 
with market economies.  The IMF’s influence in the international financial economy 
reached its highest level in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, during which period 
the Fund made a large amount of loans to both developed and developing countries to 
help them resolve balance of payments difficulties. This situation started to change in the 
late 1960s when some of the Eastern European countries with communist governments 
entered the major international economic organizations. 
 
The IMF’s role further changed in the 1970s.  The US went off the gold standard in 1971 
and the fixed exchange system collapsed. (Gowa 1983) Since then, the values of the 
major economies’ currencies have been mainly determined by market forces, with a 
limited degree of government intervention in order to prevent abrupt fluctuations. The 
IMF thus changed its policy focus from regulating currency to managing balance of 
payments difficulties; and it also become more involved in borrower countries’ domestic 
policies via conditionality attached to its loans. (Vreeland 2003) The borrower countries 
were mostly in developing areas.  
 
2.2   China 	  
In the 1950s and 1960s, China was mostly isolated from the outside, especially the 
western world.  In the 1970s, the Chinese government leaders started to gradually open 
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the country to the world, although with a high level of wariness and cautiousness.  The 
limited opening started from improving diplomatic relations with international 
organizations and foreign governments, marked by regaining the seat in the United 
Nations in 1971, and restoring diplomatic relations with the US and Japan in 1972.  The 
diplomatic opening was followed by gradually increasing economic and intellectual 
exchanges with foreign countries, which paved the way for China’s entry into the 
international economic sphere. After suffering decades of wars and isolation, China had 
been left far behind in terms of capital, technology, expertise and other resources that 
were needed for economic reforms. Therefore, in the 1970s, China became more and 
more eager for international capital and expertise to facilitate its reforms, and sought 
acceptance and general approval from other members of the international community.   
 
Deng Xiaoping and his allies, who later became the key reformist leaders of the Chinese 
government in the post-Mao era, perceived some serious structural problems in China’s 
economic development in the 1970s. However, as his relatively liberal economic views 
were in contrast with the radical political environment in the 1970s, he was demoted 
several times and he didn’t have the opportunity to promote economic liberalization till 
1978, two years after Mao’s death and elimination of political radicals. (Naughton 2007; 
Lin at al. 1996) Deng and his allies were determined to set economic growth as the 
priority goal and sought to solve China’s problems in a more liberal fashion. The 
remarkable reforms initiated during the Third Plenary Session included introduction of a 
market economy through the personal responsibility system, radical reforms in the 
agricultural sector, and expansion of international trade and foreign exchange earnings. 
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The Third Plenary Session also significantly shifted China’s trade policy from autarky to 
a more outwardly oriented one. (IBRD 1988: 1-6) Many principles formulated at the 
Third Plenary Session have since guided the Chinese government through further 
economic liberalization and opening in the following years.  
 
China was standing at a critical crossroads at the end of the 1970s. The reformist leaders 
deeply believed that the domestic reforms in an economic liberalization fashion would 
boost China’s economy and fundamentally improve citizens’ welfare and the state’s 
strength. They were determined to end China’s isolation and let China join the world. Yet 
they understood it was not easy to convince skeptical conservative officials to accept the 
idea of economic interdependence.   
 
2.3   Initial Contact and Engagement15 	  
Triggered by its UN membership, the Chinese government became more familiar with, as 
well as more approved by, the international economic organizations in the early 1970s. In 
1972, a United Nations Small Group (UNSG) was established within the Bank of China 
to assess membership in all UN financial agencies, including the World Bank and the 
IMF. The UNSG was following developments in the World Bank and the IMF closely 
and submitting its reports to the top leaders, yet with highly cautious and reserved views 
due to the intense domestic political complexion.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Jacobson and Oksenberg’s (1990) book included some good details of China’s early engagement with 
the IMF, and I will show some in this section. 	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The World Bank President at the time - Robert McNamara- thought the World Bank 
needed China’s participation to enhance the Bank’s legitimacy and increase its resources.  
Therefore, McNamara took the first move in 1973 to invite China to join the Bank. The 
Chinese authorities rejected McNamara’s first invitation because they thought the Bretton 
Woods institutions could not bring China opportunities to further its foreign policy 
objectives, and that IMF Articles of Agreement were contradictory to the socialist 
monetary system.  China particularly did not want the restrictions on the determination of 
its foreign exchange rate and control over the administration of its foreign exchange 
imposed by the IMF. (Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990: 60-65) In addition, China’s strict 
‘self-reliance’ policy would not approve any external borrowing at the time, so it was not 
worth paying the quota without borrowing from the IMF.  
 
However, in order to protect its economic benefits from IMF gold sale in 1976 from 
being taken away by the Taiwanese government (which was registered as the legal 
member that represented ‘China’), the Chinese government eventually took the first step 
toward the IMF. (De Viries 1985: 31-34) The president of the People’s Bank of China 
sent a telegraph to the IMF on this note, claiming that all properties and rights in the IMF 
belonged to the Chinese people and that the representatives of Taiwan should be expelled 
from the Fund.  (Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990: 65) Zhang Zhixiang, a former Chinese 
IMF executive director recalled China’s premier Zhou Enlai who was also the foreign 
minister at the time phoned the IMF to claim the PRC should be only legal member that 
represents China. (Zhang 2010) Since then, the question of China’s resumption of 
membership in the IMF and the World Bank had been put on the State Council’s agenda.  
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In January 1979, the PBC together with the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs sent a report to the State Council, containing the results of the USNG’s 
and other specialists’ observation of major international economic institutions.  The 
report showed the conditions in the international political environment were conducive to 
China’s accession to the IMF and the World Bank, including the Taiwan complexion and 
the attitude of the US and Third World countries toward China. The report also stated the 
benefits of joining the IMF and the World Bank, including entailing withdrawal or 
expulsion of Taiwan, enhancing China’s bilateral relations with many foreign countries, 
yielding China more information about the international financial economy that was 
needed in its domestic development programs, and of course China’s access to IMF and 
World Bank loans.  Meanwhile, the Chinese leaders were also aware of the costs of 
joining the IMF and the World Bank, including submission of highly confidential data, 
dealing with the Fund’s and the Bank’s frequent missions to China, and the financial 
contribution to meet its quota in the Fund and subscription in the Bank.  
 
Informal contacts and visits between China and the IMF and the World Bank started in 
1979 and 1980, which significantly contributed to China’s eventual accession to both 
institutions.  Meanwhile, the IMF, the World Bank and China all had started to undertake 
the final preparation for China’s accession. In March 1980, the IMF sent to China a 
delegation to negotiate on China’s IMF membership. The negotiation was a great success. 
During two weeks of intense mission, the delegation generated a document of agreements 
that referred to a few official arrangements regarding China’s IMF membership. (Ibid: 
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70-74) On April 17, 1980, less than two weeks after the delegation’s return, the IMF 
Executive Board made a decision that the People’s Republic would represent China in the 
Fund.  The decision was followed by further negotiations about China’s quota and the 
disposition of the gold reserve.   
 
China settled with the ninth largest IMF quota 1.2 billion when it joined, which was 
increased to SDR 1.8 billion by the end of the year. China also became a single 
constituency of the IMF; therefore the size of the executive board expanded from 21 to 
22. The Chinese government sent its first board governor to the IMF, the president of the 
People’s Bank of China Li Baohua, and Zhang Zicun became China’s first executive 
director in the IMF.  Similar appointments were also made for the World Bank.  With 
these appointments, the Chinese government began to set up its internal bureaucratic 
counterparts for the IMF and World Bank.  (Zhang 2010)  
 
2.4   Context for Socialization 	  
Understanding the historical, political, and institutional contexts of China regaining IMF 
membership and the transformations in the international political economy in the 1970s 
and 1980s enables us to examine if the China-IMF relationship fulfills the conditions for 
international organization socialization. In this subsection, I am going to assess if the 
contexts of the establishment of China-IMF relationship satisfied the conditions for IMF 
socialization to take place. First of all, let us recall the two themes of conditions for 
international organization socialization:  
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1. Based upon their authoritative influences, international organizations legitimately seek 
to diffuse international norms via various interactive mechanisms with participating 
members.  
 
2. States with political principles and policy practices that are different from those of 
international organizations join international organizations because of material and 
nonmaterial (dis)incentives; and later they are socialized into accepting international 
norms via various interactive mechanisms with international organizations.  
 
With regard to the first condition, the IMF proved to have the desire to transfer the 
international neoliberal economic norms to its newly joined members such as China and 
some other developing countries.  The IMF gradually switched policy focuses from its 
developed to developing country members in the 1970s and 1980s, while more and more 
developing countries approached and joined the Fund. The enlarging IMF membership- 
especially by including China in the Fund- further consolidated its legitimacy and 
authority in international economic governance. However, these new member states 
included some Eastern European countries, some former communist countries and the 
countries that were still running communist economic regimes while - and after they had- 
joined the IMF.  These states had maintained very different economic policy practices 
and political interests and values from those of the IMF and its main western advanced 
economy state member states.  
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Take China as an example, it was still running the centrally planned economic regime 
when it approached the IMF. Although the new leaders initiated some prior domestic 
reforms in economic liberalization in the late 1970s, the most crucial economic policy 
decisions, such as distribution of resources, price levels of crucial goods, central banking, 
and foreign exchange, etc. were controlled by the central communist government. In 
order to keep the international economic order that was based on the liberal international 
economy with little restrictions on trade, investment and foreign exchange, the IMF 
sought to make the new state members learn and accept the international neoliberal 
economic norms. It would also consolidate the IMF’s role among the developing world 
by socializing them into accepting the Fund’s prevailing norms.  
 
With regard to the second condition, China was eager for international capital and 
expertise to support its domestic reforms, as well as to develop its international links and 
improve its international reputation. After decades of isolation, China was lagging far 
behind in terms of technology and expertise. The domestic scholars and experts were 
mostly educated in China or the Soviet Union, and thus their knowledge about building 
modern economic and social systems was limited within the (Chinese version of) Marxist 
communist framework. The government leaders with reformist minds realized they 
should adopt a more liberal development strategy. (Naughton 2007) They also supported 
the idea of international economic interdependence. Joining international economic 
organizations was one way to obtain international capital and expertise, as well as to 
establish the reputation of a friendly member of the international political society. 
However, the domestic political pressure and the disturbances in the central leadership 
 100 
throughout the 1970s created some obstacles for China’s access to the IMF. In addition, it 
was not easy for Chinese government officials and the society in general to accept the 
ideological switch caused by China’s access to the international economic organizations.  
After a whole decade of internal research16 on the international economic organizations 
and incremental opening to the outside world, China eventually decided to join the IMF 
in 1980. By then, China was more familiar with the rules and regulations of the 
international regime, yet it still lacked substantial experience in dealing with international 
organizations; and the international neoliberal economic norms pointed toward a 
complete different direction for China’s economic development from what the 
communist orientations would lead China to.  
 
The initial engagement was a success, without any major technical disputes or ideological 
conflicts occurring. The early part of China-IMF interactions that will be included in the 
analysis of China’s participation in IMF programs in the next section displays a mostly 
harmonious relationship between the two. Although China was unfamiliar with the rules 
and regulations of the IMF, it knew what to expect from the membership of an 
international economic organization that was led by the US and its western advanced 
economic allies. In fact China was in need of the international capital, expertise and 
approval that only a legitimate multilateral institution like the IMF was able to provide.  
 
These conditions created a favourable context for ‘socialization’ to take place.  To recall 
the definition of socialization, it refers to the process by which social interactions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The research carried out by the UNSG was entirely based on the researchers’ limited knowledge about 
the international economic organizations.   
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between the staff and participants of the international organizations lead the participants 
to endorse the organization’s predominated norms. According to Finnemore, international 
organizations teach values and construct domestic institutions and procedures inside 
states that reflect emergent international norms and practices. States then adhere to these 
norms and practices even when these seem inconsistent with their material welfare or 
security interests at the time. (Finnemore 1996) Abram and Antonia Chayes argued that 
international organizations and their treaties not only ensure transparency, cut transaction 
costs, build capacity, and enhance dispute settlement, but also persuade states to ‘explore, 
redefine and sometimes discover’ their own, and mutual interests. (Chayes and Chayes 
1995: 1-33)  
 
So did China’s participation in IMF programs actually lead it to redefine its interests and 
values? Did the IMF socialize China into accepting and internalizing the neoliberal 
economic norms in the later domestic policy practices? Could we use ‘socialization’ to 
explain the IMF’s impact on China since 1980? The key approach to these questions is to 
assess the actual processes of socialization, via which the IMF could transfer 
international norms to China. Therefore, the next section will analyze the IMF programs 
that China participated in, which are divided into three types: financial assistance, 
technical assistance, and policy advice. It attempts to find out how and the extent to 
which the IMF has socialized China into accepting these international norms. Johnston’s 
framework of three ‘microprocesses of socialization’ will be applied to assess the IMF’s 
approaches to socialize China, and their consequences.  
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3   China-IMF Interactions: Did Socialization Happen? 
 
Interactions between the IMF and its member states focus on three main Fund-designed 
mechanisms: financial assistance, technical assistance, and surveillance and policy 
advice, which are also the IMF’s three major functions. China has participated in all three 
mechanisms, although it has participated in the latter two much more frequently. Via 
these mechanisms, the IMF attempts to diffuse its norms and values to the member states. 
Johnston’s microprocesses of socialization- mimicking, social influence and persuasion- 
can be traced in these mechanisms, yet to different degrees. Hence, examination of these 
interactive mechanisms also enables us to understand whether socialization took place 
and the extent to which they have affected China’s domestic economy policies.  
 
3.1   Financial Assistance 	  
The financial assistance mechanism aims to provide the member countries having short-
term balance of payments difficulties with emergency funds.  The mechanism could be 
divided into three types of lending: the main lending facilities, lending to low-income 
countries, and debt relief; each of these types of lending includes several different 
programs. (IMF official website 17 ) The main lending facilities include Stand-By 
Arrangements (SBA) for emerging market economies, the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) 
and Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) for countries with very strong policies, the 
Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) for countries with urgent balance of payments needs, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  IMF official website, the section about ‘Lending by the IMF’, access via 
http://www.imf.org/external/about/lending.htm	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the Extended Fund Facility for countries whose balance of payments difficulties are 
related to structural problems, and the Trade Integration Mechanism for countries whose 
balance of payments difficulties are caused by multilateral trade liberalization. The 
lending to low-income countries includes the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) for low-
income countries (LICs) with protracted balance of payments problems, the Rapid Credit 
Facility for LICs with urgent balance of payment needs, and the Standby Credit Facility 
(SCF) for LICs with short-term balance of payments needs. The debt relief program 
includes the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and the Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI).  
 
Most of the financial assistance programs are attached with conditionality. Conditionality 
is divided into hard and soft ones. Hard conditionality refers to the measures a borrower 
country has to meet to access any loans. Soft conditionality refers to the a wider range of 
other elements that the IMF takes into account in making decisions on completing (or 
not) the reviews in order to permit the disbursement of each installment of loans. Soft 
conditionality includes structural benchmarks, indicative triggers, and general 
undertakings in the country’s letter on intent. (Independent Evaluation Office 2002; 
Woods 2006: 70-71) Although conditionality is decided through discussions among 
borrow countries and the Fund’s specialist teams, the latter make most of the decisions on 
the details of conditionality. Once the loan is made, IMF staff also monitor the borrower 
countries in order to evaluate if they live up to the agreed program and project, and make 
the decision on whether or not releasing the next installment of loans accordingly. 
(Woods 2006) According to the Fund’s own words, conditionality enables the funds to  
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‘…evolve from helping countries deal with short-term trade fluctuations to supporting 
adjustment and addressing a wide range of balance of payments problems resulting from 
terms of trade shocks, natural disasters, post-conflict situations, broad economic 
transition, poverty reduction and economic development, sovereign debt restructuring, 
and confidence-driven banking and currency crises.’(IMF official website)18  
 
Via conditionality, the IMF indirectly influences the borrower countries’ domestic 
policy-making and policy practices. The borrower countries are required to meet IMF 
policy requirements in order to get the next installment of loans. Hence, during the 
borrowing period, these countries ought to do what they are told by the IMF and/or 
follow what other borrower countries do in order to get the loans. Hence, the process of 
‘mimicking’ may be witnessed via IMF lending. However, social influence is unlikely to 
happen, since the motivation behind IMF lending program is material-in fact, purely 
financial- rather than reputational. Neither is persuasion likely to take place via lending, 
as the effective period for conditionality is usually too short for the borrower countries to 
redefine their interests and values. If countries were required to implement policy 
changes according to IMF guidance for a longer period of time, they might start to absorb 
IMF neo-liberal economic norms.   
 
However, unlike many other IMF developing country members, China never became a 
large borrower from the Fund. China received a drawing from the Fund in the first credit 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 IMF official website, the section about ‘Lending by the IMF’, access via 
http://www.imf.org/external/about/lending.htm  
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tranche of SDR 450 million and a Trust Fund loan of SDR 309 million in 1981, and 
repaid the loan by the end of 1984. It received another drawing of SDR 598 million in 
1986, and repaid the loan after one year. China has not borrowed from the IMF since 
then. (Zhang 2010) The IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus said in 1997 that he 
did not believe that China would need IMF support in the years to come, other than 
technical assistance in macroeconomic matters. (Reuters China News 1997) 
 
Hence, China is exempted from the usual impacts of socialization via IMF financial 
assistance. It also proves that the IMF has little leverage over China’s policy decisions 
via financial assistance.  
 
3.2   Technical Assistance 	  
Technical assistance is another core mechanism of the IMF. It links the Fund with its 
member states via expertise sharing. IMF technical assistance covers a wide range of 
issue areas including central banking, monetary and exchange rate policy, tax policy and 
administration, and official statistics. It takes various forms including Fund staff’s visits 
to member countries to advise government and central bank officials on specific issues, 
Fund provision of resident specialists on a short- or a long-term basis, and training 
courses for member country financial government officials. The technical assistance 
mostly targets the IMF’s low- and lower-middle-income countries, in particular in sub-
Saharan Africa and Asia. The core products of IMF technical assistance are 
internationally standardized policy process methods and techniques. (IMF 2009c; IMF 
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official website19) Via taking a part in IMF technical assistance, member countries learn 
to adopt the methods and techniques that are widely used in the most advanced financial 
economies, as well as promoted by the IMF.  
 
China has received continuous technical assistance from the IMF since the 1980s via 
training courses in IMF institutes, IMF experts’ and lecturers’ visits to China, and 
periodical posts in IMF headquarter for the Chinese officials sent by the state’s financial 
institutions. IMF technical assistance programs provided China with significant 
information in formatting and processing financial data and policies with internationally 
formalized methods. For example, the IMF’s early efforts encouraged China to use gross 
domestic product (GDP) data instead of net material product (NMP) data, which 
indirectly made Chinese officials recognize the importance of the service sector that was 
excluded from NMP measurements. (IBRD 1983: 1: 244-254, IBRD 1985)  
 
The most remarkable example is IMF Statistics Department’s training programs for 
China. The programs provide training courses for the staff from China’s crucial financial 
institutions (both at central and provincial level) such as the PBC, the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), and the National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS). The training programs mostly cover macroeconomic statistics, fiscal reform, 
taxation, balance of payments, budgetary, and monetary operations. Most of the programs 
are initiated in response to Chinese requests for specific information and training in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Access via: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/tech.htm	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techniques. They take the forms of (1) hands-on, issue-oriented short-term missions 
designed to address specific areas of weakness in statistics; (2) short seminars for high-
level officials on the use of macroeconomic statistics for the purposes of analysis and 
policy formulation based upon internationally accepted methodologies; (3) tailored 
training combined with on-the-job training relating to specific practical topics; (4) 
participation in general training activities in Washington D. C, at the Joint China-IMF 
Training Program in Dalian, the Joint Vienna Institute, and the IMF-Singapore Regional 
Training Institute; and (5) training course/study visits to IMF headquarters on 
methodology and compilation procedures for Chinese officials. (IMF 2009c: 7-17)  
 
The IMF Statistic Department has delivered a substantial amount of valuable technical 
assistance to help China’s financial institutions produce data using internationally 
acceptable methodologies and practices, both for authority use and for the IMF’s 
operational purposes. (IMF 2009c: 5) For example, they have assisted the PBC in 
addressing methodological issues arising from the recent developments in the financial 
sector, and implementing standardized reporting forms.  They have helped the CBRC 
learn the technical methods on how to compile financial soundness indicators and how to 
analyze these data, thereby improving the effectiveness of its regulatory services.   In 
addition, the training helped the MOF officials understand the government finance 
statistics methodology, improve data quality and facilitate international comparison of 
fiscal data, thus helping them achieve the goal of more closely aligning China’s fiscal 
data with international standards.  The training course provided by IMF Statistics 
Department for the MOF in 2008 helped it address several outstanding data classification 
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and compilation issues.  With the assistance of the IMF, the MOF implemented a new 
classification system of government revenues and expenditures in 2007 and increased 
transparency and dissemination of fiscal data. (IMF 2009c: 7-17)  
 
Last but not least, the Statistics Department conducted several activities in cooperation 
with the NBS. The most remarkable one was to help coordinate General Data 
Dissemination System initiatives in China.  The Statistics Department sent a technical 
assistance mission on GDDS in 2003, and co-hosted an international meeting on 
technical cooperation in statistics with the NBS in 2004, followed by organization of 
several training seminars on the quarterly national accounts in 2004 and on the use of 
macroeconomic statistics in 2005.  The department also hosted visits to IMF headquarter 
by several NBS delegations, to discuss issues relating to the GDDS and data 
dissemination and exchanges.  Since China joined in 2002, the GDDS has provided a 
framework to further develop China’s statistical systems and helped identify technical 
assistance needs and coordination with IMF technical assistance providers.  The 
evaluation report on IMF Statistics Department’s technical assistance to China in 2009 
concluded that since China joined the GDDS, its agencies had made considerable 
progress in improving the production and dissemination of macroeconomic data, most 
notably in the introduction of more features of internationally agreed methodologies and 
datasets; improvement in data dissemination following GDDS recommendations, such as 
dissemination of advance release calendars on several agencies’ websites; wider 
dissemination of statistical products, including through websites; and faster and more 
frequent release of several sets of data.  In addition, the establishment of a GDDS office 
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within the NBS helped coordinate the work on the GDDS with all the other agencies 
involved at the senior level.  (IMF 2009c: 7-17)  
 
When China started to receive technical assistance from the IMF, it learned standard 
statistical and other technical methods via mimicking because Chinese leaders had almost 
no understanding of the basic reporting conventions and obligations of a modern market 
economy, let alone of the institutions needed to make it function. In this way, the IMF 
membership prompted China to adopt the international standards of measurement, by 
which the Chinese learned how to better evaluate itself and present itself to the outside 
world. The example of China replacing NMP data with GDP data was a good example of 
mimicking. Later, mimicking gradually transformed into social influence. Especially by 
joining the GDDS, the approved behavior such as adopting internationally agreed 
methodologies and datasets, disseminating data on the institutions’ websites, and more 
frequent release of datasets have earned China some approval and ‘back-patting’ in the 
IMF. As said by Mr Zheng Jingping, the General Director of the Department of 
Comprehensive Statistics of the NBS: 
 
‘Looking back the whole process of China’s joining the GDDS, once more we realize 
that, actively participating in international statistical activities and conducting 
international collaborations are an important, non-substitutable way to promote 
statistical development. With reference to the good experiences of advanced countries, it 
will be faster, better and get-twice-the-result-with-half-the-effort to reach the 
development goals. In addition, introducing the internationally accepted standards and 
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practices not only optimizes statistical system, but also is convenient for international 
comparisons and beneficial for China to heighten its international status.’ (Zhang 2004) 
 
However, there is little evidence to show that IMF technical assistance has led to 
persuasion. The process of technical assistance does not require ‘private acceptance’ and 
therefore it is difficult to tell if the Chinese authorities have accepted and internalized the 
international norms embedded in the technical procedures. This is also why IMF 
technical assistance has generally been welcomed by the Chinese authorities: firstly, most 
of the programs are initiated from the authorities’ request for specific information and 
techniques; and then the IMF responds with appropriate technical assistance programs 
after discussions with the national authorities. In this way, the Chinese authorities take 
the control of the contents of the training courses and the extent to which they reach the 
Chinese officials. Secondly, IMF technical assistance focuses on methodological issues 
such as reporting forms, data collection and process methods, which does not directly 
impinge upon China’s domestic economic policies. 
 
3.3   Policy Advice 	  
IMF policy advice is a part of its surveillance mechanism. IMF surveillance mechanism 
could be divided into three categories: country surveillance, regional surveillance, and 
global surveillance. The country surveillance refers to the Article IV Consultation, which 
is a regular (annual) consultation for individual member states with interactive discussion 
included. (Moschella 2012) It is the most direct surveillance among all three categories. 
The regional surveillance involves examination by the IMF of policies pursued under 
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currency unions—including the euro area, the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, and the Eastern 
Caribbean Currency Union. In addition, the Fund also issues Regional Economic Outlook 
Reports in which economic developments and key policy issues in Asia Pacific, Europe, 
Middle East and Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Western Hemisphere are 
discussed. The global surveillance refers to reviews by the IMF’s Executive Board of 
global economic trends and developments. The results of reviews are published twice a 
year in the World Economic Outlook reports, the Global Financial Stability Report and 
the Fiscal Monitor Global surveillance entail reviews by the IMF's Executive Board of 
global economic trends and developments. (IMF official website20) 
 
Unlike the previous two types of interactions, IMF policy advice for the Chinese 
authorities has tackled some essential domestic economic policy issues that are related to 
the fundamental economic and political interests and values, such as the measure of the 
exchange rate of China’s currency Renminbi, under-valued Chinese currency, 
transparency (or lack of it) in China’s financial management, and the urge for more 
fundamental reforms in China’s financial system, just to give a few examples. The IMF 
offers policy advice by sending its staff to China for both ad hoc and regular missions.  
Special missions are sent to deal with specific policy issues.  Regular missions are sent 
for IMF country surveillance facility, Article IV Consultation, via which much IMF 
policy advice is offered to the Chinese authorities on the regular basis. The Article IV 
Consultation usually takes place annually, during which an IMF team of around 10 Fund 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  IMF website, section of ‘Surveillance’, access via http://www.imf.org/external/about/econsurv.htm	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economists visits 3-4 Chinese cities in a period of about 2 weeks to gather information 
and discuss China’s economic and financial policies with the government and central 
bank officials.21 (IMF 2006; 2010a; 2011a) The team reports its findings back to Fund 
management on its return and then presents them for discussion to the Executive Board. 
The Board’s view is subsequently transmitted to the Chinese government; and summaries 
of most discussions are released in Public Information Notices (PIN) and staff reports to 
be posted on the IMF’s website.  
 
The Consultations usually refer to several issue areas including general growth trends, 
macroeconomic policies, financial sector reforms, and domestic and external risks. More 
importantly, they also include the updated policy focus of the year the Consultation is 
undertaken. For example, in the early 2000s, the Consultations discussed issues such as 
rural-urban and regional income disparity that were exacerbated during China’s economic 
growth. In the period after the global financial crisis between 2008-2010, the 
Consultations focused on China’s responses to the crisis such as the stimulus packages, 
the decline in China’s current account surplus, and measures vis-à-vis local governments’ 
fiscal positions. In the most recent years, the Consultations have focused on the 
transformation of China’s growth model, the internationalization of the Renminbi, and 
the advancement of a social safety net. In particular, the flexibility issue in China’s 
exchange rate policy and reforms in China’s financial sector toward further liberalization 
have always been on the agenda in the past years. As showed in the staff reports, the 
Consultations usually take into account the Chinese authorities’ views, and provide them 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The number of IMF staff in the team, the cities to be visited and the period of the mission vary each year.  
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with moderate advice toward the detected problems and risks. (IMF 2010a; 2011a; 
2012a)  
 
IMF surveillance and policy advice could potentially lead to a larger degree of 
socialization compared to the previous two interaction mechanisms. This is because via 
surveillance and policy advice, the IMF could potentially affect China’s interests in and 
ability to pursue national economic strategy. The main objective of IMF surveillance and 
policy advice mechanism is to lead the member states to commit to ‘pursue policies that 
are conducive to orderly economic growth and reasonable price stability, to avoid 
manipulating exchange rates for unfair competitive advantage, and to provide the IMF 
with data about its economy.’ (IMF website)22 This objective displayed on the IMF’s 
website indicates the IMF’s own neo-liberal interests and norms. The IMF’s policy 
advice for China and other member states is consistent with its own interest and norms. 
Hence, while China accepts IMF policy advice and internalizes it in its domestic political 
system, it is gradually socialized into accepting the Fund’s neo-liberal economic norms. 
 
However, the extent to which China is socialized into accepting the international norms 
via IMF surveillance and policy advice is contentious. Though China has since 1978 
pursued a general strategy of market liberalization that is mostly compatible with IMF 
norms, the extent of the reforms and their consequences are controversial. It is not 
straightforward to determine how IMF surveillance and policy advice, by taking 
socialization means, have caused China’s domestic economic reforms. The Chinese 
economic leadership has gone through phases of mimicking and of social influence, yet 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 IMF website, section of ‘Surveillance’, access via http://www.imf.org/external/about/econsurv.htm  
 114 
not necessarily reaching the stage of persuasion. The following examples indicate that the 
processes of mimicking and social influence took place to different degrees, respectively, 
in the China-IMF interactions via surveillance and policy advice.  
 
In November 1986, the IMF stated its concerns about China’s incapacity to manage 
foreign loans.  The Fund recommended the State Council should set up greater 
coordination and control over the foreign debt and foreign reserves. Some officials in the 
Supreme People’s Court, Ministry of Finance, and State Council shared these concerns. 
Later on, the IMF held a number of seminars on this topic, and introduced to the Chinese 
officials various institutional models, including those of France, Sweden, Brazil, and so 
on.  Later in the year, eventually, the State Administration of Exchange Control was 
given responsibility for gathering comprehensive statistics on China’s foreign debt and 
approving all uses of foreign exchange. (Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990: 148-9)   
 
Several movements in China’s exchange rate policy were proved as related to IMF policy 
advice. In the mid-1980s, when China suffered balance of payments problems, the IMF 
suggested China should devalue the RMB by nearly 30 per cent. China initially resisted 
the Fund’s pressure, arguing that the resulting sharp rise in the cost of imported materials 
and components would have a disruptive impact on the domestic price level. However, 
China eventually decided to devalue the RMB by 15.8 per cent against major currencies 
just after the IMF consultation mission departed from China. (Lardy 1992: 20)  
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IMF policy advice also affected China’s policy on currency convertibility.  China started 
to introduce a more market-oriented foreign exchange swap market system in 1985, 
whereby foreign-funded companies could convert their RMB earnings to foreign 
exchange at a more favourable rate and more efficiently allocate scarce foreign exchange 
among domestic users.  However, the eventual result over time was to encourage foreign 
exchange hoarding, which drove up the RMB swap rate, especially in response to 
speculative rumours of fuller RMB convertibility, thus taxing exports and indirectly 
subsidizing imports.  Although the authorities tried to address the problem with five 
subsequent RMB devaluations, China ultimately concluded in 1993 with strong IMF 
backing that in January 1994 the official and swap market exchange rates would be 
unified at a higher managed floating exchange rate. (Feeney 1998: 244)  
 
Based on that, the IMF further encouraged China to move more rapidly to fulfil the 
obligation of Article VIII of IMF Articles of Agreement, which limits the ability of 
members to ‘impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current 
international transactions.’23 On June 21, 1996, China announced it would allow foreign-
invested enterprises full access to the interbank market for foreign exchange, beginning 
on July 1, 1996. (PBC 1996: 2)  Later on in the year, the Chinese government made a 
significant step its foreign exchange policy, as well as in the China-IMF relationship.  
China decided to comply with Article VIII of IMF Articles of Agreement to make its 
currency freely convertible on the current account as of December 1, 1996. (Sylvester 
1997; IMF1996a) Michel Camdessus said on this note, 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See Article VIII, IMF Articles of Agreement: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf  
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‘This marks yet another milestone in China’s historic transformation and decisive 
progress toward further integration in the world market economy.  The achievement of 
current account convertibility will further strengthen domestic and international 
confidence in a very promising reform process.’ (IMF 1996b)  
 
By accepting the obligations of Articles VIII, China gave confidence to the international 
community that it would pursue sound economic policies that would obviate the need to 
use restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international 
transactions. (IMF 1996a) Meanwhile, the Chinese government realized that the advice 
from the IMF on China’s foreign exchange policy could offer significant help to China’s 
financial reforms, which was also why China was willing to further open its policy area 
for IMF advice in the following years.    
 
IMF policy advice prompted the Chinese government to reform its financial system so 
that its activities are closer to the standard international economic and financial practices.  
The IMF also provided China with a platform on which it could learn from the financial 
institutions of western developed economies. The reforms in China’s financial sector 
through the 1980s and 1990s proved the success of this connection provided by the IMF.  
In the mid 1980s, China set up a central banking system under the People’s Bank of 
China, which adopted measures to increase the credibility and flexibility of its monetary 
policy.  These included measures diversifying monetary policy instruments, adjusting 
credit policy, stabilizing the balance of payments and the RMB exchange rate, 
restructuring nonbanking financial institutions, accelerating financial reform and 
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restructuring of state-owned enterprises, reorganizing management; undertaking 
commercial bank reform, and further opening financial markets.  In 1998, China 
recapitalized state commercial banks.  In 1999 and 2000, China transferred 
nonperforming loans totaling 15.5 per cent of its GDP to asset management companies 
that resolved bad debts through asset sales and debt equity swaps.  Reforms were also 
undertaken in China’s state-owned enterprise sector, focusing on reducing excess 
capacity, improving efficiency, and transforming ownership structures.  Based on that, a 
modern enterprise system including independent Boards of Directors and Supervisors, 
government functions separated from enterprise management, and improved incentive 
and internal control mechanism was introduced.  (Kent 2007: 134-35; Naughton 2007; 
Lardy 1998)  
 
Moreover, the Chinese government has also enhanced legislative implementation in the 
financial sector, in order to construct a financial system that is compatible with those of 
the western developed economies’. One significant legislative implementation was the 
Central Bank Law, which became effective in March 1995, provided the legal authority 
for the People’s Bank of China to implement monetary policy and to exercise financial 
supervision over other domestic financial institutions. (Lardy 1999: 214)  Other 
legislative implementations included the Commercial Bank Law, the Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China, the Guarantee Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, the Insurance Law of the People’s republic of China, the Price Law of 
the People’s Republic of China, regulations on foreign exchange, and twenty-six laws 
and regulations on foreign investment.  (Kent 2007: 135)  These laws bring China’s 
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financial system into closer alignment with the principles and practices of central banks 
in industrialized countries with advanced monetary regime, and standard international 
financial practice.   The People’s Bank of China also issued new regulations that adopted 
standards from international banking accords, such as the Basle Accord standard of 
capital adequacy. (Lardy 1999: 214)  
 
3.4   Inadequate Policy Advice and Unsuccessful Socialization 	  
Through the above examples, we could see the Chinese economic leadership has gone 
through phases of mimicking and social influence in the early stage since it joined the 
IMF; yet we could not witness full persuasion. Persuasion is proved to have happened 
when clear evidences show that specific IMF policy advice led the Chinese authorities to 
change the values and norms in the financial regime. According to the definition of 
persuasion, when it happens, China not only carries out the practices that meet IMF 
requirements, but also genuinely agrees with the norms backing IMF requirements and 
policy advocates and internalizes these norms in its own policy-making in other related 
issue areas too. (Checkel 2001; Johnston 2008) However, the recent example of IMF 
policy advice to China has turned out to be a negative proof. The IMF’s recent policy 
advice to China has faced some difficulties, especially that on China’s exchange rate 
regime. (IMF 2010a and 2011a) The Chinese authorities continuously refused to take 
IMF Article IV Consultation advice to further revalue its currency. China’s policy on 
exchange rate regime (and other financial policies such as interest rate policy) has 
reflected the Chinese government’s distinct economic norms that differ from those of the 
IMF.  
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The deficiencies in the Article IV Consultation hindered the staff’s capability to provide 
adequate advice to the Chinese authorities and convince them to accept the IMF’s 
advocated economic norms. Yet among all IMF policy advice mechanisms, the Article IV 
Consultation is the most thorough and frequent one toward China, and thus it should 
work more effectively than any other type of policy advice. In other words, the policy 
advice in general has a limited impact on China’s domestic economic policymaking. The 
inadequacies in IMF Article IV Consultations, such as ‘poor accuracy and depth of IMF 
analysis’ and ‘weak IMF advice’, will be analyzed in the following paragraphs. They 
explain why the IMF cannot persuade China to accept its advice. In addition, the 
unsuccessful IMF policy advice is also due to ‘the priority of China’s domestic concerns’ 
and China’s complex ‘domestic policy processes’. These two factors further illustrate 
why China is reluctant to accept IMF advice on some essential policy issues and why 
China refuses to adopt the IMF’s neo-liberal economic norms. These causes of 
unsuccessful IMF policy advice shed light on the question of whether and the extent to 
which persuasion happens in the China-IMF interactions; and they make us wonder if the 
socialization approach tells the full story between China and the IMF.  
 
Poor Accuracy and Depth of IMF Analysis 
 
The accuracy and depth of the analysis carried out by IMF economists for the annual 
Article IV Consultation are not guaranteed. In China’s case, the Fund mission team 
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usually visits Beijing, Shanghai and one other large industrial city24 for a rather short 
period time of around two weeks each summer for the Consultation. In a brief trip like 
this, the mission team could not see a full picture of China’s economic development trend 
of the year. Members of the mission team varied every year, for example, to compare the 
team members in 2006 with those of 2010, only one Fund staff member was in the both 
teams; which means the economists and experts sent by the Fund to analyze China’s 
economic policies and discuss with the Chinese officials were replaced by different ones 
almost completely within 4 years. (IMF 2006: 3; IMF 2010a: 2) The frequent rotation of 
bureaucrats and economists among IMF departments therefore caused a concern that the 
mission teams sent to China may not have a thorough understanding of China’s social 
and political affairs and thus are unable to carry out an accurate analysis of China’s 
economic policies. They simply do not have sufficient time to explore China’s economic 
development in the medium run, as once they get to understand certain patterns of 
China’s economic development, they are transferred to a different post. In addition, much 
of the data and information used for the analysis are secondary sources from companies 
such as Bloomberg and CEIC Data Company, and other economic institutions such as the 
OECD, IFS and INS; or is provided by the Chinese authorities. The accuracy of these 
materials is not guaranteed by the Fund.  
 
On the other hand, the Chinese authorities have not become more frank about their 
financial data and information for IMF surveillance until the most recent years, which 
affected the accuracy of IMF analysis based on the data provided by the authorities. For 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 According to the published staff reports in 2004, 2006, 2010, 2011, and 2012, apart from in 2004 the 
team only visited Beijing, in all the other years the team visited Beijing, Shanghai and one other industrial 
city each year, which was Chongqing (2006), Lanzhou (2010), Chengdu (2011), and Wuhan (2012).  
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instance, the Chinese authorities did not allow the IMF to publish the full staff report of 
the Article IV Consultation until 2004, and before then only PINs with much less details 
were open to the public.  
 
Weak IMF Advice 
 
IMF surveillance via Article IV Consultation does not have much strength when 
confronted with China’s strong self-protective stance. As the most important bilateral 
IMF surveillance tool guiding China’s economic policies, the Article IV Consultation 
generates merely generic assessment of China’s economic development trend in each 
year. Although it does focus on the most critical policy issue according to both the 
internal and external economic environments of the year, the investigation on such policy 
issues is not well followed up and deepened over time. The advice made by the staff 
accordingly is thus too general.  Even if when it comes to a highly controversial issue like 
the undervaluation of the RMB, the IMF prefers to avoid direct disputes with the Chinese 
authorities.  
 
In the past decade, as showed in the PINs and staff reports, the Chinese authorities’ views 
were mostly consistent with Fund staff analysis and advice, apart from the disagreement 
on the irreconcilable issue of the RMB’s exchange rate. The PINs and staff reports 
indicated that the Fund staff were generally pleased with the Chinese government’s 
commitment to macroeconomic management and structural reforms which were 
compatible with Fund norms. The reports also approved China’s contribution to the 
 122 
rebalance of world economy in the post-crisis era. For instance, the 2011 Consultation 
specifically pointed out the significance of China’s Twelfth Five-year Plan. The Plan is 
highlighted by further financial liberalization and the shift toward a consumer-based 
growth model through a range of reforms that intend to strengthen the social safety net, 
raise household income, enhance productivity and invest in human capital. (IMF 2011b: 
5-6) Nevertheless, the Consultations did point out the problems in China’s economic 
policies and reforms throughout the past years, such as lack of flexibility in the exchange 
rate policy, the question of China’s transparency and its observance of standards, the 
over-heated real estate market, the excess inefficient investment and productivity issues 
in bank lending, and so on. (IMF 2002, 2006, 2010a, 2012a)  However, with regard to 
these problems, Fund staff rarely made harsh comments or vigorous criticisms on China’s 
policy decisions in the Consultations; and the reports were mostly encouraging rather 
than condemnatory. The IMF’s weak stance in surveillance and consultations is due to 
the voluntary, instead of mandatory feature of the implementation of IMF advice.  
 
One exception is the controversial case of the RMB’s exchange rate. The advanced 
economies especially the US accused the undervalued RMB of being one of the major 
causes of China’s current account surplus and the consequent unbalanced world 
economy. The Consultations directly pointed out that China’s reserve accumulation was 
significantly above the level needed for precautionary purposes, and that the RMB was 
undervalued.  They also found that the undervalued RMB reduced the scope for running a 
more proactive and independent monetary policy with higher real interest rates, as well as 
creating distortions in relative prices that undermined the government’s efforts to raise 
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household income and to develop the service sector. (IMF 2006: 28, 2010a: 63, 2011b: 
18-19, 2012a: 20, 2013b: 27-28) Based on such assessment, the Fund has constantly 
suggested China should accelerate the RMB appreciation; but even in this case, Fund 
staff did not persuade China to implement their advice.  
 
On the other hand, the Chinese authorities held a consistent and strong standpoint to deny 
the Fund’s claim of the RMB being undervalued every time it was discussed in the 
Consultations. The Chinese authorities stated that the RMB was found undervalued partly 
because the IMF incorrectly based its assessment of the degree of undervaluation upon an 
uncertain forecast of the future current account, and failed to take a broader view on the 
path of the real exchange rate. The false assessment was also due to the balance of 
payment statistics underscoring current account outflows from non-remitted income on 
non-residents’ investment in China. The Chinese authorities insisted that the RMB and 
the foreign exchange market were actually close to equilibrium. (IMF 2011b: 19) In the 
end, although the IMF clearly made their point on China’s exchange rate issue, it failed to 
persuade China to accept the policy advice and revalue the RMB.  
 
The IMF’s relatively feeble advice facing China’s strong stance on the exchange rate 
issue incurred some criticisms from the West. The strongest criticism was from 
Goldstein, who for a long time accused the Fund of being ‘very timid and purposely 
noncommittal’ on the appropriate level of the RMB and the Chinese government’s 
‘manipulation’ of the current and recent levels of the exchange rate. (Goldstein 2005: 
150-151) He also argued that the Fund failed to detect and correct the Chinese 
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government’s ‘currency manipulation’ problem because it was ‘intimidated by the 
extreme sensitivity of the Chinese authorities to external criticism of their exchange rate 
policy’ and thus failed its role of the only umpire of the international financial sector.25 
He has also called for IMF ad hoc consultations on China’s exchange rate policies and 
strengthening the rules on exchange rate policies. (Goldstein 2011: 18-23) However, 
Goldstein’s criticism did not provoke a reform in terms of an increase of strength in IMF 
surveillance on China. The suggestion of ad hoc consultation on China’s exchange rate 
policies did not have a substantial impact, because firstly the Fund very rarely initiates ad 
hoc consultations on countries’ exchange rate policies26. Secondly, even the Fund’s 
institutionalized official Article IV Consultation failed to correct China’s exchange rate 
policy problems as argued by Goldstein, why would an ad hoc consultation that is much 
less thorough and comprehensive do the job?  
 
More importantly, the Chinese authorities and scholars do not accept the criticism of 
‘currency manipulation’. Professor Yu Yongding of CASS- while admitting that the 
Chinese government did intervene in the exchange rate market for more than two years- 
refuted Goldstein’s accusation of ‘currency manipulation’, since none of the IMF rules 
indicated such matter. (Yu 2006: 524) As a matter of fact, the Chinese authorities and 
economists prefer an IMF that sticks to its basic roles- such as providing temporary 
financial assistance, assisting countries to formulate the right macroeconomic policies, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Goldstein’s criticism of the Fund surveillance was, ‘it offers no guide to what is and what is not 
internationally acceptable exchange rate policy, it finds no country guilty of misbehaving when the 
evidence to the contrary is by now overwhelming, it offers no incentive and/or penalties designed to change 
errant behaviour, and it removes the one institution (the IMF) that could plausibly serve as a credible 
international umpire from a policy arena that is rife with opportunities for breaking the rules and gaining 
market share at your neighbour’s expense.’ 
26 The IMF only initiated ad hoc consultations on countries’ exchange rate policies twice in the history: for 
Sweden in 1982 and for South Korea in 1987.  
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and providing a forum for multilateral economic cooperation and policy coordination- 
rather than a nosy and harsh watchdog that imposes its opinions on China.  The Chinese 
authorities think the IMF should be careful not to go beyond its mandate, for example, 
the conditionality attached with IMF loans should be country-sensitive and compatible 
with the countries’ potential economic prosperity; and IMF technical assistance and 
policy advice ought not to invasively disturb the countries’ domestic policy decisions.   
 
The Chinese authorities and economists do not find it necessary for the IMF to intensify 
its surveillance on emerging market economies; and neither do they find it appropriate to 
change the Fund’s mandate. Instead, if there is any need for the IMF to be tougher on its 
surveillance, it should be directed towards the policy gaps in advanced economies. (IMF 
2012a: 22-23) It does not mean that China prefers a weak and ignorant IMF than an 
effective safeguard that oversees the global economic policies, but for the moment China 
would rather support an IMF with gradualist approaches which leaves China much time 
and space to advance its domestic economic stability first.  
 
Priority of Domestic Interests  
 
The doubt about the effectiveness of IMF Article IV Consultation on China’s economic 
policy-making also refers to the superiority of domestic concerns and China’s complex 
domestic policy processes. They also explain why other forms of IMF policy advice do 
not have explicit impacts on China’s policy decisions either. IMF Article IV Consultation 
teams and other officials, together with their policy advice are mostly welcomed by the 
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Chinese authorities every year. They have continuously encouraged China to speed up 
financial liberalization, including the use of more price-based tools of monetary policy, to 
further open the capital account, to broaden the range of alternative investment vehicles 
for savers, to remove the government restrictions on bank lending and allow lending 
decisions to be based on commercial goals, to improve the financial infrastructure and 
relevant legal frameworks, and so on. (IMF 2011b; IMF 2011c: 5-7; IMF 2012b: 5-6, 
IMF 2012c: 9, IMF 2011d) The Chinese authorities’ reaction to such advocacies has 
always been ambiguous, cautious and reserved. The standard rhetoric usually sounds 
something like the progress of reforms is determined by various economic and social 
factors that are preconditioned on a stable and supportive macroeconomic environment. 
Nevertheless the precise explanations of the relevant ‘factors’ and ‘preconditions’ are 
missing.  
 
However, it would be unfair to neglect China’s efforts in the financial reforms in the past 
years. The fact is China has made impressive achievements in the banking reforms and 
financial market liberalization.  The reason why the IMF and other international 
institutions sometimes feel their opinions are being ignored is that the Chinese 
authorities’ decisions on domestic reforms are purely based on the comparative benefits 
and influences of China’s domestic industries and financial institutions. When the 
Chinese authorities make highly crucial policy decisions they always take the domestic 
concerns as the only priority; and the impacts of advice from the intergovernmental 
organizations such as the IMF are at most secondary, in other words, there is little space 
for ‘social influence’ and/or ‘persuasion’ to work.   
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Take the exchange rate policy as an example, although criticisms from the advanced 
economies and pressure from the IMF are increasing, the Chinese policymakers have not 
tended to make a hasty decision to revalue the RMB. Chinese officials and economists 
have strongly demonstrated that the exchange rate of the RMB is a matter for China. In 
2009 and 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao stated in several national and international 
conferences that a sharp RMB appreciation would destroy China’s export industry while 
it was still at the low end of the global value added chain and thus generate high 
unemployment and social instability. (Xinhua 2010; Renminwang 2009) While stressing 
the Chinese government would not make such a decision notwithstanding the massive 
international pressure, he also called upon international society, especially the US and 
Europe, not to force RMB appreciation. Although the Chinese economy is transforming 
from a export-driven to a consumption-driven growth model as part of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan, the government will not let the RMB revalue greatly as the export industry remains 
one of the most important contributors to China’s GDP.   
 
Moreover, most of the Chinese economists do not consider China’s exchange rate issues 
amount to causing the global trade imbalance, and that neither could RMB revaluation 
correct such imbalance. (Yu 2006: 521) Xu Qiyuan of the CASS argued that while China 
carries on its exchange rate regime reforms, it should preclude overseas political 
interference and hold on its own standpoint, and carry out effective counter-containment 
toward potential threats. (Xu 2011) In his book Renminbi can say no: Exchange rate of 
Renminbi, China decides! Yan Xingfang defended China’s exchange rate policies and 
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accused the US of starting a ‘currency war’ to contain China. (Yan 2010) Although some 
arguments in the book sound overly defensive, they reflect some Chinese economists’ 
explicit antipathy toward international criticisms over China’s exchange rate policies, as 
well as their will to protect China’s domestic industries and market stability. Therefore, 
the strong objection against a sharp RMB revaluation among the domestic concerns 
prevented the IMF and any other outsiders to impose their advice on China’s exchange 
rate policies.  
 
When there are differences among domestic voices on one policy issue, the authorities 
usually choose to secure the benefits of the most influential party. For instance, 
marketization of interest rates was proposed in 1993, yet the discussions of advantages 
and disadvantages of such a reform have remained controversial. Both the saving and 
debit interest rates are still under central control today. The most important reason for the 
reform being delayed is that the marketization of interest rates would harm the core 
benefits of China’s four largest state-owned commercial banks. Once the interest rate is 
liberalized, the four big banks’ interest margins from which most of the profits are 
generated will decline, and competition from smaller and local banks will increase 
rapidly. (Tan 2011) Meanwhile the central bank worries the marketization of interest 
rates will cause ‘price wars’ among banks and thus push up the debit interest rates and 
consequently make borrowing even more difficult for the companies. In spite of the 
increasing voices protesting against the over-protection of the four big banks and calling 
for a fairer market condition for smaller and/or private financial institutions, savers and 
corporations, the authorities chose the conservative route to maintain policies that favour 
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the four big banks.  Therefore, the authorities continued to keep the interest rate 
controlled, at least till the whole financial sector is better self-regulated. Interest rate 
marketization is just one example of the policy issues upon which China’s reforms lagged 
behind the IMF’s standard economic liberalization. In some other similar cases referring 
to the economic reforms, the Chinese authorities have chosen to preserve the state-owned 
sectors’ benefits. Such policy decisions clearly violated the IMF’s classic neo-liberal 
norms.  
 
After all, China has a unique development model that is distinguished from the rest of the 
world. The Chinese authorities think only a certain part of IMF advice is suitable for 
China’s domestic situation, and the rest is less relevant with regard to China’s unique 
developmental model. China has socialized into some of the IMF guiding norms, to the 
extent that China’s economic reforms in the past 30 years have mostly followed the 
liberal economic principles. However, Chinese policymakers and economists are 
challenged by multiple tasks that require them to adopt a very different approach toward 
economic liberalization because of China’s own unique political regime and social 
environment.  
 
China does not tend to minimize public ownership in the country’s crucial industrial 
sectors, instead it keeps exploring better ways to manage the dynamics between the 
public and private sectors under the ruling party-state. The scholars working on the so 
called ‘Beijing Consensus’ and ‘China model’ – such as Barry Naughton, Giovanni 
Arrighi, and Zhao Suisheng- pointed out the significance of the state government in 
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China’s economic development. (Naughton 2010, Arrighi 2007, Zhao 2010) Barry 
Naughton argued that China is so unique that its model is not applicable to other 
developing countries; nevertheless he concluded 6 aspects of China’s economic 
development that were crucial to the success and could possibly inspire other developing 
countries.27 (Naughton 2010: 437-453)  
 
These aspects emphasized the significance of public ownership and the state sector in 
China’s industrial development. Since the Chinese authorities want to make sure the 
financial sector has sufficient capital available for the public and state owned sectors, 
they prefer to keep the financial sector under controlled reforms to protect it from the 
wild market. Approaches like this are not compatible with the neo-liberal norms 
advocated by the Fund.  Nevertheless, even when China is engaged in the reforms that 
are compatible with Fund norms, all the specific decisions on the issues like the extent, 
the time period, and the range of affected institutions or individuals are made according 
to the authorities’ own cost/benefit analysis. China’s reforms are not guided by the IMF 
and/or any other international organizations, but mostly by its own governments. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 These 6 aspects are described as: 1 public ownership can be reasonably efficient, and the ‘mixed 
economy’ is a decent model of industrial organization; 2, competition is encouraged in all sectors except 
those designed as strategic and remains more important than ownership; 3, public ownership can be used to 
exploit market power and generate revenues for investment and public goods’ creation; 4, a strategy of 
investment-led growth is essential; 5, for a growth-oriented polity, the state sector may be used 
aggressively to create growth (and revenue) opportunities outside the state sector; 6, managers of publicly-
owned corporations can be motivated by tying their compensation to their company’s performance in 
maximizing asset value. 
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China’s Political System 
 
The institutional features of China’s financial sector further explained why IMF advice 
failed to exert large influences on China’s economic policy-making. The IMF’s direct 
corresponding institution in China is the People’s Bank of China. In the PBC, there is an 
‘IMF Division’ under the management of the International Department, which takes 
charge of the interactions with the IMF. Their major duties are coordinating with the IMF 
on the affairs such as dispatching Chinese officials to the IMF for temporary posts, 
receiving delegations from the Fund, managing the schedules of Chinese delegations to 
IMF meetings, and other administrative matters. (Interview with a Chinese official28)   
They are separated from the PBC’s core decision-making sectors. In simple words, PBC 
staff who align with the IMF do not have much influence on the Bank’s policy decisions. 
Therefore, IMF advice may not be taken into account in the Central Bank’s essential 
policy decisions.  As argued by Woods, if the IMF wants to successfully ‘persuade’ the a 
state government to accept its policy advice, it needs to find ‘sympathetic interlocutors’ 
in the state that share the Fund’s ‘technical expertise, methodology, and an orthodox 
economist’s understanding of problems and solutions’. She also added that what’s 
equally important is the ‘sympathetic interlocutors’’ position in the government structure 
and the bureaucratic and political incentives they face. If they do not have large influence 
in the government, the Fund lacks ‘a degree of leverage and influence’; and this is the 
case in China. (Woods 2006: 72-80) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  The interview was conducted in Beijing. The interviewee (Interviewee 1) is a government official who 
works closely with the IMF in a Chinese Financial Institution.	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The State Council usually assigns the directors or deputy directors of the PBC’s 
International Department to the IMF as executive directors.  These officials have a 
relatively low political status in the domestic bureaucratic system, and thus very little 
voice in China’s political society. On their return, their working experience in the Fund 
may have very limited contribution toward China’s economic policymaking. One 
example further reflected that the IMF-related affairs are not on the top list of the Chinese 
government’s political agenda. The Chinese government usually sent the governor of the 
PBC and the Minister of Finance to World Bank-IMF Annual Meetings; however, it only 
sent some lower level officials to the 2012 Annual Meetings held in Tokyo because of the 
on-going island dispute with Japan. In this case, China’s representation in the IMF was 
simply compromised facing the political dispute that was regarded as more critical to the 
country’s sovereignty and dignity.  
 
As the IMF’s main corresponding institution in China, the PBC’s lack independent 
decision-making power further prevented the IMF advice from exerting substantial 
influence on China’s economic policy decisions. Although the PBC formulates some of 
the country’s crucial monetary policies, it is subordinated to the executive orders of the 
State Council. PBC policy decisions are also heavily influenced by other economic 
institutions, such as the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce, the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange, and the China Banking Regulatory Commission.  
Although the PBC is an important component of the State Council, it does not have 
adequate political power to overturn decisions of the local provincial governments. 
Considering that some of China’s most wealthy and powerful provinces on the east, 
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southeast, and south coast- such as Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong- 
rely their economic development on the export industries, it is almost impossible for the 
PBC to decide to revalue the RMB as advocated by the IMF and advanced economies but 
harmful to China’s own exports.  
 
4   Is Socialization a Good Approach to Analyzing the China-IMF 
Relationship? 
 
Although the context of China joining the IMF and their earlier engagement created 
favourable conditions for socialization to take place, the sequence of socialization 
processes –mimicking, social influence, and persuasion- has not (fully) taken place. 
China’s economic leadership has gone through the phases of ‘mimicking’ and ‘social 
influence’ in the early stage since joined the IMF, yet not full persuasion. Achievement of 
persuasion would be China’s real acceptance of the IMF’s advocated neo-liberal 
economic norms; and the rejection of it shows that the Chinese government makes its 
economic policy decisions based upon more influential factors other than IMF 
propositions. 30 years into China’s IMF membership, the Fund has not successfully 
convinced the Chinese authorities to deeply change its minds, values, and attitudes to 
further liberalize its economy. Although China has undertaken domestic economic 
reforms in the style of liberalization that complies with IMF norms, it has refused to take 
into account IMF advice on the policy issues that are fundamental to the state’s domestic 
economic development, such as liberalization of interest rates and foreign exchange rates. 
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(IMF 2010a; 2011a; 2012a) The reasons for China’s resistance to IMF policy advice are 
both political and institutional.  
 
As previously mentioned, the lack of accuracy and depth in IMF Article IV Consultation 
is caused by the limited IMF personnel and expertise resources. On top that, the advisory, 
instead of mandatory, characteristic of IMF Article IV Consultation makes IMF advice 
rather pale and unconvincing facing the strong stance of the stubborn Chinese authorities. 
More importantly, the protection of the benefits of strong domestic industrial and 
financial groups further prevents IMF neo-liberal economic norms from intruding 
China’s domestic policy-making. China has a unique development model in which the 
government does not intend to minimize public and state ownership in the country’s 
crucial industrial sectors. In order to ensure the financial resources for the public and 
state owned sectors, as well as for the financial stability, the government prefers to 
liberalize its financial sector incrementally. The Chinese government would like to 
control the exact speed and pace of its financial liberalization, rather than letting the IMF 
make the decision. China prefers the IMF as a moderate and advisory coordinator rather 
than a watchdog that imposes its opinions on China. In addition, the fact that the PBC – 
as the IMF’s directly corresponding institution in China- does not have independent 
policy-making power makes IMF policy more difficult from shaping China’s financial 
policies.  
 
These political and institutional obstacles to IMF socialization are fundamental and 
structural. It is not likely that the Chinese government will start to accept and internalize 
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the IMF’s neo-liberal norms to a much larger degree at the expense of the balance (or 
imbalance) of China’s domestic economic interests. Therefore it is not likely that the 
effectiveness of IMF socialization, especially those of persuasion will increase within a 
short period of time. These fundamental and structural obstacles have revealed some 
limitations in the ‘socialization’ explanation of the China-IMF relationship.  
 
4.1   Measure of Normative Factors 	  
First of all, the consequences of IMF socialization vis-à-vis China are difficult to observe 
and assess. The socialization approach focuses on the changes in China’s values and 
norms, which are mostly concealed and ambiguous. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, 
Kent tried to solve the measure of international socialization.  In her paper ‘China’s 
International Socialization: the Role of International Organizations’, she proposed three 
indices to measure the international socialization for China. They are China’s readiness to 
redefine its actual interests, including its implementation of international norms in 
domestic law and practices; China’s preparedness to renegotiate its sovereignty in 
response to organizational and treaty pressure; and the degree to which China shows a 
readiness to shoulder the costs, as well as enjoy the benefits, of organizational 
participation. (Kent 2002: 349-358) Yet the terms such as ‘actual interests’, ‘sovereignty’ 
and ‘costs/benefits’ require for more specific explanations.  
 
In the case of China-IMF interaction, IMF advice has provided China with some 
guidance for reshaping China’s financial policies and establishing new financial 
institutions and laws, yet it is unknown to what extent such guidance has influenced 
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China’s domestic reforms. China has increasingly participated in more IMF programs 
such as the GDDS in 2002 and the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) in 
2009, which reflected China’s willingness to renegotiate its economic sovereignty by 
submitting more financial fata and information to the Fund. However, the Chinese 
government blocked the publication of its Article IV Consultation staff reports in the 
period of 2007-09 for unknown reasons, which showed it was not completely prepared to 
‘renegotiate its sovereignty’ with the IMF. In this case, we cannot judge whether the IMF 
has successfully socialized China into accepting its norms.  
 
4.2   Material and Non-material Impacts 	  
Secondly, the socialization approach focuses on the international organization’s 
nonmaterial impacts on the state including the changes in its political principles, values, 
and norms that are reflected in the later practices. In practice, it is highly unrealistic to 
separate nonmaterial from material impacts on the state policy practices, especially in the 
cases of IMF financial assistances. The IMF provides the member states that have 
balance of payments difficulties with loans. These loans are attached with conditionality, 
which require the loan beneficiaries to carry out domestic political and economic reforms 
under the guidance of economic liberalization in order to secure the succeeding issuance 
of loans. The socialization theorists argue that the international neoliberal economic 
norms are transmitted to the member states via IMF lending conditionality. I agree with 
this increment process of norm transmission; however, I want to point out that the 
material incentive (financial benefits) is the primary motivation for state engagement in 
the IMF lending mechanisms. The norm transmission process would be cut off if the state 
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finds a lending source that is more tolerant toward its domestic political environment. 
Therefore, in some, if not the most cases, the nonmaterial impacts are built upon the 
material impacts.  
 
Although China does not receive much financial assistance from the IMF, it does take 
into account the concerns of material benefits/costs when it makes the decisions of 
whether to compromise more sovereignty and invite more IMF technical assistance and 
policy advice in domestic affairs. The more benefits of engaging in the IMF are reflected 
in the measurable material terms, the more attractive IMF programs seem to be to the 
China authorities.  
 
4.3   Other Factors than IMF Socialization 	  
Thirdly, international organization socialization is not the only- may not even be the 
primary- influence of the changes in the member state’s political principles, interest, 
values and norms. The consequences of international socialization are often reflected 
through the state’s institutional changes and policy practices.  However, we cannot easily 
judge if a certain domestic change is due to the socialization of the specific international 
organization that the state participates in, because the state’s institutional changes and 
policy practices respond to various internal and external factors.  
 
Internally, as mentioned in the earlier text, China’s domestic financial policy-making is 
influenced by several domestic governmental departments, such as the PBC, CBRC, 
MOF, SAFE, and the NBS. Therefore if the PBC that interacts with the IMF has less 
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influence in the domestic political system (which is true in many cases) than those of 
others29, the IMF may fail to socialize China into accepting and implementing its 
advocated norms. In this case, even if the IMF has successfully convinced the PBC to 
accept its norms, it still has limited influence on the final decisions of the Chinese 
government. The multiple sources of institutional and power influences make it difficult 
to distinguish in the impact of IMF socialization.  
 
Externally, China participates in various economic institutions and programs. China has 
undertaken its domestic reforms in the past three decades in the style of liberalization, 
which matches the advocated IMF neoliberal economic norms.  However, it does not 
mean the interaction with the IMF is the only reason behind China’s economic 
liberalization. China has engaged with various international and regional institutions in 
the past three decades, such as the World Bank, the WTO, the G20, the BRICS and so on. 
Each of these institutions may lead China to change its existing interests and values; and 
therefore it is difficult to tell which of these institutions (and to what degree) socializes 
China into accepting their specific norms. The neoliberal economic norms exist in a 
certain political environment rather than a single institution, and each institution in the 
environment interprets the norms in a unique way.  If China is proved to be socialized 
into accepting the neoliberal economic norms, it is usually the consequence of China’s 
engagement with a mixture of international and regional organizations rather than any 
single one of them on its own.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 They may, or may not, be influenced by the socialization of other international organizations.  
 139 
In addition, China’s increasing participation in the international financial market has 
probably ‘socialized’ China into accepting more liberal economic norms than in 
international economic organizations.  The market imposes penalties automatically when 
the behaviour of Chinese financial institutions and firms deviates from its expectations 
and from those of other market players.  Market forces also promote transparency and 
efficiency, and encourage China to improve self-regulation in the financial sector. 
Exploiting the public international capital market required that Chinese listing entities- 
including the Ministry of Finance and non-sovereign borrowers such as the Bank of 
China, the Construction Bank of China, the China International Trust and Investment 
Company, and regional trust and investment companies- divulge more information in the 
1990s than in the past.  China’s entry into the international equity markets also raised 
requests for more information and increased transparency.  In the early 1990s, the 
Chinese regulatory authorities spurned an initial information suggestion that it offers its 
equity shares on a to-be-created second-tier Hong Kong market where the listing 
requirements would be less rigorous.  Alternatively, the Chinese authorities chose to meet 
the normal listing requirements.  Therefore, a large amount of work was required to 
restate the accounts of Chinese firms in the standard Western format; and a much greater 
degree of financial disclosure was required.  (Lardy 1999: 212-14)  
 
4.4   State as a Strong-minded and Self-determined Member  	  
Fourthly, the socialization approach simply assumes the international organizations are 
the providers of the international norms, and states are the takers. It does not fully apply 
to the China-IMF case. It explains better the China-IMF relationship in the period when 
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China just joined the IMF than that of later periods when China got more familiar with 
IMF practices and more confident with its own development model. After decades of 
isolation, China was lacking the capital and expertise when it regained IMF membership 
in 1980. China had very little knowledge of the methods used in financial practices and 
the rules and regulations in the international financial system. China was also unfamiliar 
with the practices of the IMF and other international economic organizations. Since 
China was willing to learn all the methods and rules from the IMF while the Fund was 
seeking to diffuse the neoliberal internal economic norms among developing countries, it 
created a suitable environment for socialization in the early period.  
 
Even then, we ought not to ignore China’s intention to cooperate with the IMF. China 
was clear about its willingness to learn the financial practices and earn international 
approval from the IMF, as much as its unwillingness to have the IMF overly intervene its 
domestic policy-making. China has always had a unique domestic political and social 
system, backed by very strong self-consciousness and culture. China did not join the IMF 
by chance; instead, it had a clear goal of what it wanted to achieve and how the IMF 
could help it achieve the goal. This goal also grew over time. For example, in the 1980s 
and 1990s the Chinese authorities mainly hoped the IMF would teach standardized 
financial practices and rules to the Chinese officials who were taking charge of domestic 
financial reforms. Since the 2007/08 global financial crisis, China has urged the IMF to 
maintain stability of the international financial system in which China now has a bigger 
share of.  (Eichengreen 2009; Baston 2009: A10; Xiang 2010)  
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Later when China got more involved in IMF and other international economic activities, 
it learned to develop a strategy to handle the IMF-related issues, and hence not just did 
what it was told to do. The strategy includes a better assessment of the cost/benefit of 
signing up for IMF programs, alignment with other emerging market and developing 
country members in order to build a stronger community within the Fund, and seeking to 
have a stronger voice in IMF formal and informal governance. Therefore, while learning 
the internationally formalized financial practices and being socialized into accepting the 
international neoliberal economic norms to the extent that is controlled by the authorities 
themselves, China’s participation may also lead the IMF to modify its institutional 
structure and policy practices. As described by Chin, it is a ‘two-way socialization’. 
(Chin 2012)  The socialization approach drives us to focus on the IMF’s impacts on 
China, which may lead to ignorance of China’s impact on the IMF. For example, China’s 
participation further legitimated the IMF’s status as genuine global organization, and 
blunted the charge that it was merely the instrument of Western imperialism and 
exploitation. (Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990: 131) The IMF also gained important 
information and knowledge about China’s political and economic development via its 
interaction with various Chinese government officials and experts, because an increasing 
amount of data became available to the IMF, and through that to other international 
institutions. China’s participation in the IMF also broadened the IMF’s view on economic 
development of some transition economies such as the Eastern European countries and 
developing countries such as Vietnam and Tanzania in the early years, and other 
emerging market economies in the later years. (Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990) In 
addition, China has been endeavouring to push forward IMF quota and voting share 
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reforms that mean to strengthen the decision making power of the emerging market and 
developing country members.  
 
As China grew stronger in general in the past three decades, its role in the international 
political society has largely increased. As a result, China is less threatened by the 
sanctions from international organizations.  As China gets more familiar with the rules in 
the international political society, it has also joined more international and regional 
organizations. These outside options have made China even less restricted by the Fund. 
Apart from engaging with other international organizations, China sometimes prefers to 
take the bilateral cooperation that is relatively flexible, or chooses to take the unilateral 
solution if no international cooperation fits into its agenda.30 China has also developed its 
own strong interests and values. Supporting by its increasing economic power and 
political influence (especially in the emerging market economy and developing countries), 
China is less willing to compromise its interests and values; instead, it is more likely to 
promote its own norms via interactions with international organizations. As Elizabeth 
Economy argued, ‘Beijing has launched a “go out” strategy designed to remake global 
norms and institutions’; and ‘China is transforming the world as it transforms itself... 
China has become a revolutionary power’. (Economy 2010: 142) It is uncertain how 
strong China is to change the rules in the international financial economy, yet it is 
definite that China is not a passive rule taker. It strives to promote an international 
financial economic system where its own expansion is not largely constrained.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  China’s bilateral, unilateral and regional financial cooperation will be discussed later in Chapter 7.	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The socialization approach takes the international norms as granted, which overestimates 
the correctness, universality, and adaptability of the norms. The international norms are 
not static. They may be extended to a global level; and in this case it is difficult to tell if 
the later changes in the state are due to socialization by a specific international 
organization or the general environment. The international norms advocated by the 
international organization may also fall behind the development of the political 
environment and become unsuitable for guiding the state’s policy practices anymore; and 
in this case it is not appropriate to assume the international organization continues to 
socialize the state into accepting norms that are out of date. IMF policy guidance for its 
member countries is controversial. Its incorrect policy guidance for the Southeast Asian 
countries during the Asian financial crisis incurred massive criticism. Its advocacy about 
capital control and exchange rate regime has been proved wrong in several cases. 
(Moschella 2012) In addition, the IMF’s internal governance structure does not match the 
economic power structure among states in the real international economic society. While 
emerging market economies are playing an increasingly important role in the world 
economy, the IMF is still mainly controlled by the western developed countries whose 
shares in the world economy are shrinking. (Woods and Lombardi 2006) Hence the 
IMF’s promotion of neo-liberalism and its unbalanced governance structure have made 
its norms less suitable and attractive among many states. It makes the proposition on IMF 
socializing states into accepting and internalizing its norms less convincing.  
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5   Conclusion: China’s Objectives and A Different View of the China-IMF 
Relationship 
 
Hence we need a different approach to analyzing the relationship between China and the 
IMF in the later stage where China has developed its own objectives and strategies in the 
governance of the international financial economy. We need an approach that is not 
restricted to ‘normative’ factors in the interactions between China and the IMF; that also 
takes into account of China’s participation in other international institutions, and impacts 
of China’ domestic political concerns and institutions; and that correctly addressed 
China’s strong intentions that lead it to further participate in IMF programs. The last 
point is extremely important, because the Chinese government’s objectives largely (if not 
solely) determine its strategic moves in the international political sphere. China’s 
objectives should be regarded as the primary driving force of its participation in IMF 
programs in the new approach.  
 
In addition, some of the causes of unsuccessful IMF policy advice are related to the 
inadequacies in IMF functions such as lack of expertise resources to support the Article 
IV Consultation for China and the weak advisory (rather than mandatory) features of 
Fund surveillance programs. Hence the new approach should pay more attention to the 
IMF’s functions that directly lead to the result of its interactions with China and other 
members.  
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The results of IMF policy advice also disclose the strong influences of the Chinese 
authorities’ political preferences. Since the authorities insist on protecting the interests of 
powerful domestic industries and financial sectors that are likely state-owned, they are 
reluctant to compromise when they deal with the IMF advice that calls for market-
determined resource distribution and reduction of government administrative controls. It 
does not only happen in IMF surveillance and policy advice. In general, when the IMF’s 
preferences deviate from those of the Chinese authorities, the results of interactions 
between the two are likely to be disappointing. The impacts of the Chinese authorities’ 
preferences further emphasize China’s initiative in participation in IMF programs. China, 
as an increasingly influential IMF state member, is not submissive to the Fund’s 
decisions and norms.  
 
The limitations of socialization theory thus drove my attention to principal-agent theory. 
Principal-agent theory refers to relationships between states and international 
organizations based on delegation. States, based on their needs and objectives in a certain 
issue area, delegate authority to an international organization that performs the delegated 
tasks on the states’ behalf in order to benefit the states. International organizations have 
independent functions and institutional rules and political practices, and they decide the 
ways in which they want to accomplish the delegated tasks. International organizations 
can be highly influential that they can influence the states’ decisions on delegation, which 
is compatible with socialization theory’s focus on international organizations’ impacts on 
their state members.  
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As a theoretical framework, principal-agent theory is not restricted by the division 
between material and normative factors. It takes into account the states’ institutional 
features and their relative positions in the international organization. Most importantly, it 
emphasizes the states’ objectives and the international organizations’ functions as the 
reasons for delegation. Principal-agent theory also looks into the states’ preferences, 
compared to those of the international organizations’, in order to assess the results of the 
interactions between states and international organizations. 
 
Principal-agent theory overcomes some limitations in socialization theory, yet it does not 
deny the probability of international organization socializing state members into 
accepting their norms and values. It recognizes the normative influences of international 
organizations, which are based on the organizations’ institutional rules and patterned 
behaviour and the staff’s working principles and values. Hence, it greatly supplements 
socialization theory in analyzing the relationship between China and the IMF in the later 
stage. The essential concepts and causal relations in principal-agent theory will be 
reviewed and discussed in the next theory chapter. Following the theory chapter, 
principal-agent theory will be used to analyze the relationship between China and the 
IMF in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
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Chapter 4 - Theoretical Approach (II): Principal-Agent 
Theory 
 
 
1   Introduction 
 
Principal-agent theory in international relations is used as a direct approach to defining 
the relationships between states and international organizations. It assumes states as 
principals, and international organizations as the states’ agents in the international 
political sphere.  (Nielson and Tierney 2003) Principals and agents are tied up together 
via ‘delegation’, which is also the most essential interaction in principal-agent theory. All 
the causal relations are based on delegation in the principal-agent theoretical framework. 
States delegate authority to international organizations because the latter have advanced 
functions that can help the former accomplish various tasks in order to achieve their 
goals. (Hawkins et al. 2006)  
 
Principal-agent theory not only defines relationships between states and international 
organizations, but also examines the related factors of delegation, including its causes, 
processes, and consequences. The purpose of such examination is to pursue a more 
comprehensive and thorough understanding of the relationships between states and 
international organizations. Delegation indicates dynamic relationships between states 
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and international organizations, affected by various features of both sides of the actors as 
well as the external environments. For instance, states’ and international organizations’ 
interests and preferences can primarily affect the states’ decisions on delegation. States’ 
and international organizations’ governance structures also matter. An international 
organization’s institutional structure determines each state’s role of governance and thus 
its decision making power in the organization, which leads to specific delegation 
consequences. A state’s governance structure determines the form of delegation (with a 
certain degree of discretion) and the length of the ‘delegation chain’ in a principal-agent 
framework. States’ decisions on delegation to an international organization do not remain 
the same permanently, and they vary according to the consequences of delegation.  If 
satisfactory delegation consequences are generated, states may choose to ‘re-delegate’; 
however, if the delegation consequences are undesired, states may ‘de-delegate’. In the 
dynamic process of delegation, states seek to use controlling mechanisms to ensure 
satisfactory delegation consequences; meanwhile, international organizations use agency 
strategies to influence the states’ decisions on delegation. (Ibid)  
 
Principal-agent theory can be used to analyze the relationship between China and the 
IMF, because the Chinese government has explicit objectives in the international 
financial economy that can be achieved with the IMF’s assistance. In other words, the 
Chinese government delegates tasks to the IMF due to its advanced functions, so that the 
IMF can accomplish the tasks more effectively (than China undertaking the tasks on its 
own or delegating them to other institutions). This is consistent with the Chinese 
government’s pragmatic and cautious diplomatic approaches: driven by its distinct 
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objectives, the Chinese government gets engaged with international organizations for 
various benefits; meanwhile, it avoids getting involved in controversial events or those 
that threaten China’s sovereignty. Principal-agent theory also facilitates assessments of 
the consequences of China’s delegation (of tasks) to the IMF.  Such assessments involve 
examinations of a number of key factors mentioned above, such as actors’ preferences 
and governance structures, principal controls, agency strategies, and so on, based on 
China’s and the IMF’s functional roles that are set as principal and agent respectively. 
Before the examinations are carried out, the key concepts and causal relations in 
principal-agent theory need to be reviewed and discussed. 
 
Section 2 of this chapter includes a brief introduction of principal-agent theory in 
multiple disciplines, including microeconomics, American politics, comparative politics 
and international organization studies. Section 3 focuses on the concept of delegation, 
especially the reasons for states to delegate tasks to international organizations. When 
states make decisions on delegation, they are usually motivated by international 
organizations’ outstanding expertise, political skills, and resources; agenda setting power 
that enables them to generate equilibrium in controversial circumstances; capability to 
govern decision-making in situations where the contract is not explicit; capability to solve 
time-consistency problems; and capability to ‘lock-in’ political winners’ policy effects. In 
section 4, the key features of the main actors in the principal-agent framework- 
principals, agents and third party actors- are discussed based on the existing literature.  
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The reviewed essences of principal-agent theory effectively contribute to the proposal of 
a systemic approach to analyzing the relationship between states and international 
organizations in Section 5. The approach has four stages: identifying actors, analyzing 
agents’ functions and principals’ consequential delegation decisions, evaluating agents’ 
delegation actions, and assessing the consequences of delegation. These four stages are a 
connected sequence; and the results of one stage are linked to the later stages. In 
particular, the consequences of delegation depend on the features of the involved actors, 
their functions and delegation processes. The proposed research approach enables us to 
specify the relationship between China and the IMF in a more analytical and orderly way. 
However, the interactions between China and the IMF mark a unique principal-agent 
framework, where some specific features and causal relations are distinct from the 
principal-agent interactions in the previous research. They reflect the originality of 
applying principal-agent theory in the China-IMF interactions. These unique features and 
causal relations are examined in the 6th section of the chapter.  
 
2   Principal-Agent Theory 
 
Principal-agent theory derived from agency theory in the field of microeconomics. It was 
originally designed to solve the information asymmetries issues in the insurance sector. 
(Spence and Zeckerhauser 1971) Economists specified the key concepts and issues of 
principal-agent theory and developed a canonical model to test the theory. (Holmstrom 
1979; Shavell 1979)  The later development of the theory increasingly focused on 
information asymmetries and incentives; and it was applied in a broader range of areas 
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than just insurance.31 Principal-agent theory further developed in the studies of American 
(especially congressional) and comparative politics. (Shepsle 1979, 1986, 1989; Weingast 
and Moran 1983; Weingast 1984; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984) For example, 
Weingast and Moran argued that the congressional committees possess sufficient rewards 
and sanctions to create an incentive system for agencies. The bureaucrats are motivated 
by incentives to act in the Congress’ best interests. Therefore, members of the Congress 
shape bureaucratic behaviour without monitoring, by offering implicit contracts based on 
the observable effects of the behaviour. (Weingast and Moran 1983; Weingast 1984; 
Miller 2005) Political scientists also used principal-agent theory to explain the 
relationship between the chief executive (as the agent) and the general public (as the 
principal). (Downs and Rocke 1994)  
 
This rational choice institutionalist logic was extended to studies of international 
organizations, where international organizations are regarded as bureaucracies at the 
international level. The basic framework of principal-agent theory applied in international 
organization studies is that member states (as the principal) hire an international 
organization (as the agent) to perform some functions that will benefit the members. 
(Nielson and Tierney 2003: 245) The member states usually have clear goals to achieve; 
and under the impact of conceived benefits of international organization functioning, they 
choose to delegate tasks to the international organization in order to pursue the goals. 
Member states use various forms of controlling mechanism to ensure their international 
organization agent would fulfill its duty to accomplish the delegated tasks. Yet it does not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 For Classic works in agency theory in Economics, please see Alchain and Demsetz 1972, Williamson 
1975, and Fama 1980.  
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mean the international organization agent loses all of its controlling power to the 
principal member states. While international organizations carry out tasks, they act 
independently, with little interference from the member states. They are sometimes even 
empowered to sanction member states in order to facilitate dispute resolution or bolster 
treaty commitments. Yet some other international organizations are more constrained to 
follow the orders of their member states. The degree to which the international 
organization enjoys autonomy depends on its institutional design and relationship with 
the member states.  
 
Just like in domestic institutions, problems emerge when member states delegate to their 
international organization agent.  Kiewiet and McCubbins pointed out three specific 
difficulties when delegating. Similarly, in international spheres, the agent can even more 
easily ‘hide information’ from the principal whose revelation would hurt the agent and 
help the principal. The agent can do things behind the principal’s back, ‘concealing 
actions’ that the principal would sanction if known. The principal faces ‘Madison’s 
dilemma’- in which the need to delegate authority may give powers to the agent that can 
be used against the principal. (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991) Principal-agent theorists 
mostly assume the principal and agent have different preferences, or opposite ones in 
some extreme cases, which is the main reason for uncoordinated actions and unwanted 
results of agent behaviour, that is agency slack. Although the principal uses various 
controlling mechanisms to keep the agent on the desired track, it cannot prevent the 
problems completely. In this case, the principal can renegotiate (or threaten to 
renegotiate) the contracts with the agent, which may lead to re-delegation or de-
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delegation. Such threats and institutional reforms may impose costs on principals, but 
they can employ these tactics strategically to modify agent behaviour.  
 
In a well-designed principal-agent framework, member states ought to have clearly 
established goals; and after careful assessment of the cost and benefit of delegation, they 
make the decision to delegate certain tasks to an international organization. The member 
states ought to design a self-enforcing contract and carry out appropriate controlling 
mechanisms that induce the self-interested international organization to abide by the 
wishes of the members. Unfortunately, the ideal principal- agent model does not happen 
often; and agency slack is detected in most of the cases.  In order to explore further 
principal-agent theory in the studies of international organizations, I need to firstly clarify 
the key concepts in the theory. 
 
3   Delegation 
 
Delegation refers to the most essential relationship between the principal and the agent.  
Without delegation, the principal-agent framework could not function. According to 
Hawkins et al, delegation is ‘a conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent 
that empowers the latter to act on behalf of the former.’ (Hawkins et al 2006: 7) This 
grant of authority is not automatically valid permanently, which means the principal can 
revoke the authority from the agent because of results that differ from the expected ones 
when the delegation decision was originally made. Principal-agent theorists often 
emphasize the importance of principals’ and agents’ preferences. They consider that the 
 154 
agent’s preferences differing from those of the principal’s leads to undesired practices 
and results, although they do not imply particular assumptions about the actual 
preferences of both sides. What puts specific theories under the name of ‘principal-agent 
theory’ is a focus on the substantive acts of principals in granting conditional authority 
and designing institutions to control possible opportunism by agents. (Hawkins et al 
2006:7) Therefore, principal-agent theory is a relationship- and action- based theory, a 
theory that is based on ‘delegation’ in particular. It is the strategic interactions between 
principals and agents and the consequences that matter.  
 
When the principal grants authority to the agent, it could set strict rules to restrict certain 
actions to be undertaken by the agent in order to accomplish the tasks. Nevertheless, in 
most of the cases in international relations, member states would not carry out this rule-
based delegation to international organizations; instead, they would prefer discretion. 
Discretion refers to a grant of authority that specifies the principal’s goals but not the 
specific actions to be undertaken by the agent to achieve the principal’s goals. Discretion 
enables the agent to accomplish the delegated tasks in the way it prefers, under the 
guidance of its specified expertise and techniques. Therefore, discretion is more likely to 
lead to a professional and efficient accomplishment of the tasks, which is one of the 
essential reasons why the principal decided to delegate in the first place. Discretion 
enables the agent to enjoy a larger degree of autonomy32, with which the agent is able to 
develop its own interests and policy practices.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Hawkins et al regard autonomy as the range of potential independent actions available to an agent after 
the principal has established mechanisms of control. It is different from agency slack (which will be 
analyzed later in the chapter) as agency autonomy is intentional, whereas agency slack is undesired. 
(Hawkins et al 2006:8)  
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Before the principal makes the decision to delegate, it usually has already run a careful 
assessment of the costs and benefits of delegating certain tasks to the agent. The 
assessment could be based on the principal’s own knowledge of the agent. It could also 
be based on information provided by the agent, especially if the potential principal is not 
initially familiar with the specific functions of the agent. In the latter case, the agent 
could use strategies to convince the potential principal to delegate. After the authority is 
already granted, the agent could still use strategies to convince the principal to (re)-
delegate more precisely designed tasks, or to authorize new pursuits for the agent later. 
For example, in the domestic political sphere, the executives could use favourable 
policies to convince the voters to, or to continue to, support the government. In the 
international sphere, international organizations could introduce specific programs to the 
member states and convince them to delegate tasks to the organizations. Thus with regard 
to the decisions about delegation, the agent is not necessarily subordinate to the principal, 
as its functions and strategies to a large extent influence the principal’s decisions to 
delegate, or not.  
 
3.1   Reasons to Delegate 	  
The principal’s decisions about delegation- including which agent to delegate to and what 
tasks to be delegated- are based on the agent’s functions.  This logic is very close to the 
functionalist approach of rational choice theory. Pollack maintained that it explains 
choices of institutions in terms of the functions a given institution is expected to perform 
and the effects on policy outcomes it is expected to produce, subject to the uncertainty 
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inherent in any institutional design. (Pollack 1997:102-10333) To be applied in the studies 
of international organizations, it explains why member states pick a specific international 
organization to govern certain subsequent interactions. In general, the principal-agent 
model of delegation has inherited the functionalist approach, by which it has identified a 
number of functions for which principals may choose to delegate authority for. However, 
the agent’s functions that seem conducive to the principal do not sufficiently lead to 
successful and productive delegations. In practice, successful and productive delegations 
also largely depend on the institutional design of the agent organization, an argument that 
differs from that of Pollack’s. In any case, I would like to discuss first the reasons for the 
principals to delegate, i.e. distinct functions of the agents, in the following pages.  
 
First of all, the Principal delegates tasks to an agent, instead of taking an action by itself, 
because of the agent’s outstanding expertise, political skills, and resources to perform the 
tasks. The agent’s specialization is the most basic reason that leads the principal to 
delegate. Nevertheless, gains from one-time task accomplishment is unlikely to lead to 
delegation. When one-time tasks occur, the actor would probably perform the tasks by 
itself rather than bear the costs of designing, creating, finding and controlling an agent. 
On the other hand, if the tasks to be performed are repeated or increasingly challenging, 
specialization-driven delegations are likely to take place. Delegation to an international 
organization is largely because of the organization’s superior technical expertise, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Pollack quoted Robert Keohane’s argument on this point, ‘in using rational-choice analysis to study 
institutions… we are immediately led toward a functional argument… In general, functional explanations 
account for causes in terms of their effects… So, for example, investment is explained by profit, as in the 
statement ‘The increased profitability of oil drilling has increased investment in the oil industry.’ Of course, 
in the temporal sense investment is the cause of profit, since profits follow successful investment. But in 
this functional formulation the causal path is reversed: effect explains cause.  In our example, this inverse 
link between effect and cause is provided by the rationality assumption; anticipated profits lead to 
investment.’ (Keohane 1984:80)  
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credibility, and legitimacy that states are lack of to make policy on their own.  For 
example, the International Criminal Court has the superior legitimacy to prosecute 
international war crimes and crimes against humanity that are inappropriate to be 
processed by the courts at national levels. (ICC official website34) The intervention of the 
UN Peacekeeping force is more legitimate than that of any single sovereign state. The 
IMF has centralized expertise to collect and analyze data from various nation states, 
which enables the Fund to provide policy advice to its member countries. States delegate 
routine loan decisions to the World Bank and IMF, whose professional risk assessment 
and lending conditionality ensure the safe return and good use of the money. However, 
powerful states sometimes acquire sufficient technical expertise to perform the tasks on 
their own or by cooperating with a small group of privileged states; yet such actions do 
not enjoy the same level of legitimacy as delegating to an international organization.  
 
Secondly, states sometimes cannot reach an agreement on policy with regard to some 
controversial issues, in which case they can delegate to an agenda-setting agent to induce 
an ‘equilibrium when one might not otherwise exist’. (Hawkins et al 2006:16) 
International Organizations often provide member states with a forum to discuss the 
issues that affect multiple entities, which are not only impossible to be solved 
unilaterally, but where the states also find it extremely difficult to reach an policy 
agreement. This happens especially when the relevant states have diverging opinions on 
the issue, and the political power influences among these states are relatively balanced. 
Pollack used the example of the European Commission’s role within the European Union 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Accessed at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx 	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to prove the distinctive agenda-setting power of international organizations as agents. 
(Pollack 2003: 84-85) However, even if the issue is brought into an International 
Organization, collective-choice dilemmas may still happen, especially when the 
organization managing the coalition’s collective preferences is far from the preferences 
of the powerful member states. On the other hand, the more convergent the membership’s 
preferences and the politically weaker the preference outliers in social intransitive 
settings, the more likely states will be to delegate to an agenda-setting international 
organization. (Hawkins et. al 2006: 17)  
 
Thirdly, the relationships among states and other non-state international actors are largely 
based on various contracts, such as Free Trade Agreements, Status of Forces Agreements, 
the CTBT, and so on. Some of them are bilateral and some are multilateral. These 
transnational contracts reflect mutual agreements among the actors on various issues in 
international affairs, yet they do not guarantee completely coordinated actions among 
actors.  This is because the contracts are invariably incomplete. Although the related 
parties endeavour to consider all possible future situations and to negotiate ex ante the 
responsibilities and appropriate actions, it is impossible to settle a permanent contract to 
include all the possible contingencies. (Williamson 1985) Therefore, as Milgrom and 
Roberts argued, the contracting parties would rather ‘content themselves with an 
agreement that frames their relationship- that is, one that fixes general performance 
expectations, provides procedures to govern decision-making in situations where the 
contract is not explicit, and outlines how to adjudicate disputes where they arise.’ 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1990: 62)  
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Pollack pointed out that these procedures may, or may not involve the creation of a new 
agent and/or delegation to an existing agent. If the uncertainty is relatively less great, the 
parties may choose to lay down rules governing future decision-making and dispute 
arbitration. If the uncertainty is very great and future decision-making is expected to be 
complex, the parties are more likely to choose to delegate these activities to an agent that 
can fill in the details of an incomplete contract and adjudicate future disputes among the 
parties. (Pollack 1997: 104) In particular, if the parties have difficulties in reaching an 
agreement on the contract, they can create an agent or select an existing agent with high 
autonomy. With its strong autonomy, the agent can generate a more fair agreement that is 
more accepted by the principals in general.  If the principals design the agent and sequent 
policy processes well, the agent’s decision will reflect the average purposes of the 
agreement.  
 
Fourthly, policymakers suffer from time-inconsistency problems, because they attempt to 
implement policies that aim for long-term political goals, which may violate the short-
term interests of the affected parties. In this case, the political actors lose credibility 
among the affected parties.  Credibility problems can also occur when issues impose 
concentrated costs and diffuse benefits, as argued by Pollack. To prove the argument, he 
used the example of EU competition policies that hurt producers but benefit general EU 
citizens to explain credibility problems for states with major producers negatively 
affected by the policies. (Pollack 2006)  When the political actors suffer from credibility 
problems, they could choose to delegate authority to an international organization or 
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revise an existing IO contract to enhance the credibility of their policy commitments. 
(Martin 1992a; Stone 2002)  In some cases, the issues are simply too complex to be 
processed in a national-level institution, and thus the tasks are delegated to an 
international independent institution with higher political credibility. In any cases, 
Hawkins suggested that ‘principals can mitigate these problems by delegating policy to 
enforcing agents with high discretion and, typically more extreme preferences so that, left 
to their own devices, the agents will move policy in the desired direction.’ (Hawkins et al 
2006: 19)   
 
And finally, the political actor that seizes the power to implement policies may lose its 
power in the future; and in this case the actor could choose to delegate to an agent in 
order to preserve the validity of its advocated policies. This is called ‘lock-in’ effect in 
American politics. As Moe described it, ‘most political institutions arise out of a politics 
of structural choice in which the winners use their temporary hold on public authority to 
design new structures and impose them on the polity as a whole’. (Moe 1990: 213-222) It 
could also apply to international institutions. For example, the United Nations Security 
Council has a permanent membership that is composed of the winners of the Second 
World War, which aims to ‘lock-in’ the balance of power in the international political 
society in 1945 when the War just ended. When principals delegate to international 
organizations to ‘lock-in’ their preferred policies, they would design the mandate 
carefully so that it cannot be easily changed or removed. For example, they would design 
specific voting rules that will stick to the agent to reserve their political dominance in the 
agent. For instance, the IMF voting rules that ensure the veto power of the US and the EU 
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countries added together, respectively, have successfully ‘locked-in’ the utility and 
political dominance of the Fund’s western advanced economy members.  
 
4   Actors in the Principal-Agent Framework 
 
Assessments of the consequences of delegation to international organizations require 
accurate analysis of the involved actors’ identities, including their institutional rules, 
structures and preferences. They can be very complex sometimes. Wrong identification 
of the actors may lead to incorrect application of principal-agent theories. The key actors 
in a principal-agent model are principal, agent and third party actor, yet each category 
may include more than one entity, depending on the setting of the model.  
 
First of all, since various member states delegate authority to an international 
organization, the organization needs to respond to multiple principals respectively. 
Sometimes they delegate authority to the international organization over a common 
contract, and in this case the member states are considered as a collective principal. Yet 
the way the decision-making power is distributed among the collective principal is 
crucial. In fact, in most of the cases, member states delegate authority to an international 
organization as a collective principal. However, we often focus on the relationship 
between a specific member state and the international organization in research. 
Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the impact of other member states, either as separate 
principals or as the remaining part of the collective principal.  In addition, the impact of 
the preferences of the member state as a single principal differs from that of the member 
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state as a part of a collective principal. Moreover, although so far we have assumed 
‘member states’ as principals, in many cases a specific sector(s) of the states acts as the 
direct principal. The preferences of the sector(s) may differ from those of other domestic 
sectors, and in this case the principal’s policy strategies toward the agent may become 
complicated, as it needs to convince the other domestic sectors at the same time. Other 
sub-national, national and supranational actors are also often considered as principals in 
IR studies.  
 
Agents also have complex identities. We usually consider international organizations as 
agents in principal-agent models. Most international organizations have complex internal 
governance structures and various functioning sectors. In one international organization, 
not all the functioning sectors act like agents to the member states, yet they have 
overlapping responsibilities within the organization. In some cases, when the 
international organization has strong influence on the member states’ (especially 
developing country member states) domestic policy practices, they act like principals to 
these same states that are also part of the collective principal to the organization itself. In 
addition, the agent’s preferences are crucial when we assess the consequences of 
delegation.  If the agent’s preferences largely differ from those of the principal’s, and the 
principal does not carry out effective controlling mechanisms, it is likely to generate 
undesired results of delegation.  
 
Last but not least, principals and agents are not the only actors in the principal-agent 
framework, where third party actors may also play an important role. For example, driven 
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by their own interests, the third party actors may attempt to influence the principals, who 
consequently lead their agents to act in certain ways. The third party actors sometimes 
could even influence the agents directly and lead them to act independently from their 
principals. 
 
Due to the complexity of the structures of the actors (both principal(s) and agent(s)), the 
principal of one agent could be the agent of another principal. In addition, the line 
between the third party actor and the principal can be blurred sometimes, depending on 
how significant the actor’s impacts on the agent are. In any case, the networks among 
principals, agents and the third party actors are important constituent parts of the 
principal-agent framework. 
 
4.1   Principal  	  
Principals are the political actors with clear intentions, goals, and preferences. They 
delegate part of, or all of their tasks to agents, the action of which makes them principals. 
Principals cannot keep their status without agents. In the simplest principal-agent model, 
a single principal delegates authority to a single agent. Nonetheless, in reality, usually 
more than one actor delegates to an agent. When a single agent has more than one 
contract with organizationally distinct principals, such delegation relationship is called 
‘multiple principals’ (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast 1989; Hammond and Knott 
1996) A good example of ‘multiple principals’ delegation is the EU, where the European 
Commission is responsible to both the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. 
Both the institutions, acting as principals, can re-contract with the European Commission 
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independently. (Nugent 2003) On the other hand, when an agent has more than one 
principal, and the principals delegate through one contract, such delegation regulation is 
called a ‘collective principal’. Most international organizations are responsible to 
collective principals. For example, the member states send representatives to the IMF, 
and some of them become executive directors who compose the executive board. The 
executive directors reach agreements among themselves and then delegate tasks to the 
IMF (staff and management).  If the executive board cannot reach an agreement, whether 
via discussion or voting, then they have to keep the status quo.  
 
While the members share one delegation contract with the agent, they often do not have 
the same influence on the agent. In some cases, a small group holds a disproportionately 
large amount of influence; and in the most extreme case, one strong member holds 
dominating influence. Therefore, the way the decision making power is distributed 
among the actors (for example, voting rules, or election rules) within the collective 
principal is crucial.  Within a collective principal, if one actor or a group of actors has a 
veto power, then any decision to remove the agent or reform the agent’s incentives must 
be preferred to the status quo by the veto player. This makes the status quo difficult to 
change. Nielson and Tierney pointed out that an agent at the status quo might be insulated 
from interfering principals, especially if coordination within the collective principal is 
costly or if any member or group of members with the power to veto a change is willing 
to do so. (Nielson and Tierney 2003: 248) 
 
 165 
Within the collective principal, each member’s preferences, especially those compared to 
other members’ preferences can affect the coordination between the (collective) principal 
and the agent. Since delegation requires member states to resolve their policy conflicts 
before they can mutually decide to grant authority to the agent, the more unified the 
member states are, the more likely it is that they will reach agreement and delegate to the 
international organization.  The less similar the member states’ preferences, the less 
likely they will be to delegate to the agent. However, in an international organization, it is 
unlikely that all the member states share the same goals and preferences. In addition, the 
greater the heterogeneity of the member states, the less likely they will be to revise an 
existing delegation relationship, since some of the members would prefer the status quo 
to any proposed institutional and policy change. Preference heterogeneity gives more 
space for agent autonomy, because if the agent is aware of the disagreement among the 
collective principals, it could play the members against each other.  It makes it difficult 
for the collective principal to revise, or threaten to revise, the delegation contract. Hence, 
the agent can more easily ignore threats and refuse to modify its behaviour. (Nielson and 
Tierney 2003: 249)  
 
When we study the relationships between states and international organizations, we often 
simply assume the ‘state’ is a single actor. In the principal-agent framework, we often 
consider the ‘member state’ as the principal and the international organization as the 
‘agent’. Such simplification of actors’ identities could sometimes lead to incorrect 
assessment of the causes and consequences of the actors’ interactions. When the state 
government appoints a specific team of officials and their functioning department to 
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collaborate with an international organization, these officials (together with their 
department) only represent a certain set of all the state governmental mandates and 
functions. These officials compose the proximate principal of the international 
organization. These officials cannot independently make delegation decisions. They are 
either controlled by some domestic governments of higher levels, or directly responsible 
to the domestic voters and interest groups.  Therefore, while they delegate to the 
international organization as a principal, they also play the agent role vis-à-vis some other 
political actors. This complex mechanism is described as ‘delegation chain’. (Nielson and 
Tierney 2003; Broz and Haws 2006)  
 
Take the US delegation to the IMF as an example: following the delegation chain, several 
domestic actors can have direct and indirect influences on IMF behaviour. The delegation 
chain includes four groups of actors: private actors (voters and interest groups), Congress 
(legislators), Executive (President, Secretary of the Treasury), and the IMF (US 
Executive Director). Broz and Haws used this delegation chain that links US private 
actors to international decision-making to explain the ‘micro-incentive that underpin the 
behaviour of complex international organizations’. They assume that private sectors 
advance their international financial policy goals through one of three channels: directly 
to the IMF, via the Executive Branch, or by way on Congress. Meanwhile, since the 
Congress plays an active role in funding decisions, the Congress can indirectly influence 
the Fund via the Executive Branch. Therefore, IMF behaviour is not only directly subject 
to the control of the Executive Branch, but also that of the Congress and the private 
actors, indirectly. Eventually they found out that, through the delegation chains described 
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above, American ‘money-centre’ banks comprise a key constituency for the IMF and 
lobby on its behalf. US policy-makers use their influence at the Fund to ensure that 
countries where American banks are highly exposed can secure IMF loans. (Broz and 
Haws 2006: 77-80) 
 
Unlike the US, most other states are not so deeply embedded in international organization 
decision-making processes and the international political society in general.  Nonetheless, 
they also often have complex delegation chains vis-à-vis international organizations, 
although the distant principals may not effectively influence international organization 
behaviour. However, since the proximate principal is often subject to the influences of 
other domestic political sectors, the delegation contract with the international 
organization could turn out to be complicated.  Therefore, the longer the delegation chain 
is, and the more complex the principal state’s domestic political environment is, the less 
predictable is the delegation result. 
 
4.2   Agent 	  
The title of ‘agent’ makes a political actor sound subordinate, because agents receive 
tasks from, and accomplish them on behalf of, the principals. Agents do not initiate tasks 
by themselves. In international organization studies, we consider international 
organizations as agents. Most of the international organizations were established under 
the initiative of one or a group of states, in order to undertake the tasks delegated by the 
founding states. Nonetheless, when states delegate to international organizations, the 
contracts often include considerable degrees of discretion. Discretion enables 
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international organizations to enjoy agency autonomy, with which they are able to 
develop their own interests and policy practices. As international organizations develop 
over time, their interests and policy practices gradually grew into a unique 
‘organizational culture’ that remains within them. The international organizations mostly 
composed of international civil servants are likely to have more autonomy than those 
with staff sent from national bureaucracies. (Cortell and Peterson 2006)   
 
Agents can use their autonomy to influence the principals’ future policy decisions, 
especially when the agent pool is limited and/or agents possess significant expertise. 
Agents can demonstrate to states through past success to the states, or lobby state 
government officials, for more authority and resources. They negotiate with states the 
terms of their contracts, and even use their resources and knowledge to influence 
principals’ preferences. As Burley and Mattli concluded, agents use autonomy to expand 
their influence through function spillover, political spillover and upgrading common 
interests. (Burley and Mattli 1993)  
 
Agents have various strategies through which they can gain autonomy. Agents interpret 
principal mandates and other rules prior to delegation, in a principal-friendly way in order 
to receive delegations. Agents reinterpret those rules once states have delegated, in a way 
that increases the costs of principal control mechanisms or that decreases the probability 
that principals will override such reinterpretations. Moreover, agents expand permeability 
to non-principal third party actors, especially when their preferences align, when third 
party actors have specific information demanded by agents, when agents are attempting 
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to gain the compliance of third party actors and it is costly to coerce compliance, and 
when they share basic understandings, norms, or professional commitments. Finally, 
agents create barriers to principal monitoring by using dualism and ceremonialism. 
Agents can compartmentalize monitoring by promoting ‘dualist’ features in their own 
organization, displaying the part of their organization that is most pleasing to outsiders 
while hiding the other part remains hidden. Agents can ceremonialize monitoring by 
making principals accept incomplete or even symbolic information or by making 
monitoring merely formal and superficial. (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006: 205-212) 
 
Agent functions are the fundamental causes of delegation.  Other than that, agent 
preferences also largely affect the actual result of delegations. Agents’ preferences are 
often distinguished from those of principals; sometimes they are assumed to be quite 
opposite. Principal-agent theory traditionally assumes that agents pursue their own 
interests, subject to the constraints imposed upon them by their principals. (Kiewiet and 
McCubbins 1991:5) According to Williamson (1985:30), agents are ‘self-interest seeking 
with guile’, and especially when the principals cannot perfectly control their agents, the 
agents’ subsequent actions are undesired by the principals. This consequence of 
principal-agent interaction is called ‘agency slack’.  Principals could use certain 
controlling mechanisms to mitigate agency slack, but cannot prevent it completely.35 
When states delegate to international organizations, they are more likely to succeed if the 
international organizations have similar preferences to their own.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Agency slack is an important focus in principal-agent theory, and it will be further discussed in Chapter 
7.  
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Like principals, agents also have complex institutional structures. Most international 
organizations have complex internal governance structures and various functioning 
sectors, as well as external official links with other institutions. Apart from formal 
governance via voting and other regular mechanisms, international organizations are also 
often subject to informal governing rules. A mixture of formal and informal governing 
rules makes the principal-agent relationships a more complex network. It may provide 
agents with more autonomy, because they can use their informal governing leverage to 
lead the policy products of delegation in the direction they prefer. On the other hand, it 
may also strengthen the influence of the organization’s most powerful members, because 
they are usually the most active ones in the informal governance.  
 
In an international organization, not all the functioning sectors act like agents to member 
states, yet they have overlapping responsibilities within the organization. In some cases, 
when international organizations have strong influence on the member states’ (especially 
developing country member states) domestic policy practices, they act like principals to 
the same states that are also members of the collective principal to the organization itself. 
They sometimes even have the power to sanction member states for not following the 
rules and regulations of the institutions. For example, when multilateral development 
banks and funds lend to member countries, they usually attach various conditionalities to 
the loans, which are used to guide the required policy reforms in the borrower countries. 
If the borrower country fails to live up to the pre-agreed requirements for the loans, the 
multilateral development bank/fund could refuse to release the next installment.  
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4.3   Third Party Actors 	  
Principals and agents are not the only actors in the principal-agent framework, where 
third party actors may also play an important role. Although the third party actors do not 
have shares in the formal voting rights of agents, they are indeed influential in both 
principal and agent behaviour. In international relations, a large number of domestic and 
international social groups are active in almost every issue area including security, 
economic, health, environmental, human right, and so on. They can offer the information 
needed by both states and international organizations. For example, social groups can 
help states monitor international organizations, as well as they can lobby them, help fund 
them, observe and participate in debates. Where international organization agents are 
appointed, interest groups can utilize persuasion, shame, information or symbols to 
influence decision-making. (Keck and Sikkink 1998) They have evidently influenced the 
behaviour of international organization agents, and through them even those of their state 
principals. On the other hand, driven by their own interests, they also attempt to influence 
the states that consequently lead their international organization agents to act in certain 
ways.  
 
5   Principal-Agent Theory As an Analytical Tool  
 
Principal-agent theory locates states and international organizations in specific interactive 
relationships, and identifies their roles in these relationships as principals and agents 
respectively. It provides a framework where the functions and structures of both states 
and international organizations are assessed based on the essential interaction between 
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the two: delegation. Since the principal-agent relationship is about states delegating 
authority to the international organizations with advanced authority, expertise and 
techniques (in certain issue areas) so that the latter can better accomplish tasks on behalf 
of the former, the eventual consequences of delegation are undoubtedly the focus in 
research. Moreover, principal-agent theory is a theoretical framework that focuses on the 
actors in international relations, yet it does not overlook the structural and social 
elements both inside institutions and in the general international political system. These 
structural and social elements play an important role in determining the specific 
relationship between a state and an international organization, and whether or not the 
international organization can successfully accomplish the tasks delegated from the state. 
Principal-agent theory thus could be used as a practical analytical tool to examine the 
relationship between a state and an international organization. Based upon the basic 
features of principal-agent theory and its actors introduced in the previous sections, I am 
going to propose a four-stage approach to analyzing the relationships between states (as 
principals) and international organizations (as agents).  
 
First of all, identify the features of the actors. These features include the actors’ 
objectives, interests and structures. On top of that, it is important to locate the actors in 
the corresponding positions first, that is states as principals and international 
organizations as agents.36 To be a principal, the state needs to have clear intentions, goals, 
and preferences in a certain issue area. Hence, after the state measures its capability of 
achieving these objectives on its own and realizes it is not able to do so, it can choose to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 However, international organizations can act like principals in some cases, when states need to fulfill 
their responsibilities toward international organizations to continue their memberships.  
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either create a new agent or delegate to an existing agent. The state can create an agent 
alone, yet in most cases it creates an agent together with other states with similar 
objectives in the specific issue area. The state’s objectives may change over time. The 
state’s objectives are the primary driving force of delegation, so when we use principal-
agent theory to analyze state-international organization relations, we ought to ensure the 
state’s dynamic objectives are correctly applied.  
 
The structures of the actors, especially those of the agent, determine the form of 
delegation. As discussed earlier in the chapter, a state is often a member of the ‘collective 
principal’ of the international organization it participates in. Different states have 
different weights in the collective principal. The state’s weight among all members of 
collective principal significantly determines its decision making power in the 
international organization. The state’s weight is determined by both formal and informal 
governance rules of the international organization, which will be discussed later.  
 
Agents’ interests also matter in principal-agent theory, and need to be clarified in the 
research. Despite the influence of its strongest member state(s), the international 
organization acts as an independent institution with unique interests and rules for 
practices. Agents’ interests are decided by the objectives of each international 
organization that are developed from its unique founding principles. They are also greatly 
influenced by the staff’s working principles that are developed from their education 
background and working experience. Nevertheless, although international organizations’ 
interests are independent from those of their member states, they are under strong 
 174 
influence of their strongest member(s)’ preferences, especially if the strongest member(s) 
are also the founding state(s) of the international organization. The international 
organization’s interests, and mostly the staff’s interests in some cases, greatly decide the 
agent’s capability to accomplish the tasks delegated from states.  
 
Secondly, analyze the agent’s functions and the principal’s consequential delegation 
decisions. It has been stated earlier in the chapter that an international organization’s 
functions are the most fundamental reasons that lead the state to delegate certain tasks to 
the organization. Hence in order to assess a state’s delegation decisions toward an 
international organization, we need to initially look into the organization’s specified 
functions.  The main functions of international organizations that distinguish them from 
any state and sub-state level institutions were discussed earlier in the chapter. They 
include outstanding expertise, political skills, and resources to perform the tasks; agenda-
setting power to induce an ‘equilibrium’ among states on controversial issues; capability 
to govern decision-making in situations where the contract is not explicit; capability to 
solve time-inconsistency problem; and capability to ‘lock-in’ the validity of the political 
winner’s advocated policies.  
 
These functions are enabled and supported by international organizations’ superior 
authority, competence, and legitimacy. However, not all the international organizations 
have an equal strength as the mentioned functions. Hence, in order to assess the state’s 
decisions on delegation, we need to look into each of the functions the international 
organization has.  Based on the strength of each function, the state makes the decision on 
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delegation accordingly. A state often expects an international organization to solve 
multiple tasks due to its multiple functions; and the relationship between a specific 
function of the international organization and delegation decision on a single task made 
by the state needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.   
 
Thirdly, evaluate the conceivable factors of the state’s delegation actions. The 
consequences of delegation largely depend on the state’s delegation actions, including the 
degree to which authority is granted and the extent to which staff autonomy is tolerated. 
A state’s delegation actions are crucial especially when the international organization has 
more than one principal. Before we assess the consequences of delegation, we should 
evaluate the conceivable factors of states’ delegation actions. One important influential 
factor of states’ delegation actions is the state’s preferences. The state’s preferences 
compared to those of the international organization determine whether the interactions 
between the two will be smooth and productive. In the case of a collective principal, a 
state’s relative preferences compared to those of other members can significantly 
influence the state’s delegation actions. For example, Martin explained the influence of 
actors’ preferences on agency autonomy in the context of evolution of IMF 
conditionality. She made four hypotheses to test how actors’ preferences shape states’ 
delegation actions in the IMF. She concluded that the closer a state’s preferences are to 
those of the Fund’s, the more likely the state will tolerate staff autonomy. (Martin 2006)  
 
The other important factor of states’ delegation actions is the organization’s governance 
rules. Governance rules decide a state’s decision-making power in the international 
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organization. Governance rules vary among international organizations. Some 
international organizations have their policy decisions made mostly based on formal 
governance rules (for example, voting rules and election rules), some based on informal 
governance rules (for example, an informal forum outside the international organization’s 
formal governing mechanism), and some are mixed. The state’s aggregate decision-
making power- derived from the mixture of formal and informal governance rules- 
determines the extent to which the international organization’s final policy practice 
converges with the state’s decision. The state’s influence among international 
organization staff, especially when the staff are granted a large degree of autonomy, also 
contributes to the state’s decision-making power in the organization. These two factors of 
state delegation actions – consistency of preferences and international organizations’ 
governance rules- greatly contribute to the assessment of delegation consequences.  
 
Finally, assess the consequences of delegation. The purpose of delegation- that is letting 
the international organization accomplish the tasks that could not be done effectively by 
the state on its own- has already been emphasized as the fundamental driving force of the 
whole principal-agent interactions. Hence, it naturally leads the principal-agent approach 
to its final analytical stage, also an important goal of the approach- assessing whether or 
not the consequences of delegation have fulfilled the state’s objectives. If the 
international organization accomplishes the tasks as the state expected, we say the agent 
has generated satisfactory delegation consequences, which may lead to re-delegation. If 
the international organization failed the tasks or did not fulfil them as the state expected, 
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we say the agent has generated undesired delegation consequences, which may lead to 
de-delegation.  
 
International organization staff’s actions that lead to undesired delegation consequences 
are defined as agency slack. Agency slack happens quite often, as it could be caused by 
multiple reasons, for instance, the staffing rules of the international organization do not 
reflect the state’s interests; the international organization’s governance rules reduce the 
state’s decision making power among all collective principals; the state’s preferences 
deviate from those of the international organization; the international organization’s 
resources are inadequate to solve the tasks delegated from the state; and so on.  
 
However, agency slack could be avoided, or at least reduced to some extent. One key to 
avoid or reduce agency slack is to use effective principal control mechanisms, such as 
screening and appointment processes, control of the budget, clear rules, and sanctions 
through rewriting the delegation contract. (Alter 2006) Yet controlling mechanisms can 
be costly, plus the principal could be too reliant on the agent’s expertise, and thus the 
principal may decide to continue delegation while knowing agency slack is happening. 
Assessment of delegation consequences is a crucial step in principal-agent theory used as 
an analytical tool, because it explains the state’s decisions toward the international 
organization: to re-delegate or to de-delegate. Such delegation decisions reveal the 
essence of the relationship between a state and an international organization, and show 
the prospects of the actors’ roles in the related issue area.  
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When principal-agent theory is applied to analyze the relationship between states and 
international organizations, the actual approaches vary due to the specific features of 
actors and their interactions, yet they ought to mostly follow the four stages suggested 
above. I will use this approach to analyze the relationship between China (as principal) 
and the IMF (as agent) in the next three chapters. It provides an suitable framework 
where China’s objectives that led it to the IMF, together with the unique interactions 
between China and the IMF that are affected by their preferences, functions and 
structures will be discussed. Eventually, I intend to assess the extent to which the IMF 
performs as a diligent agent that assists China to achieve its objectives. Before that, in the 
next section, I will briefly explain why principal-agent theory is suitable for analyzing the 
relationship between China and the IMF, and how I will do it.  
 
6   Use Principal-Agent Theory to Analyze the Relationship between China 
and the IMF 
 
Scholars of International Relations have used principal-agent theory to analyze the 
interactions between states and international organizations, and especially the 
effectiveness of international organization functioning. A wide range of regional and 
international organizations has been scrutinized by the approach. They include the 
regional institutions such as European Union and its institutions the European 
Commission and the European Parliament, European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) and its two main institutions the Commission and the Court, and European Court 
of Justice (ECJ). (Pollack 1997, 2006; Kassim and Menon 2003; Vaubel 2006; Milner 
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2006; Hawkins and Jacoby 2006, 2008; Alter 2006; Maher, Billiet and Hodson 2009) 
More studies were done on international organizations including the international 
economic organizations such as the GATT/WTO (Cortell and Peterson 2006; Xu and 
Weller 2007; Elsig 2010), the IMF, World Bank and multilateral development banks 
(MDBs) (Nielson and Tierney 2003, 2006; Gutner 2005; Vaubel 2006; Lyne, Nielson and 
Tierney 2006, 2009; Broz and Hawes 2006; Milner 2006; Martin 2006; Nielson, Tierney 
and Weaver, 2006; Gould 2006; Clegg 2010), and other international organizations such 
as the UN Security Council (Thompson 2006), International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Alter 
2006), the International Labour Organization (ILO) (Vaubel 2006), and World Health 
Organization (WHO) (Cortell and Peterson 2006).  
 
Some of these studies explain general interactions between international organizations 
and states by using principal-agent theory. Others focus on specific delegation, or 
emphasize the characteristics of specific actor(s) (principal, agent or the third party 
actor). Several scholars have done research on the IMF, yet with different focuses.  
 
For example, Broz and Hawes analyzed the ‘chain of delegation’ and explored the 
influence of US domestic politics and private actors on IMF lending decisions. Via the 
assessment of complex power actors in US politics and their respective ties with the IMF, 
the scholars demonstrated that only the correct identification of principals lead to 
accurate assessment of delegation consequences. (Broz and Hawes 2006)  
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Martin closely scrutinized the connections between principal and agents, she specifically 
analyzed the reasons for agency autonomy in the context of evolution of IMF 
conditionality. She pointed out two sources of variation in the autonomy of IMF staff: 
divergence of preferences among the executive directors and private information held by 
the staff. She argued that IMF staff get a larger degree of autonomy when state preference 
diverge; and staff get more flexibility in dealing with information when the demand for 
high-quality information is intense and when their preferences are believed to converge 
with those of the major member states. (Martin 2006)  
 
Gould explored factors that lead to agency slack in the context of IMF conditionality 
programs. He argued that the divergence of interests between the principal and agent, 
high costs of monitoring and the informational asymmetry between the principal and 
agent lead to agency slack. He also pointed out that the principal-agent framework 
needed to better detect and measure the agent’s interests and take into account the 
influences of their party actors in order to work better. (Gould 2006)  
 
Clegg used the case study of the IMF Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) initiative 
to demonstrate the significance of integration of the agential influence of state 
preferences with the structural influence of social environments in explaining the changes 
within international organizations. (Clegg 2010) In a more recent work, he combined 
principal-agent theory with the constructivist theory to explain US influence in IMF 
concessional lending.  (Clegg 2012) 
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Some analyses made by the above scholars could be applied to the case study of China-
IMF interactions, yet some others are less suitable. Similar to the previous research on 
state-international organization interactions with the principal-agent theoretical 
framework, I will also explore the key terms such as delegation, agent autonomy, agency 
slack, agency strategies, principal control mechanisms, and so on. More importantly, I 
intend to find out the relations among these terms in the context of China-IMF 
interactions in various policy issues and activities, which contribute to a comprehensive 
analysis of the China-IMF.  However, when principal-agent theory is applied to analyze 
the relationship between China and the IMF, a number of concepts and causal relations 
are distinct from those in the previous research that need to be emphasized.  
 
First of all, China is a non-traditional principal. Most of the existing research that 
examines the relations between states and international organizations with principal-agent 
theory assume the US and/or other advanced developed states as principals. (Lyne, 
Nielson and Tierney 2006; Martin 2006) In some cases, even though the scholars 
recognized that member states work together as a ‘collective principal’, such as the 
Executive Board in the IMF, they assume it is led by the strongest principal(s) in the 
Fund. (Milner 2006; Broz and Hawes 2006; Gould 2006) It is true that many international 
organization policy decisions are highly influenced or even dominated by the strongest 
member states such as the US and other developed states. ‘Western dominance’ and 
‘unbalanced power distribution’ are two crucial factors of IMF governance and decision-
making processes, which will be considered in the later analysis. However, it does not 
mean other members of the collective principals do not have an impact on organization 
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decisions. Lyne, Nielson and Tierney argued that highly institutionalized international 
organizations require a complete model of possible member-state coalitions 
encompassing the preferences of all member states, not just major powers. They used the 
case of World Bank to show that if the formal rules suggest that the preferences of any 
member state are represented in the ultimate policy choice, then the preferences of all 
member states should be included when predicting agent behaviour. (Lyne, Nielson and 
Tierney 2009)  
 
Among all the IMF member states other than the US and the Fund’s other traditional 
western controlling power states, China is one of those with growing voices in IMF 
governance and increasing objectives vis-à-vis IMF programs. Moreover, due to its rapid 
economic expansion and increasing international influences, China has gradually 
accumulated a considerable amount of authority in the international political system. In 
addition, China has also developed an explicit goal of larger flexibility in the 
international monetary system and greater decision-making power in the governance of 
the international financial economy. These conditions make China an eligible principal of 
the IMF.  
 
However, compared to the IMF’s other member states, China is a non-traditional 
principal. It is non-traditional because Chinese officials and economists have relatively 
thinner knowledge about IMF operation and weaker diplomatic techniques in 
international economic affairs compared to the Fund’s dominant western state members, 
especially in the early stage of engagement. As a principal, China does not have the sort 
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of complex ‘delegation chain’ that the US does (Broz and Hawes 2006), yet the domestic 
actors do matter with regard to the Chinese government’s decisions on delegation. It is 
non-traditional also because the tasks China delegates to the IMF include less explicit 
instructions and rules. In other words, although the Chinese government has clear 
objectives that it wants the IMF to achieve via implementing the delegated tasks, it does 
not specify how IMF staff should do it. Hence the tasks China delegates to the IMF are 
generic, yet it does not weaken China’s eligibility of being a principal as long as it has 
clear objectives. Despite its relative weakness, China’s principal role also explains its 
stance facing other regional and international financial economic institutions and its 
further goals with regard to the international financial economy. 
 
Secondly, the IMF is an influential agent. In the previous chapters, I used socialization 
theory to explain the IMF’s influence on China’s domestic institutional building and 
policy changes via technical assistance and policy advice mechanisms. Although the 
sequence of socialization- mimicking, social influence and persuasion- has not been 
completed, the IMF has had some significant influences on China’s domestic economy. 
For example, IMF technical training programs have provided Chinese officials with 
information in formatting and processing financial data and policies with internationally 
formalized methods; IMF policy advice has had some moderate influences on China’s 
exchange rate policy. The IMF’s strong influences on China that have already been 
proved do not contrast with the Fund’s role as an agent. Being an agent does not mean it 
fulfills tasks delegated from states with no controlling power. In fact IMF functions of 
technical assistance and policy advice not only prove why China delegated tasks to the 
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Fund in the first place, but also help us understand the IMF’s role as an influential agent 
that enjoys a large degree of autonomy. This feature of the IMF is compatible with the 
existing research that focuses on the distinct role of agents in international organization 
studies,37 and the Fund’s agent influences are even stronger facing the non-traditional 
principal China. Hence my earlier analysis of the IMF’s influence on Chinese officials 
will help us understand the Fund’s great agent autonomy and agent strategies in the later 
chapters.  
 
However, I argued in the previous chapter that the IMF did not convince the Chinese 
government to fully change its mind, values and attitudes to further liberalize its 
economy, and the reasons for China’s resistance to IMF policy advice is both political 
and institutional. The reasons include lacking accuracy and depth in the Article IV 
Consultations; the advisory, rather than mandatory nature of IMF policy advice makes it 
pale and unconvincing facing China’s strong stance; protection of domestic industrial and 
financial groups prevents IMF neo-liberal economic norms from intervening into China’s 
domestic policymaking; the IMF’s corresponding institution in China - the PBC- lacks 
political influence in China’s domestic political system. Most of these factors could be 
incorporated into the reasons for unsuccessful China-IMF interaction, and they contribute 
to the undesired delegation consequences, agency slack, which will be examined in 
Chapter 7.  
 
Thirdly, China’s share of decision-making power among all ‘collective principals’ needs 
to be verified. China is a member of the Fund’s collective principal. Its share of decision-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 For example, Hawkins and Jacoby 2006 and Thompson 2006.  
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making power among all ‘collective principals’ directly affects China’s decisions on 
delegation and the consequences of delegation. If it has a large decision-making power, 
the consequences of delegation are more likely to be consistent with China’s expectation, 
and vice versa.  Since China is a restrained principal compared to the US and other 
western advanced develop states, its decision making power in relative terms is crucial. 
Since IMF governance is divided into formal and informal governance, China’s role in 
each category needs to be examined respectively.  
 
Principal-agent theory focuses on a state’s governance role in the international 
organization as a factor in the effectiveness of delegation.  When applied in the China-
IMF case, it reveals China’s dynamic role in IMF governance. It thus appropriately 
illustrates the significance of China’s quota and voting share increase in the IMF, which 
explains the Chinese government’s efforts in pushing forward IMF governance reforms 
in the past years. On the other hand, a state’s formal governance role in the international 
organization could be ignored in socialization theory.  
 
Fourthly, social constructivist factors are not ruled out. Principal-agent theory also 
emphasizes the agent’s preferences, which are mostly reflected in the staff’s interests. In 
the case of the IMF, the staff mostly read economics in the US and other western 
developed countries, and therefore their education background and working experience 
decided their assumptions and working principals are dominated by the neo-liberal 
economic norms. The staff’s interests, together with the IMF’s institutional rules 
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contribute to building a unique ‘organizational culture’ of the Fund.38 According to 
socialization theory, the IMF attempts to socialize China into its organizational culture 
and internalize the norms attached with such culture. On the other hand, principal-agent 
theory further argues that the difference between the state’s preferences (for example, 
protection of domestic economy in China’s case) and the agent’s preferences (neo-liberal 
economic norms in the IMF’s case) can explain the undesired consequences of 
delegation. Hence in this case, principal-agent theory does not rule out social 
constructivist factors in the framework, and it uses such factors to explain the interactions 
between states and international organizations. It thus helps provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the relationship between China and the IMF.  
 
Fifthly, apart from the actors themselves, the external context matters. The context of the 
interactions between China as a principal and the IMF as an agent is crucial. The 
contextual influences include international economic trends, financial crises (both the 
Asian financial crisis and the recent global financial crisis), governance of regional 
financial economic cooperation (as a complementary or substitute to IMF programs), and 
so on. These external contextual factors can largely influence both China’s and the IMF’s 
interests and strategic roles in the international political economy.  
 
Finally, ‘outside options’ could be real options rather than strategies of leverage. 
Scholars of international organizations argue that a strong member state with large 
‘outside options’ can use these options as a lever to make the agent achieve principal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The concept of organization culture was developed by Barnett and Finnemore (1999, 2004), and it will 
be further discussed in the later chapters.  
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objectives. However, in China’s case, its ‘outside options’ are likely to be real practical 
options instead of tools to increase its bargaining power. 39 For example, while it 
delegates certain tasks to the IMF, it may also delegate similar tasks to another regional 
or international organization that could fulfill the same type of tasks. It thus reveals 
China’s ‘multiple agent’ pluralist approach to the governance of international financial 
economy.  
 
7   Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed the key concepts and causal relations in the principal-agent 
theoretical framework, among which delegation is the most important one. In the studies 
of international organizations, principal-agent theory indicates a pragmatic rational 
choice-based connection between states and international organizations: states delegate 
conditional authority to international organizations in order to achieve their objectives in 
a more effective way.  
 
Unlike socialization theory, principal-agent theory locates states in a proactive position. 
The states are thus not simple norm takers as socialization theory suggests; instead, they 
take the initiative to make decisions on whether to delegate authority to international 
organizations and the extent to which they get involved with the organization designed 
programs.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Outside option will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
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Like socialization theory, principal-agent theory also recognizes international 
organizations’ strong influences on states’ decisions on delegation and other policy 
decisions. Principal-agent theory argues international organizations have their unique 
organization cultures that are based upon staff interests and institutional rules and norms. 
It takes into account the principles and preferences of actors. Yet principal-agent theory 
does not only focus on the normative impacts of international organizations. It discusses 
the impacts of states’ controlling mechanisms and international organizations’ strategies 
on delegation consequences. It also points out that an international organization’s specific 
governance structure can influence the states’ delegation decisions and effects.   
 
Most importantly, principal-agent theory focuses on the examination of delegation 
consequences, which are regarded as an important measure of the dynamic relationships 
between states and international organizations. In the socialization theoretical framework, 
it is difficult to measure if participating in an international organization can actually 
convince the state government to redefine its interests and values. On the other hand, 
principal-agent theory performs better in assessing the consequences of interactions 
between states and their international organization agent. This is because measures of 
delegation consequences (especially measures of agency slack) are well specified by 
principal-agent theory, of which more details in the case of China-IMF interactions will 
be provided in the later chapters.  
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In addition, principal-agent theory also takes into account the influences of third party 
actors and external environments, and it increases the accuracy and comprehensiveness of 
the research.  
 
Hence, propositions from principal-agent theory supplement socialization theory and 
present a more suitable theoretical framework to examine the relationship between the 
pragmatic Chinese government, as a principal, and its influential international institution 
agent the IMF. The four-stage approach proposed in this chapter will be used as a 
specified analytical tool to analyze the China-IMF relationship. It is the first time 
principal-agent theory is used to assess the interactions between an emerging power and 
an international organization, more specifically a western dominated Bretton Woods 
institution. Undoubtedly the related case studies contain some distinct features that are 
unexplained in the previous principal-agent theory research in international organization 
studies; these features are briefly discussed in this chapter, and they will be taken into 
account when the China-IMF relationship is examined in the next three chapters.  
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Chapter 5 - China participates in the IMF: A Principal-Agent 
Framework 
 
1   Introduction 
 
This chapter analyzes China’s features as a principal, and the IMF’s features as an agent. 
More importantly, it discusses the IMF’s outstanding functions that attract the Chinese 
government to delegate multiple tasks to the Fund. It also discusses each task China 
delegates to the IMF, according to the Fund’s functions. This chapter thus responds to the 
first two stages of the four-stage approach to analyzing the relationship between China 
and the IMF within a principal-agent theoretical framework.  
 
The Chinese government had some clear goals regarding economic advancement and 
economic links with abroad in the early period of ‘reform and opening up’40 that started 
in the late 1970s. China’s participation in the IMF reflected some of its goals, for 
example the Chinese government sought to learn from the IMF the methods and 
techniques of running a modern financial system, to get information about other 
countries’ financial economy from the IMF, and to get reconnected with foreign 
economic institutions and become an eligible member of the international political 
society via participating in IMF programs. These goals initially legitimated China’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 It refers to China’s domestic reform program (mainly in the economic sector) that started in 1978.  
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principal role in the interactions with the IMF, although it was a relatively weak member 
of the IMF’s ‘collective principal’. The 24 Executive Directors that represent all 188 
member countries compose the Fund’s Executive Board. The Executive Board is the 
‘collective principal’, and IMF staff who represent the Fund are the agent in the 
framework. When assessing China’s principal role, its preferences and relative position in 
the Fund’s structure of governance require to be clarified. When assessing the IMF’s 
agent role, its functions, staff autonomy, and strategies are the most essential factors that 
affect its interaction with states, and thus need to be explained initially.  
 
After clarifying the features of China as a principal and those of the IMF as an agent, the 
chapter focuses on China’s delegation to the IMF. China delegates various tasks to the 
IMF for a number of reasons. First of all, the IMF has prominent expertise and 
information advance. Hence the Chinese government delegated the technical training task 
to the IMF in order to learn internationally standardized methods and techniques in 
financial governance. The case study of the IMF Statistics Department’s technical 
training programs for Chinese officials was included in Chapter 3, yet it was explained 
from the perspective of China being socialized into accepting IMF norms by learning. 
However, the case study probably fits better into the principal-agent theoretical 
framework, because the Chinese government took the initiative to decide the contents and 
forms of the technical training and then request IMF assistance. Hence it is more 
reasonable to regard China as a principal who delegates the task of technical training to 
related IMF departments (in a pro-active way), instead of being socialized into accepting 
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the IMF’s norms (in a re-active way). Yet it does not change any facts in China’s 
participation in IMF technical assistance programs.  
 
Meanwhile, China also delegates authority to the IMF’s surveillance and policy advice 
programs (such as the Article IV Consultations analyzed in Chapter 3), the results of 
these programs are published in various staff reports and working papers. From the 
reports and working papers of the results of surveillance for other countries, China can 
get a further picture of the international financial economy. At the same time, China 
shows its commitment to the Fund’s supervision on orderly economic growth and 
reasonable stability of price and exchange rates.  
 
In addition, China also delegates tasks of multilateral lending to the IMF, because the 
IMF has decades of experience in dealing with loan arrangements for member countries. 
Lending via the IMF not only avoids more risks but also demonstrates China’s 
international responsibility via an internationally recognized channel (compared to aiding 
via bilateral lending to the countries with controversial political states).  
 
Secondly, the IMF has outstanding agenda-setting power that enables the member states 
to achieve equilibrium on the controversial issues. The IMF provides the states with a 
forum to discuss and solve some issues on which agreements are not easy to achieve 
otherwise. The example analyzed in the chapter is the IMF Multilateral Consultation on 
Global Imbalances, which brought together China, the US, Euro Area, Japan and Saudi 
Arabia to discuss the issue and seek to find a multilateral solution.  
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Finally, the IMF is expected to help China solve some complex issues that cannot be 
solved by China on its own.  The chapter discusses this standpoint with the example of 
China’s attempt to delegate to the IMF the task of reforming the US dollar-dominated 
international monetary system and creating a favourable monetary environment for 
China’s RMB and financial stability.  
 
2   China as a Principal 
 
Recalling the historical background, China experienced a series of drastic domestic 
political reforms in the 1970s, which also led to the economic reforms later in the decade. 
The gradual opening that started in the early 1970s, including diplomatic, intellectual and 
trade opening, made the Chinese leadership realize that China was far behind many other 
states in terms of economic welfare, technology and expertise. When the reformist 
leadership that was led by Deng Xiaoping seized the political power after Mao’s death, it 
decided to embrace the idea of economic interdependence by reconnecting China to the 
world economy. Meanwhile, the leadership also initiated domestic political and economic 
reforms in a liberalization fashion. Nevertheless, decades of domestic wars and isolation 
left China with little knowledge about how to build up a modern economic regime and 
social system. By the late 1970s, China was still running a centrally planned communist 
economic regime. Therefore, China was in need of a large amount of expertise to enable 
it to establish a market-based domestic economic system, as well as to communicate and 
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cooperate with foreign economic institutions. This need eventually drove China to join 
the international economic organizations such as the IMF and World Bank in 1980.  
 
It took the Chinese leadership a whole decade to finally make this decision. As already 
discussed in Chapter 3, the decision was made upon several factors including numerous 
rounds of communication with both institutions, several careful assessments run by the 
UNSG of costs and benefits of joining the institutions, and the concerns about Taiwan’s 
political status at the time. Therefore by the time the Chinese government decided to join 
the IMF, it had a clear idea about what costs and benefits IMF membership would bring 
to China. More importantly, the Chinese government had a clear goal of what it wanted 
the IMF to help China achieve: 
 
• China wanted to learn from the IMF the methods and techniques in running a 
modern financial system that meet international requirements.  
 
• China wanted to get information about other countries’ financial economy from 
the IMF.  
 
• China wanted to get (re)-connected with foreign economic institutions via 
participating in IMF programs.  
 
• China wanted to accelerate the expulsion of Taiwan from the international 
political society by demonstrating its legal membership in the IMF.  
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• China wanted to show to the world that it could be a friendly member of the 
international political society, which would significantly enable smooth economic 
cooperation with foreign states.  
 
China’s goals were not static, and they would develop over time. In fact, China’s goals in 
international financial affairs via IMF have advanced in the past three decades, as China 
has become more influential and ambitious in the international financial economy. We 
will certainly return to this point later. Above all, it is important to know that China had 
obvious incentives to join the IMF and, more importantly, explicit objectives that it 
wanted the IMF to help it achieve. It made China an eligible principal of the IMF.  
 
To recall the definition of principal, it is ‘an actor who grants conditional authority to an 
agent’ (Hawkins et al 2006). Therefore, China is the principal that grants conditional 
authority to the IMF, which is the agent. However, China is not a single principal of the 
IMF, yet it is one of the IMF’s ‘collective principals’. Like most of the international 
organizations, the IMF responds to many member countries that delegate through one 
contract. (Nielson and Tierney 2003:247) Each member state appoints one governor and 
one alternate governor (usually the minister of finance or the governor of the central 
bank), who together compose the IMF’s Board of Governors.  The Board of Governors is 
the highest decision-making body of the IMF, yet it has delegated most of its powers to 
the IMF Executive Board for daily business.  
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The 24 Executive Directors at the EB represent all 188 member countries. Essential 
economies like the US, Japan, Germany, France, UK, China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia 
have their own seat at the table but most countries are grouped in constituencies 
representing four or more countries. The EDs are sent directly by the member states, 
often from the Central Banks, to reside in the IMF and represent the states’ interests. 
Therefore, in this context, the EB is set as the collective principal, which collectively 
delegates the tasks to IMF staff. The most common tasks delegated by the member states 
are designing conditional loan agreements, providing loans to the member states with 
balance of payments difficulties and helping them solve the problems, providing 
technical assistance to member states, and surveillance on the member states’ financial 
stability. According to the collective principal concept, decision rules that aggregate 
preferences within the collective principal are primary. IMF EDs have different voting 
weights. Each member state’s voting weight is pegged to its quota in the IMF. This 
decision-making system was designed to reflect the relative positions of its member 
countries in the global economy.  
 
When the delegation relationship between China and the IMF is discussed later in the 
thesis, China is regarded as an independent principal of the IMF. It specifically means 
that the decisions to delegate tasks to the IMF (instead of taking the unilateral move or 
choosing other forms of international cooperative) are decided solely by the Chinese 
government rather than jointly with any other entities. However, many other issues in the 
IMF, such as lending decisions, governance reforms, and expansion of IMF financial 
resources, have impacts on multiple members and thus require collective approval from 
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the EB. Therefore, collective decisions can affect the IMF’s capacity in solving 
international issues, and thus influence the Chinese government’s decisions to delegate, 
re-delegate, or de-delegate. In this case, China is also regarded as a part of the collective 
principals.  
 
The collective principal of the IMF has some distinct features. First of all, members in the 
EB have different preferences. As we discussed in Chapter 3, the IMF has socialized 
China into accepting some neoliberal economic norms to a certain level; yet China’s 
preferences fully converge with neither those of the Fund’s advanced economies nor 
those of the Fund itself. In some cases- such as debates on China’s currency rate- China’s 
preferences are opposite to those of the latter two. (Xinhua 2010; Renmingwang 2009)  
 
Secondly, the decision-making powers are unequally distributed among the members. 
The formal decision-making powers are distributed in terms of ‘voting shares’, which are 
proportionately related to the members’ financial contribution to the Fund. The US has 
the single highest voting share, which has earned it a crucial veto power since the IMF 
was initially founded. Adding EU countries’ voting shares together also generates a veto 
power. The veto power enables the holder(s) to stop any change from the status quo. On 
the other hand, the IMF’s emerging market economy and developing country members, 
including China, have disproportionately low voting shares. (Woods and Lombardi 2006) 
Hence, they cannot influence IMF policy decisions as effectively as the Fund’s advanced 
economy state members that hold more voting shares do. It makes China and other under-
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represented members feel their opinions not being sufficiently respected, and thus 
discourages them to delegate more tasks to the IMF. (IMFC 2008a) 
 
Facing the IMF, China is not a principal with a strong stance. Although China was one of 
the original funding members of the IMF, the Guomindang government and the later 
Taiwanese leadership were not much involved in Fund activities. When the Communist 
Chinese government gained its legal IMF membership in 1980, it had very little 
knowledge about the Fund’s day-to-day business. Although China’s economic strength, 
political status, and capacity in performing international economic activities have 
improved greatly in the following decades, it does not act like an ‘owner’ of the Fund. 
China has indeed learned a great amount of methods and techniques of financial practices 
via interactions with the IMF and other international economic institutions, yet its 
financial system is still rather backwards in terms of variety of financial products and 
inflexible in terms of financing channels and controls. It is mainly due to the priority of 
state ownership in China’s main industrial and financial sectors; and the fact that the 
government set the goal of ‘stability’ instead of ‘profit’ for China’s banking sector.41 
China’s interests are thus different from those of the IMF, which increases the possibility 
of undesired delegation results, that is ‘agency slack’. The domestic concerns are 
fundamentally embedded in China’s political interests, which thus greatly affect China’s 
decisions on delegating tasks to the IMF. When China delegates tasks to the IMF, it does 
not want too much policy intervention from the Fund staff. One may argue that China is 
not very specific about the exact tasks that the IMF should achieve; it is however 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Details about China’s domestic concerns with regard to state ownership were explained in Chapter 3. 
More of China’s domestic financial and economic features will be discussed later. 
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definitely clear about what it does not want the IMF to achieve from delegation. For the 
same reasons, China acts like a distant, instead of a close, principal when it delegates 
and/or participates in other activities of the IMF.  
 
In addition, China’s relatively weak principal role is not merely reflected in the 
inadequate voting share to match its shares in the actual world economy. Voting share is 
the official, yet not the only sign of decision-making power in IMF governance. Some 
IMF decisions are made mostly under the impact of informal governance.  (Stone 2011) 
Some IMF decisions are made by IMF staff, who would only submit the proposals that 
are mostly likely to be approved by the Board. According to their experience and 
expertise, the staff know the exact criteria for a qualified proposal, and they would not 
submit a proposal that does not meet the requirements. IMF staff thus have a large degree 
of ‘agency autonomy’ in running the Fund. Like in the EB, China is also relatively less 
influential in both informal governance and among the management staff team compared 
to some other advanced western economy state members. Contrasting to China’s 
relatively weak principal stance, the IMF is an influential agent.   
 
3   The IMF as an Agent 
 
The IMF was established under the initiative of the US and the UK in order to bring the 
international financial economy back to order in the post-war era. The IMF’s original 
goals therefore reflected the founders’ interests and values: to promote institutionalized 
international monetary cooperation, to facilitate growth of fair international trade, to 
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maintain exchange stability, to assist in the establishment of free multilateral payment 
system with no foreign exchange restrictions, and to assist the member states with 
balance of payments difficulties. Since the Fund started to function, the membership has 
grown, especially among the developing countries. In the 1960s and 1970s, the IMF 
switched its policy focus from the developed to developing country members, especially 
in lending and policy advice. However, IMF goals and basic principles have not changed 
greatly.  The US is still the most influential member of the IMF; and the western 
European advanced economy members share the governance power with the US. 
 
Despite the mighty US influence, the IMF is an independent international economic 
organization with unique interests and rules for practices. These interests and rules 
gradually compose a unique ‘organizational culture’ that is embedded in all IMF 
programs.  Principal-agent theory scholars often assume agent interests as opposite to 
those of the principals’, for example the bureaucracy intends to ‘maximize their budget, 
their staff and their independence’. (Niskanen 1971, Vaubel 1996: 195) This assumption 
simplifies the character of the IMF. We could assess IMF interests via the structure of its 
staff members. The staff members that work in the IMF (both headquarters and 
residential representative offices all over the world) consist of two major parts: the 
officials sent by member state governments; and the international civil servants who are 
directly hired by the Fund, also those who serve the interests of the Fund instead of any 
member state. We do not usually count the former as a part of ‘IMF staff’. The latter 
comprised the majority of IMF staff, which is also assumed as the ‘agent’ that represents 
the Fund’s interests. Cortell and Peterson argued that the international organizations 
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mostly composed of international civil servants are likely to have more autonomy than 
those with staff sent from national bureaucracies. (Cortell and Peterson 2006)  
 
The IMF is comprised of an international staff of economists mostly trained in a few 
universities in the US and west Europe. They share very similar academic backgrounds 
that conferred them similar assumptions and principles. Gould argued that IMF staff are 
trained as economists and want to be successful economists, influencing the direction of 
the international economy at large and the economies of individual borrowers by 
applying theoretical principles. (Gould 2006: 288) They would like to be part of a 
successful IMF that helps improve the world economy. IMF staff are thus unlikely to 
focus only on maximization of budget and independence at the expense of IMF 
reputation. Therefore it is incorrect to put the agent preferences in opposition to those of 
the states. On the other hand, some scholars argue that the IMF is manipulated by the US, 
and thus it adopts the preferences of the US as its own.  This is yet another overly 
simplified assumption. Nevertheless, due to their education background and working 
environment, IMF staff have preferences that are closer to those of the US than those of 
emerging market economy and developing country members.   
 
The IMF is a rather influential agent vis-à-vis China.  The IMF obtains a large degree of 
autonomy from China’s delegation. This is specifically because China does not explicitly 
specify the tasks to be delegated to the IMF, as it is less familiar with the techniques and 
methods used in financial operations compared to other strong principals. In fact, China 
has learned many techniques and methods from the IMF via participating in interactive 
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programs. The large IMF autonomy is also because China does not run strict monitoring 
programs over IMF programs, which provides the IMF with an even larger degree of 
autonomy. 42 In some cases, the IMF could use its autonomy to influence China’s 
delegation decisions.  As Burley and Mattli argued, agents use autonomy to expand their 
influence through function spillover, political spillover and upgrading common interests. 
(Burley and Mattli 1993) Agents could also demonstrate to states their past success, or 
lobby state government officials for more authority and resources, which is how the IMF 
convinced the Chinese authorities to join the IMF in 1980. Since then, the IMF has 
continued to use its technical assistance and policy advice facilities to influence China’s 
preferences. The IMF uses these strategies to encourage China to delegate more tasks and 
confer more resources to the Fund. 43 For example, the IMF encouraged China to comply 
with Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement to make its currency freely 
convertible on the current account in 1996; to join the GDDS in 200244; and to commit to 
the FSAP in 2008.  
 
The FSAP mainly focuses on the factors that affect China’s financial stability. China’s 
first FSAP evaluation started in August 2009. The evaluation team included a rather large 
group of IMF and World Bank staff.  They met with senior officials and staff from the 
PBC, China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC), etc.; as well as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 China does get worried that the IMF may overly intervene in its domestic economic policy-making and 
other activities; however, since it does not submit much information to the IMF anyway, it does not need to 
frequently monitor IMF programs.  
43 They were described as ‘socialization tools’ in the previous chapter, but ‘agent strategies’ here. Since 
they both explain the same action, the two approaches are complementary rather than substitutes for each 
other.  
44 Details of GDDS were explained in the previous chapter.  
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representatives from financial institutions, industry organizations, and private sector 
representatives in Beijing, Chongqing, Nanchang, Ningbo, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. 
Compared to the Article IV Consultations, the FSAP evaluation shows a larger degree of 
thoroughness and depth.  
 
The first FSAP report for China recognized China’s banks and financial sector were 
healthy, but pointed to vulnerabilities that should be addressed by the authorities. It 
pointed out the near-term risks in China’s financial sector: deterioration in loan quality 
due to rapid credit expansion; growing disintermediation by shadow banks and off-
balance sheet exposures; a downturn in real estate prices; and the uncertainties of the 
global economic scenario. It encouraged China to push forward financial reforms to 
prevent medium-term vulnerability from harming the whole economy. The reforms 
include broadening financial markets and services and developing diversified modalities 
of financial intermediation in order to foster healthy competition; reorienting the role of 
government away from using the banking system to carry out broad government policy 
goals and allowing lending decisions to be based on commercial goals; expanding the use 
of market-based monetary policy instruments and using interest rates as the main 
instrument to govern credit expansion; and upgrading the financial infrastructure and 
legal frameworks, including strengthening the payments and settlement systems, as well 
as consumer protection and expansion of financial literacy. China’s commitment to the 
FSAP shows China’s further willingness to delegate to IMF surveillance. (IMF 2011e) 
As stated by PBC governor Zhou Xiaochuan at an IMF-PBC joint symposium in 
2011,‘China will further strengthen its financial stability, regulatory and supervisory 
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framework and promote financial reform and development by incorporating the findings 
of the China FSAP as appropriate.’ (IMF 2011f) 
 
In addition, the IMF is aware of the Chinese authorities’ usual reserved and sensitive 
attitude toward international advice, and thus it uses specific tactics to deal with China.  
In the Article IV Consultation program, the IMF has been making moderate yet persistent 
suggestions on China’s undervalued exchange rate problem, instead of harsh criticism 
like some Western governments would do. The IMF understands that the Chinese 
government takes domestic concerns as the absolute priority. Harsh criticism and 
international pressure would not convince China to sacrifice its domestic benefits; in 
contrast, it may offend the authorities and drive them away from the Fund. On the other 
hand, the Chinese authorities do get intimidated by negative international feedback, 
especially those from an influential intergovernmental organization like the Fund. In this 
case- despite the argument that the IMF is not able to impose policy implementation on 
its members because of the advisory rather than mandatory nature of the institution itself- 
moderate and persistent suggestions ought to work better than harsh criticism and 
enforcement for China.  
 
4   China Delegates to the IMF 
 
China delegates to the IMF because of the Fund’s specific functions that enable China to 
achieve goals in a more efficient way than it would have done by taking unilateral or 
other cooperative approaches. The motivation of state delegation is usually based on the 
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international organizations’ outstanding functions; yet the contents of tasks and the extent 
to which they are delegated to the agent vary. China’s tasks for the IMF consist of 
generic rather than explicit objectives.  
 
4.1   Expertise and Information Advance 	  
The Principal delegates tasks to an agent, instead of taking an action by itself, because of 
the agent’s outstanding expertise, skills, and resources to perform the tasks. The agent’s 
specialization is the most basic reason that attracts the principal to delegate. China 
delegated to IMF technical assistance, as it hoped to learn from the IMF the methods and 
techniques in running a modern financial system that meets the international 
requirements. Therefore the Chinese authorities would decide what kind of methods and 
techniques are in short supply among Chinese officials, and they would make requests for 
IMF technical assistance on the demanded methods and techniques; the IMF then 
responds with appropriate technical assistance programs after discussing with the 
authorities. The contents of IMF technical assistance programs were discussed in the 
earlier chapter, and they proved a rather effective delegation result as China has 
implemented some techniques and methods in financial practices that were learned from 
the IMF.  
 
China also delegated to the IMF in order to get information about other countries’ 
economic trends and the general international financial economy. Thompson argued that 
it is the neutrality of international organizations that allows them to serve as informative 
agents of the international community, supplying information that an individual state 
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could not credibly supply. (Thompson 2006: 232) Apart from the neutrality, the IMF also 
has centralized expertise to collect and analyze data from various nation states, which 
keeps China updated with the world economic developing trends. The information and 
data is delivered via staff reports for various monitoring and assessment programs (for 
example, Article IV Consultations and Financial Sector Assessments), working papers 
done by IMF economists, and other assessment reports grouped by regions, periods and 
issue areas.  
 
China delegates to IMF surveillance and policy advice programs to fulfill the agreement 
of subjecting its economic and financial policies to the scrutiny of the international 
community. Via participating in these programs, China shows its commitment to orderly 
economic growth and reasonable price stability, to avoid manipulating exchange rates for 
unfair competitive advantage, and to provide the IMF with data about its economy. In 
order to get the information and keep IMF monitoring and assessment programs credible, 
the Chinese authorities must sacrifice some of its (economic) sovereignty and submit data 
and information to the Fund. The extent to which China is involved in IMF surveillance 
and policy advice programs reflects its willingness to sacrifice its sovereignty in order to 
pursue better cooperation with foreign financial economic institutions. For example, 
China has increasingly delegated authority to programs such as the GDDS and FSAP. 
Participation in both programs reflects China’s increasing interests in delegating authority 
to the IMF.  
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Moreover, like many other members, China also delegates the tasks of multilateral 
lending to the IMF. The IMF staff have rich experience in dealing with loan 
arrangements for member countries, including negotiations, risk assessment, designing 
lending contracts, making proposals for the EB to approve, and monitoring whether 
borrower countries live up to the conditionalities. According to Rodrik, multilateral 
agencies are supposedly better at providing information, especially that necessary to 
monitor the recipient; and the interaction of multilateral organizations with recipient 
countries can be less politicized than that between donor countries and recipient. (Rodrik 
1996)  
 
Unlike the US, China has a much smaller degree of involvement in the borrower 
countries’ domestic politics and economy. Broz and Hawes did a study to prove that US 
‘money-centre’ banks comprise a key constituency for the IMF and lobby on its behalf’. 
And US policy-makers use their influence at the Fund to ensure that countries where US 
banks are highly exposed fall under the IMF’s insurance umbrella. They found that the 
size of and IMF loan to a country is positively related to the degree of US money-centre 
bank exposure in that country. (Broz and Hawes 2006: 77- 106) Thacker developed a 
macroeconomic model to prove that political friends of the US are more likely to receive 
loans than its enemies; and moving political interests toward those of the US’ increases a 
country’s possibility of receiving loans from the IMF. (Thacker 1999) Compared to the 
US, China has much less political intention when it delegates to IMF lending 
mechanisms. It thus does not usually have particular maneuvers over IMF lending 
programs.  
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China delegates to IMF lending mechanisms by contributing to IMF financial resources, 
and the funds would be lent out to the countries with temporary balance of payments 
difficulties according to IMF arrangements. One example was during the Asian financial 
crisis, China participated in the IMF rescue package for stricken Asian financial 
economies by lending Indonesia $200 million, Thailand US 1 billion, and funds to South 
Korea supporting its exports. (Kent 2007:132) Another example was that when Europe 
was hit by the Euro-zone crisis, China chose to lend to Europe via IMF -and European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)- programs rather than directly to the crisis-hit 
countries. China has contributed significantly to IMF lending power to protect the world 
economy from Europe’s debt turmoil. It agreed to contribute $43 billion to the IMF at a 
G20 meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico in June 2012. (IMF 2012d) Chinese scholars consider 
lending via the IMF as the most secure way of lending. (Sun 2012) The IMF thus acts 
like a guarantor for the borrower countries. IMF lending programs could also be the 
‘signpost’ for China’s outward foreign investment decisions. Since the countries that 
receive IMF loans are likely to be subjected to IMF conditionalities, their financial 
stability is under IMF supervision. Hence for Chinese companies, it is safer to invest in 
these countries than other countries that do not receive IMF financial assistance.  
 
In addition, China also delegates multilateral lending tasks to the IMF as a means to 
fulfill its role of a ‘responsible great power’. Profit is not the main purpose of China’s 
decision on delegating to IMF lending mechanism. Yet it is the reputation of a 
responsible member of the international political society that China would rather obtain 
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via IMF multilateral lending. As the world’s most influential financial intergovernmental 
organization, the IMF confers on China the reputation it wants via active participation 
and interaction. It gives other states a feeling that China does not only pursue profit in the 
international business, but it also contributes to the maintenance of international financial 
stability. It also shows China’s willingness to participate in international political society, 
and solve problems in a collective and cooperative fashion. As a leading Chinese scholar 
at the CASS said in an interview:  
 
‘Europe needs help now, and other countries may need help in the future. Should we help 
them? Yes, because we need to take the responsibility at some point. So to help is better 
than not to help. How do we help them then? Multilateral (means) is better than 
unilateral (means). So we prefer to help them via the IMF.’ 45 
 
4.2   Agenda-setting Power and Multilateral Decision-Making 	  
China, as well as other states, delegates to the IMF when it cannot reach an agreement on 
policy with regard to some controversial issues, because the IMF’s agenda-setting power 
helps the states find a negotiated equilibrium.  The IMF provides states with a forum to 
discuss the issues that affect multiple entities, which not only cannot to be solved 
unilaterally, but where the states also find it extremely difficult to reach a policy 
agreement. This happens especially when the relevant states have diverging opinions on 
the issue, and when political power influences among these states are relatively balanced. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 The interview was conducted in Beijing. The interviewee (interviewee 2) is a leading scholar in China’s 
political economy.  
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In some cases, the affected states can reach mutual agreement via some contracts among 
themselves, yet the contracts do not guarantee completely coordinated actions. This is 
because the contracts are invariably incomplete.  Although the related parties endeavour 
to consider all possible future situations and to negotiate ex ante the responsibilities and 
appropriate actions, it is important to settle a permanent contract to include all the 
possible contingencies. (Williamson 1985) In this case, the states may choose to create a 
new agent and/or delegate to an existing agent that can fill in the details of an incomplete 
contract and adjudicate future disputes among the states. (Pollack 1997:104)  This could 
happen especially when the states face an emergent situation when an institutionalized 
mutual agreement- possibly together with the institution - is urgently needed; and when 
the uncertainty is very great and future decision-making is expected to be complex.  
 
Hence, China delegated the tasks of solving global issues that involve multiple actors to 
the IMF. China does not possess the same level of sophisticated financial diplomatic 
skills that the US and other advanced economy countries do; neither does it lead the 
consensus of opinions and policies in international political society. Hence, when China 
encounters global issues that involve multiple actors, it may not be able to handle them 
on its own. In addition, the Chinese authorities are rather sensitive to criticisms from 
western governments and other foreign governmental bodies. They often regard the 
criticism from the west as hostile and provocative.  In such cases, they would prefer to 
leave the issues to be solved by the multilateral institutions whose standpoints are usually 
milder than those of the western state governments’.  
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Global imbalances are an example of an issue that could only be solved by multilateral 
approaches.  Both industrial developed and emerging market developing countries were 
deeply trapped into this problem before the global financial crisis started.  Natural 
rebalancing alone was not sufficient to resolve the problem; instead, additional structural 
adjustments were required in the countries that were at the centre of the global 
imbalances.  In order to the solve the global imbalances, the US could cut their budget 
deficits and save and export more; while surplus economies, notably China but also 
countries like Germany and Japan could rely more on domestic demand.  The 
international community imposed large pressure on these affected countries and urged 
them to reform their macroeconomic and trade policies to rebalance the world economy.  
However, national governments were unwilling to let other countries’ agendas lead the 
pace and scope of change, and individual countries’ economic sovereignty and self-
interest continued to take precedence over international cooperation. (Guerrieri 2010: 
687)  At this point, the IMF was expected to be the right platform on which to build 
effective policy coordination to resolve the global imbalances.   
 
China’s exchange rate regime incurred much criticism from the west for ‘artificially 
keeping the RMB undervalued’. However, the Chinese government and scholars denied 
the accusation and refused to revalue the RMB as a direct response to international 
pressures.  The Chinese government has restated in the past years that the exchange rate 
regime is a domestic issue and should be exempted from intervention by any other 
external forces.  However, it does not mean that China is unwilling to cooperate with the 
international community to resolve the problem of global imbalances. Yet the Chinese 
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government prefers to resolve the global imbalances issues via a multilateral institution 
instead of facing the pressure from the west by itself.  
 
Therefore, China decided to delegate the task of resolving the global imbalances issues to 
the IMF Multilateral Consultation on Global Imbalances, along with the Euro area, Japan, 
Saudi Arabia, and the US, in 2006.46 The IMF maintained that among the above 
countries/regions, they could mitigate vulnerabilities inherent in the present pattern of 
imbalances and help sustain world growth as demand and savings patterns adjusted. (IMF 
2007a)  The Multilateral Consultation included bilateral visits and multilateral meetings 
in 2006 and 2007. At these meetings, the states and the IMF agreed that the problem of 
global imbalances is a medium-tern problem that requires gradualist and multilateral 
approaches. They agreed that the objective of any measurements vis-à-vis the global 
imbalances were not just to reduce imbalances, but also to sustain robust global growth. 
Thus it was suggested that measures to boost US national savings should be accompanied 
by measures to strengthen domestic demand and growth elsewhere; and these measures 
would be bolstered by increased exchange rate flexibility in some cases.  And finally, the 
policy coordination across countries needed to be further strengthened.  (IMF 2007b: 8-9)  
 
The participants submitted to the IMFC a report on the discussion and the details of their 
policy plans in April 2007, and agreed to further measures on resolving the imbalances 
that are consistent with the IMFC strategy in the future.  A later IMF staff report on the 
Multilateral Consultation program revealed some positive progress. For example, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 The above countries either contribute directly to the imbalances through current account deficits or 
surpluses, or represent large shares of global output. 
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RMB had appreciated in nominal terms, and the currency band for daily exchange rate 
fluctuations against the dollar had been widened. In the US, a congressional budget 
resolution had adopted the administration’s balanced-budget objective over the medium 
term.  (IMF 2007b: 10)   
 
In summary, although the multilateral consultation did not lead to more direct and notable 
results, it did bring China to the negotiation table to discuss an issue where China resisted 
discussing it directly with those who had adverse contentions. China expects the IMF to 
play a role of mediator when it is facing multilateral challenges. China also expects the 
IMF to facilitate fair discussion and multilateral implementation among the key players 
of the global imbalances, while minimising potential conflicts.  China also expects the 
IMF to use its agenda-setting power to solve multilateral problems in the long term.  
 
4.3   China Lacks the Power to Deal With Controversial Issues Alone 	  
In September 2008, China replaced Japan and became the largest foreign holder of US 
debt. China officially declared $1.95 trillion in hard currency reserves at the end of 2008, 
not including holdings beyond the People’s Bank of China.  In total, Chinese state 
investors were estimated to possess $2.3 trillion in US assets in September 2008, with 
approximately $1.5 trillion invested in US dollar-denominated debt.  This represented 
about 30 per cent of global currency reserves, more than twice the reserve level of Japan, 
and four times the holdings of Russia or Saudi Arabia.  In 2008, China purchased 46 per 
cent of official US debt. (Lakshmanan 2009) As the world’s biggest US dollar and US 
dollar-denominated assets holder, China has expressed increasing anxiety toward the 
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potential depreciation of the US dollars and the US dollar-denominated assets in the past 
6-7 years. The president of the China Investment Corporation, Gao Xiqing, made a harsh 
comment on US financial products in 2008, ‘if you look at every one of these [derivative] 
products, they make sense. But in the aggregate, they are bullshit. They are crap. They 
serve to cheat people.’ (Follows 2008)  
 
As the crisis deepened, the Chinese officials urged the US to protect the value of China’s 
US dollar-denominated assets and guarantee Chinese capital’s access to US product 
markets.  Especially when China switched to assets with higher risks and return, for 
example to the bonds issued by government-sponsored enterprises (GSE) such as Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, the protection of the value of China’s dollar-denominated assets 
was extremely desired.  However, Chinese pressure yielded unsatisfactory results.  The 
most significant accomplishment was to push the Treasury Department to place Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac into receivership; yet China’s persistent efforts to use financial 
statecraft failed to move US policies on asset protection.  China repeatedly urged, 
insisted, and threatened the US government to provide asset protection, but the US 
officials declined China’s requests for explicit guarantee of the GSE debt.   
 
Some policy analysts warned the US government of the dangers of excessive dependence 
on foreign financial creditors while ignoring their requests. Stephen Roach stated, ‘given 
America’s reliance on China’s funding of its external deficit- a reliance that will only 
grow in an era of open-ended trillion dollar budget deficits- the US is in no position to 
risk reduced Chinese buying of dollar-denominated assets.’ (Roach 2009: 7) Sester 
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warned, ‘A Chinese or Russian decision to reduce holdings of dollars would probably 
inflict more pain on the United States than vice versa. Alternative sources of external 
financing would probably not be willing to lend to the United States on a comparable 
scale at the same terms.’ (Sester 2008: 3-4) Some US analysts and policymakers 
specifically worried China would transfer its creditor advance into financial leverage over 
the US. However, Drezner did not agree. He argued that for financial leverage to yield 
tangible concessions, the target state (the US in this case) must be unable to find 
alternative creditors, lack the capability to inflict costs on the sanctioning country in 
response to coercive pressure, anticipate few conflicts with the coercing state over time, 
and try to maintain a fixed exchange rate. These conditions did not apply to the US. 
Because the US still has many other sources of credit, it was still perceived as a safe 
heaven compared with the alternative market even after the financial crisis hit the US. 
Moreover, if China reduced its purchase of US assets, the dollar would inevitably 
depreciate against the RMB, which would lead to capital loss in China’s external 
investment portfolio. In addition, the US possesses great monopsony power in the 
issuance of liquid assets, and creditor countries cannot easily diversify away from 
holding the dollar. (Schwartz 2009) The interdependence between China and the US 
further makes it difficult for China to use financial leverage over the US. Furthermore, 
the expectation of future conflict will reduce US willingness to accede to China’s 
pressure. And finally, the US does not maintain a fixed exchange rate regime, and it 
issues debt denominated in its own currency. (Drezner 2009: 7-45)  
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The facts showed that China became a net seller of US debt for the first time in more than 
two years in November 2008, yet it did not significantly affect US financial policy. China 
also failed to receive any enhanced guarantee of access to US markets. Although China’s 
policymakers and economists kept calling for changes in US fiscal and monetary policy 
in several international conferences and forums, they failed to create either political or 
market pressure on the US.  
 
Xinhua commented on the financial crisis and the volatile US financial system, ‘the 
financial crisis, as many have known, is a result of ill-advised macroeconomic policies by 
some advanced economies and their failure to enforce vigorous regulation over the ever 
growing financial industry.’ (Ming 2009: 18)  In order to avoid more effects from the 
deepening financial crisis and to prevent itself from falling into another financial crisis 
caused by the under-regulated US financial market, China became more and more eager 
to free itself from the US containment that is backed by the US dollar’s dominant status 
in the international monetary system. As argued by Paola Subacchi, ‘…in today’s larger 
and more integrated world economy the dependence on the dollar as the basis of both 
trade flows and financial reserves has clearly become excessive, creating a system that is 
fundamentally unbalanced.’ Thus the existing international monetary system needs to 
evolve into a multicurrency system that would respond more flexibly to the demand for 
liquidity and would provide a way to diversify the accumulation of reserve assets. 
(Subacchi 2010: 667) In order to divert and reduce the risks caused by the single-reserve 
currency characteristic of the system, the Chinese government realized that 
diversification would be the ultimate long-term solution. Especially since the global 
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financial crisis provided the chance for a new layout of the international monetary 
policies and redistribution of governance power among the institutions, China has sought 
to play a more proactive role in the reforms of the international monetary system. Some 
of China’s highest government leaders including President Hu Jintao and Vice Premier 
Wang Qishan have expressed China’s determination in pushing forward the 
reconstruction of a ‘diversified’, ‘scientific’ and ‘organized’ international monetary 
system. (The 21st Century Economic Report 2011)  
 
Chinese authorities and economists think the IMF should play an important role in 
correcting the single-reserve currency problem in the current system. China hoped IMF 
rules would include symmetrical external discipline on domestic policies for all countries 
including the US, which has dramatically abused its status as the main reserve currency 
country. (Eichengreen 2009) They urged the Fund to strengthen surveillance on 
macroeconomic policies, especially the currency issuance policies of the major reserve 
issuer countries. It is consistent with Drezner’s argument that financial statecraft is more 
likely to work with multilateral support. (Drezner 2009: 22) Deputy People’s Bank 
Governor Hu Xiaolian said in March 2009, ‘under the current situation, we feel that the 
IMF particularly needs to strengthen its surveillance of the economic policies and 
financial policies of the major reserve-currency-issuing nations.’ (Baston 2009: A10) The 
Chinese delegation at the IMF called on the Fund to promote diversification of the 
international monetary system and disconnect it from the US economic conditions and 
sovereign interests. Lacking the capability to face the US alone, some Chinese 
policymakers and economists regarded China’s participation in IMF reforms as an 
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effective approach to larger decision-making power in the governance of the reformed 
international monetary system.  
 
In particular, Xiang47 argued that the main purpose of China’s efforts toward IMF 
reforms was to protect itself from the damage caused by the ‘Dollar Standard’. (Xiang 
2010) The Governor of the People’s Bank of China Zhou Xiaochuan called on the IMF to 
increase the use of the SDR as a super-sovereign reserve currency. Zhou suggested the 
IMF should set up a settlement system between the SDR and other currencies; actively 
promote the use of the SDR in international trade, commodities pricing, investment and 
corporate book-keeping; create financial assets denominated in SDRs to increase its 
appeal; and further improve the valuation and allocation of SDRs to include the 
currencies of all major economies in the basket. (Zhou 2009) However, these simple 
suggestions were not developed into a constructive proposal. They lacked a technically 
practical focus. Some Chinese economists agreed with Zhou’s suggestion on the 
expansion of the SDR, and further emphasized the IMF’s crucial role in the international 
financial regulation. For example, they argued for more purchase of SDR denominated 
assets to increase China’s influence in IMF financing (Zhang 2009); to let the RMB join 
the SDR basket (Wang 2009a; 2009b); and to rebuild the IMF as the world’s central bank 
that effectively oversees and coordinates monetary policies in all the countries (Qiao and 
Xu 2011: 5).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Xiang Songzuo is the deputy director of the International Currency Research Centre of the Renmin 
University of China and the chief editor of the Global Finance journal.  
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The above cases indicated when, for what reasons, and in what ways China delegated to 
the IMF. China delegates to IMF technical assistance programs to learn from the IMF the 
methods and techniques in running a modern financial system that meet the international 
requirements. China participates in IMF monitoring and policy advice programs, 
submitting its information and data to the IMF, as well as obtaining information and data 
of economic trends of other member states and general international financial economy. 
China also delegates the tasks of making lending risks assessment and designing lending 
contracts to the IMF. China delegated to IMF Multilateral Consultation on Global 
Imbalances, as the IMF was able to provide a forum on which China (along with four 
other major players whose economic policies are highly related with the global 
imbalances issue) could discuss the controversial exchange rate regime issues in an open 
international environment instead of facing harsh western criticism alone. Finally, China 
increasingly faces the potential damage caused by depreciation of US dollars and US 
dollar-denominated assets. It is also threatened by the growing instability in the 
international monetary system cause by the single-reserve currency problem. Yet it is 
simply too weak to challenge the might of the US economy and enforce reforms in the 
international monetary system.  In this case, China expected the IMF to strengthen 
monitoring of US domestic economic policy; and assist China to diversify the 
international monetary system by promoting the SDR.  
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5   Conclusion 
 
The chapter has discussed the key features of China as a principal, more precisely a 
member of the ‘collective principal’; and those of the IMF as China’ international 
institution agent.  The People’s Republic of China is not a founding principal of the IMF, 
hence it does not ‘own’ Fund policies like the US and its western developed country allies 
do. On the other hand, the IMF performs as an influential agent that assists China in 
achieving its objectives in the international financial economy.  
 
The Chinese government delegates various tasks to the IMF due to the Fund’s 
distinguished functions. The chapter discussed the Chinese government’s delegation to the 
Fund, including delegating to IMF technical training, surveillance and policy advice and 
multilateral lending programs because of the Fund’s prominent expertise and information 
advance; delegating to the IMF Multilateral Consultation on Global Imbalances because 
of the Fund’s outstanding agenda setting power; and its attempt to delegate to the IMF the 
task of reforming the US dollar-based international monetary system and creating a 
favourable environment for China’s RMB and financial stability because China cannot 
balance against the US power in the international financial market on its own.  
 
The tasks delegated by the Chinese government mostly aim for the IMF’s advanced 
functions. Via delegation, China seeks to learn more methods and techniques of financial 
governance; get information about the international financial economy; solve global 
imbalances in a transparent and open forum; show its commitment to international 
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cooperation and orderly growth of the world economy; and achieve an international 
monetary system that is less subjected to the restrictions of the US and more friendly to 
China’s financial advancement.  
 
However, the consequences of China’s delegation to the IMF are yet to be assessed. 
Benign wishes and efforts do not guarantee satisfactory consequences. The actual 
delegation decisions and actions of the Chinese government are greatly influenced by 
China’s preferences compared to those of the IMF and its other member states, China’s 
relative decision-making power in the IMF’s governance mechanism, and China’s 
influence among IMF staff. These listed factors will be assessed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 6 - China participates in the IMF: Preferences, 
Governance, and Staff Autonomy 
 
 
1   Introduction 
 
This chapter examines China’s preferences regarding IMF policy decisions and policy 
processes; China’s relative decision-making power in the IMF’s formal and informal 
governance mechanisms, respectively; and China’s influence among IMF staff. These 
three factors largely affect China’s delegation decisions and actions, which also lead to 
different consequences of delegation. The examination conducted in this chapter 
responds to the third stage of the four-stage approach to analyzing the relationship 
between China and the IMF within a principal-agent theoretical framework.  
 
China’s preferences regarding IMF policy decisions and policy processes directly 
influence China’s decisions on delegation and the processes of delegation. Hence, in 
order to assess China’s delegation decisions and the consequences of delegation, its 
preferences need to be clarified first. It is difficult to detect a state’s real preferences, 
because sometimes states say one thing but do a different one. In this research, China’s 
preferences are reflected in the Chinese representatives’ statements at the semiannual 
International Monetary and Financial Committee meetings. These statements may not 
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include all the opinions held by the Chinese authorities regarding IMF operation, yet they 
reflect a considerable amount of Chinese authorities’ true preferences, although 
interpreted in a rather diplomatic way. The research looks into the Chinese 
representatives’ statements in the period from 2001 to 2011, and they include 
increasingly explicit propositions that reflect the Chinese authorities’ increasing 
involvement in IMF programs. China’s propositions refer to various IMF issue areas; and 
they are divided into six categories: to understand member countries’ domestic 
environment; to respect member countries’ sovereignty; to follow IMF mandate and not 
go beyond it; to meet member countries’ needs; to treat the IMF’s developed and 
developing country members fairly; and to increase developing country members’ 
representation and participation in the IMF. (IMFC 2000; 2001; 2002a; 2002b; 2003a; 
2003b; 2004; 2005a; 2005b; 2006; 2007a; 2007b; 2008a; 2008b; 2009; 2010a; 2010b; 
2011)  
 
China’s delegation process and especially its effectiveness are determined by China’s 
relative position in the IMF’s structure of governance, in both formal and informal 
spheres. A state’s quota and voting share in the IMF represent its formal governance 
power: the more quota and voting share it holds, the higher formal governance power it 
has, and thus the more likely it delegates tasks to the Fund with larger tolerance for staff 
autonomy. China’s IMF quota and voting share has become a popular topic among both 
scholars and policymakers in the past decade. The Chinese government conceived its 
quota and voting share were severely lower than China’s actual proportion in the world 
economy, and started to request for more representation in the IMF since the late 1990s. 
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The Fund’s other emerging market and developing country members have been in the 
similar situation, some are more severely underrepresented, and some are less. The IMF 
thus has suffered legitimacy problem due to the unequal governance structure. In order to 
solve the legitimacy problem, the IMF has initiated three major rounds of quota and 
voting share reforms in 2006, 2008 and 2010. The results of these reforms indicate the 
dynamic changes in China’s share in the Fund’s formal governance.  
 
However, a state’s formal governance power does not reflect its full decision-making 
power in the Fund; the informal governance of the IMF reveals its hidden structure.  A 
state exercises its informal governance power in the informal forums and groups outside 
the EB, such as the G7, the group of EU representatives to the IMF (EURIMF), the G24 
and so on. The informal governance power reflects a state’s capability to network and to 
influence IMF staff in the Fund.  
 
Finally, the chapter looks into the IMF’s staff, attempts to find out how much influence 
China has among IMF staff. IMF staff’s expertise in various fields of economics and their 
status of ‘international civil servants’ enable them to enjoy a large degree of autonomy. 
IMF staff, but not officials from any state government or other political organizations, are 
technically running the Fund including its daily administration and practices of all crucial 
policy decisions.  Hence, IMF staff’s knowledge and judgments are crucial to the final 
decisions of the IMF. In other words, the degree to which IMF staff acquire an accurate 
and comprehensive understanding of a member country’s domestic political social 
environment and economy determines the effectiveness of the Fund policy toward that 
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member country. I assume IMF staff have a naturally better understanding of the 
country/region they come from; hence the more staff are recruited from one 
country/region, the better IMF policies reflect that country/region’s real problems and 
meet its real needs. In this way, I evaluate the effectiveness of IMF policies for China by 
examining the proportion of the IMF staff with Chinese nationality.  The more IMF staff 
with Chinese nationality are employed, the better IMF policies serve the Chinese 
people’s real interests; and vice versa.  
 
2   China’s Preferences 
 
Actors’ preferences are crucial in principal-agent theory. In the case of China-IMF 
relationship, what matters is not only China’s preferences compared to those of the 
IMF’s, but also to those of other, especially the strong western advanced economy state 
members’. Conflicts of preferences among member states, which are described as 
‘distributional conflicts’ by Lisa Martin, could largely affect the delegation 
consequences. (Martin 2006: 142) The international organization, that is the IMF in this 
case, also has its specific preferences on specific issues. Martin put the states’ preferences 
on a spectrum, where the IMF’s ideal point could also be located. She found out that 
when states preferences diverge and thus there are disagreements among states about the 
desired policy, the IMF staff have large room of maneuver and thus greater autonomy. In 
contrast, when states’ preferences converge, the IMF staff have less flexibility. Moreover, 
when the states believe that staff preferences are in line with them, they are more likely to 
grant authority to the IMF and allow them more flexibility. If the states perceive that the 
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IMF staff has divergent preferences, they would act more reserved toward the Fund. 
Those states whose preferences are closest to those of the staff will be the strongest 
proponents of staff autonomy. (Ibid: 142-145)  
 
In the case of IMF, since the Fund’s preferences are closer to those of the US and other 
western advanced economy member states, the consequences of ‘staff autonomy’ are 
often consistent to what these countries would prefer. At least they are closer to these 
countries’ preferences than those of China’s. Therefore, if China’s preferences diverge 
from those of the US and the Fund’s other western advanced economy member states, 
and if the states’ preferences are widely distributed along the preference spectrum, the 
consequential agency autonomy may lead to undesired delegation results for China. If 
China’s preferences differ from those of the IMF’s, it may decide not to delegate; or 
reclaim authority, setting more explicit guidelines for policy or exercising more direct 
oversight if the authority has already been delegated to the Fund.   
 
It is not easy to identify a state’s explicit preferences in all issue areas. Yet we can find 
what a state prefers in general through its speeches and activities in the IMF. In China’s 
case, I shall identify its preferences with regard to Fund policy decisions and activities 
via the Chinese representatives’ statements at IMFC meetings. The Committee discusses 
matters of concern affecting the global economy and also advises the IMF on the 
direction of its work. The IMFC has 24 members who are usually central bank governors, 
ministers, or others of comparable rank and who are drawn from the governors of the 
Fund’s 188 member countries. The membership reflects the composition of the IMF's 
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Executive Board. The IMFC meets twice a year, at the Bank-Fund Annual Meetings and 
at the Spring Meetings. The members’ statements at IMFC meetings include their 
opinions about IMF policies and programs, and their requests and advice for IMF policies 
and programs. Therefore, these statements directly reveal the members’ preferences vis-
à-vis the Fund, as well as those compared to other member states. (IMFC 2002b, 2003b, 
2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a)   
 
Chinese representatives at the IMFC have increasingly made explicit statements with 
regard to the IMF’s various issues areas. They include the IMF’s lending facility and 
conditionality, standards and codes, surveillance mechanism, HIPC Initiative and Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility Program, anti-money laundering regulations and 
regulations against other criminal financial activities, SDR locations, sovereign debt 
restructuring, reforms in the quota and voting share system, and the IMF’s own 
institutional and financing mechanism reforms. The Chinese representatives’ statements 
(or requests) reflect China’s preferences with regard to IMF policies and programs.  They 
are summarized in the following subsections. (Ibid) 
 
2.1   To Understand Member Countries’ Domestic Environment 	  
First of all, China argues that in the IMF’s programs, genuine concern about member 
countries’ actual domestic political and economic environment and their different 
development stages would help avoid any ineffective ‘standard’ or ‘fit-for-all’ models.  
An updated study of the world economic environment would help the IMF facilitate the 
macroeconomic stability of its members in a dynamic international monetary system.  In 
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particular, Chinese officials believe that the implementation of the IMF standards and 
codes should adequately reflect differences in member countries’ economic and 
institutional development stages and, especially the reality in most developing countries. 
(IMFC 2001: 2; 2003a: 3) Moreover, the recipient countries’ domestic weakness in 
infrastructure and capacity building should be fully considered while the IMF provides 
financial and technical assistance and policy guidance, so as to avoid imposing unrealistic 
requirements and expectation on them which would hinder progress of poverty reduction 
and increase the burden on them. (IMFC 2002a: 4) In 2005, China supported the use of a 
joint IMF-World Bank low-income countries debt sustainability analysis framework, 
emphasizing the need to consider each country’s actual conditions when analyzing its 
ability to sustain debt. (IMFC 2005a: 5)   
 
Chinese officials also particularly emphasized the importance of correct understanding of 
each member country’s unique domestic complexion in IMF surveillance, for example 
when the Fund promotes new transparency policies (IMFC 2004: 4).  Chinese officials 
strongly appreciated the IMF managing director’s report on the Spring Meeting in 2005 
which advocated the adoption of different forms of communication for different countries 
and effectiveness of surveillance based on different countries’ unique characteristics.  
Chinese officials pushed forward the implementation of this proposal, and advocated that 
Fund staff policy recommendation should be even more specific and that each country’s 
conditions could be reflected in a more objective, accurate, and focused manner in the 
Article IV Consultation report. (IMFC 2005b: 4)  Chinese officials also pointed out that 
the focus of Fund surveillance should be on reviewing whether a member country’s 
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macroeconomic policies are consistent with the objective of maintaining domestic and 
international economic stability. Therefore, surveillance over exchange rates should focus 
on whether the adopted exchange rate regime is consistent with a country’s 
macroeconomic policies rather than on the exchange rate level.  Evaluating the exchange 
rate level alone would hardly be objective and certainly miss more fundamental issues.  
(IMFC 2006: 4, 2006b: 4)  Due to the problems in the global financial sector that were 
disclosed during the 2007/08 financial crisis, Chinese officials urged the IMF to update 
its understanding of the dynamic world economic environment, study the inherent 
deficiencies in the current international monetary system and propose fundamental 
improvements according to current global economic and financial circumstances.  (IMFC 
2008b: 3-4)  
 
2.2   To Respect Member Countries’ Sovereignty  	  
The second point Chinese officials have brought up in several meetings and negotiations 
with the IMF is that the Fund should follow the founding principles to respect member 
countries’ sovereignty and trust their governments.  Some of the Fund policies should be 
implemented by member countries on a voluntary basis. Chinese officials specifically 
emphasized that IMF technical assistance and policy guidance should not comprise any 
sort of direct audit, and Fund assessments should comply with local laws and policies. 
(IMFC 2000: 5)  China also thinks that the IMF should be cautious in publishing data 
referring to its member countries, and data provision should continue to be on a voluntary 
and consultative basis. (IMFC 2004: 4) Moreover, while dealing with loans, the IMF 
should faithfully respect the intentions and policies of its borrowing members, and 
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develop mutual understanding and trust with its members, so as to ensure the success of 
Fund assisted programs and strengthen members’ ownership of Fund programs. (IMFC 
2001: 3)  Chinese officials also pointed out that in IMF anti-money laundering programs 
and other programs for preventing criminal financial activities, the sovereignty and 
situations of individual countries should be respected, and the ownership and initiatives 
of national governments should be brought into full play. (IMFC 2002a: 5) Furthermore, 
Chinese officials commended the IMF’s efforts in assisting low-income countries’ 
poverty-reduction and long-term development programs, but they also demonstrated that 
the Fund should let the poor countries autonomously draft their own poverty-reduction 
strategy documents.   
 
2.3   To Follow IMF Mandate 	  
Chinese officials maintain that the IMF should strictly follow its mandate and not operate 
in issue areas beyond its mandate.  In addition, the IMF should avoid overlapped 
functions with other international economic institutions such as the World Bank and the 
Bank for International Settlements. (IMFC 2000: 2) Chinese officials brought out this 
point when they commented on the IMF anti-laundering and other criminal financial 
activities.  They argued that since the IMF has neither mandate nor expertise in anti-
money laundering and terrorism financing activities, it should not get directly involved in 
them; instead, the Fund should direct its efforts to areas where it has mandates, as 
prescribed in its Articles of Agreement.  The relevant assessments and technical 
assistance should follow a unified, voluntary and cooperative approach but not include 
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aspects of law enforcement; neither should they compromise the Fund’s core. (IMFC 
2002b: 6, 2003a: 6)  
 
2.4   To Meet Member Countries’ Needs 	  
Chinese officials maintain that the IMF should make and implement their policies based 
on demands from its member countries, especially those who receive most of the Fund 
assistance and guidance.  In its HIPC Initiative and Poverty reduction and Growth 
Facility programs, the Fund should listen more carefully to suggestions and comments 
from the developing countries to better understand and resolve problems emerging from 
the procedures of these programs, for example the PRSP preparation process. (IMFC 
2000: 6-7) The IMF should understand that the formulation and implementation of any 
standards and codes and policies must achieve the objective of promoting the ‘rule-taker’ 
countries’ economic development; and thus it is important to listen to these ‘rule-taker’ 
countries and understand their demands. Based on this point, Chinese officials maintain 
that the IMF should learn about the imperfections in the developing countries’ financial 
sectors and provide sufficient expertise and technical assistance to meet their institution- 
and capacity-building needs. (IMFC 2005b: 4)  Moreover, during IMF surveillance, while 
the Fund emphasizes data provision by member countries, it should also pay close 
attention to fostering and improving their capacity building, particularly in helping the 
developing countries strengthen their fundamental statistical work. (IMFC 2004: 4)  In 
the management of IMF lending facilities, for example conducting the review of access 
limits, the rate of charge and maturities of lending instruments, consideration should be 
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given as to how attractive these instruments are in satisfying the potential needs of 
member countries.  (IMFC 2008b: 4)   
 
2.5   To Treat the IMF’s Developed and Developing Country Members Fairly 	  
Furthermore, the Chinese officials argue that IMF policies and programs should fairly 
reflect the distributions of economic resources among developed and developing country 
members and their different economic influences.  First of all, since the developed 
countries have crucial influences in the global financial economy, the IMF should 
implement stricter policies over the economic activities of these countries.  Chinese 
officials suggested several times that the IMF needs to tighten its surveillance of 
macroeconomic and financial policies of the major industrial countries and important 
financial centres, in order to prevent large fluctuations among the major currencies, 
ensure the sound and efficient operation of international financial markets, and promote 
healthy development of the world economy.  (IMFC 2002a, 2002b, 2003a, and 2006a)  
Deputy Governor of People’s Bank of China Hu Xiaolian said in March 2009, ‘Under the 
current situation, we feel that the IMF particularly needs to strengthen its surveillance of 
the economic policies and financial policies of the major reserve-currency-issuing 
nations.’ (Baston 2009: A10)  
 
After the 2007/08 global financial crisis happened, the Chinese officials further 
emphasized the need for the IMF to enhance surveillance over the macroeconomic 
policies of the advanced economies.  (IMFC 2008b: 3)  They proposed that the Fund 
surveillance should focus on the evolution of developed countries’ sovereign risks and 
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their impact on international market interest rates, exchange rates, and international 
capital flows; on public and private sector financing in developing countries; and on 
global inflation and the real economy.  (IMFC 2008b: 3; 2010a: 4)  
 
Secondly, the Chinese officials maintain that the IMF should always fulfil its 
responsibility toward poor developing countries and facilitate proper global allocation of 
major production factors.  To achieve this end, the IMF should implement vigorously the 
initiatives in the Monterrey Consensus, and urge developed countries to reach the target 
for ODA of 0.7 per cent.  (IMFC 2002b: 5) China continues to support the Fund’s HIPC 
initiative and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility program; and encourages the IMF 
to increase flexibility with non-concessional financing to low-income countries.  They 
also further called on the Fund to work with other international financial institutions to 
explore new financing mechanisms for more effective reallocation of productive 
resources to low-income countries in the wake of the 2007/08 global financial crisis.  
(IMFC 2009: 4) In addition, the Chinese officials pointed out that the IMF should be 
cautious about charging for technical assistance, because a high charge would reduce the 
demand of the service from the poor developing countries by which the IMF technical 
assistance is most needed.  (IMFC 2007a: 4)  
 
Finally, the Chinese officials have emphasized a few times in meetings with IMF staff 
that the developed countries should take the leading responsibility to help developing 
countries strengthen their economic development.  Chinese officials argued that 
combining debt relief and poverty reduction should not result in stricter conditionality for 
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HIPC debt relief; and therefore, in addition to debt relief initiatives, the developed 
countries should provide extra official assistance funds for poverty reduction program to 
the HIPC countries.  (IMFC 2000: 7)  Chinese officials have also called on the industrial 
countries to renounce trade protection and continue to open up their markets to 
developing countries to create a favourable international environment; meanwhile they 
urged the IMF to conscientiously oversee the progress of the developed countries in the 
reduction of trade protection.  (IMFC 2003a: 5) The IMF’s developed country members 
have also been encouraged to facilitate the smooth implementation of the Fund reforms 
that are intended to improve the developing country members’ representation and 
benefits.  (IMFC 2007b: 5) 
 
2.6   To Increase Developing Country Members’ Representation and Participation 
in the IMF 	  
Chinese officials call on the IMF to include more emerging market and developing 
countries in the Fund’s decision-making and policy-formation processes in all issue areas, 
so that the Fund could serve the interests of all the member countries on a fair and 
justifiable basis.   Chinese officials proposed two major approaches to a larger 
involvement of the emerging market and developing country members in the IMF’s key 
policy-making procedures.  Firstly, the IMF should employ more staff from emerging 
market developing countries.  For instance, Chinese officials suggested that the IMF and 
low-income countries could benefit from engaging more technical assistant experts from 
the emerging markets who are aware of the specific needs of the recipient members.  
(IMFC 2008b: 3) More importantly, Chinese officials have been endeavouring to push 
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forward the quota and voting-share reforms in the IMF since the late 1990s.  Since then, 
Chinese officials have encouraged the IMF to speed up the reforms in quota and quota 
formula at almost every IMF-World Bank joint annual meeting and IMFC meeting.  
Chinese officials argue that quota shares and formulas should reflect the changes in 
member countries’ relative positions in the world economy and the rapid growth of 
developing countries, and the under-representation of emerging market and developing 
economies should be corrected.  
 
The above statements made by the Chinese officials reveal China’s preferences with 
regard to IMF policy decisions and policy practices. The Chinese representatives do not 
usually use rigorous terms to criticize IMF in these statements?yet their ‘requests’ and 
‘advocates’ reflect the Chinese government’s dissatisfaction with IMF policies. China 
thinks the IMF should be guided by a better understanding of its developing country 
members’ domestic political and economic environment and the difficulties they face 
during economic development. IMF assistances and policy advice should be provided 
based upon the recipient countries’ needs. China remains skeptical about the IMF’s bias 
toward its western advanced economy members and calls for fair treatments for all 
members. China thinks the IMF should carry out stricter surveillance on the developed 
countries to avoid fluctuations and disruptions in the global financial economy. China 
also urges the IMF to improve representation for the Fund’s emerging market economy 
and developing countries in order to maintain its legitimacy and effectiveness in the 
governance of global financial economy.  China also thinks the IMF and its developed 
country members should take the major responsibility in helping developing countries 
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prompt economic growth and maintain financial stability. These points of view show that 
China’s preferences are in line with those of the IMF’s emerging market economy and 
developing countries; yet they are not completely clashing with those of the developed 
countries.  
 
China also thinks the IMF should operate within the mandate of its Articles of 
Agreements.  It should respect the member countries’ sovereignty, their freedom to 
accept or not accept IMF advice, and their ownership of the projects. Hence, China 
maintains the usual conservative and cautious attitude toward IMF intervention. This 
proposition is compatible with China’s rejection of IMF advice on the essential policy 
issues that may affect the interests of China’s powerful domestic industries and financial 
institutions. China’s preferences thus differ from those of the Fund’s advanced 
economies, together with its skeptical attitude toward IMF on some specific issues, such 
as the IMF’s unequal governance structure, can explain why China is distant from the 
IMF’s core decision-making mechanisms.  It may also drive China away from delegating 
to the IMF.  
 
3   China’s Decision-making Power in IMF governance  
 
Another crucial factor of China’s delegation decisions and effectiveness is China’s 
decision-making power in the IMF’s structure of governance. IMF structure of 
governance is divided into formal and informal governance. In IMF formal governance, a 
state’s decision making power is represented by its quota and voting share; and in IMF 
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informal governance, a state’s decision making power is exercised through informal 
negotiation and networking. This section explores China’s decision making power in the 
IMF’s both formal and informal governance.  
 
3.1   China’s IMF Quota and Voting Share and Formal Governance Power 	  
China’s decision-making power in the IMF’s formal governance is determined by its 
quota and voting share in the Fund. Quota subscriptions are a central component of the 
IMF’s financial resources. Each member state of the IMF is assigned a quota, based 
broadly on its relative position in the world economy. A member state’s quota determines 
its maximum financial commitment to the IMF, its voting share, and its access to IMF 
financing. The IMF uses a quota formula to guide the assessment of a member state’s 
relative position in the Fund. Therefore, the changes in China’s IMF quota and voting 
share indicate its evolving position and decision-making power in the Fund. China’s 
relative position and decision-making power among IMF state members reflect the 
strength of China as a principal.  
 
China initially faced the dilemma between a desire to keep its quota, and thus its potential 
liability low, and a desire to attain a quota larger than that of India’s and one that would 
enable it to elect an executive director with a single country constituency. Eventually 
Chinese opted to become a major contributor.  In July, 1980, the IMF board of governors 
made the first decision of China’s quota as SDR 1.2 billion, which was increased to SDR 
1.8 billion in November in the same year.  In 1983, as a consequence of the Eighth 
General Quota Review, China’s quota was further increased to SDR 2.39 billion which 
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was just above that of India’s, making it the ninth largest in the IMF. 48 (Jacobson and 
Oksenberg 1990: 76) China’s quota was upgraded moderately in the 1990s, but not 
greatly enough to satisfy China’s requirements. The Chinese officials believed that given 
their quotas at the time, developing countries lacked sufficient votes to affect Fund 
policies.  In particular, China wanted more active participation and bigger voices in the 
IMF, with a quota increase to better reflect its position in the world economy following 
the resumption of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong. (Kent 2007: 132)  The IMF 
responded to China’s request with a positive answer.  On January 4, 2001, Horst Hohler, 
the Managing Director of the IMF, announced that the Executive Board had proposed to 
the Board of Governors an increase in China’s quota to SDR 6.4 billion from SDR 4.7 
billion.  The new quota represented about 3.0 per cent of total quotas, made China the 
eighth largest quota holder in the Fund. (IMF 2001a; 2001b) 
 
After entering the new century, as China’s economy continued to grow rapidly, China 
realized that its representation in the IMF was lagged far behind its proportion in the 
global economy, which hindered it from exerting influences on IMF policymaking.  
Therefore, China enhanced its requests for quota and voting shares reform in the Fund, 
calling for a shift of quota proportion and voting shares from developed countries to 
emerging market economies and poor developing countries.  The Chinese delegations 
have emphasized IMF quota and voting share issue at IMFC meetings in almost every 
year since 2002.  In IMFC April meeting in 2002, the Chinese delegation called on the 
IMF to complete its review of quota formulas as soon as possible to introduce new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 The member states having quotas larger than China were, in order of the size of their quotas: the US, the 
UK, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Canada, and Italy.  
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formulas to reflect objectivity and fairly the status and needs of developing countries in 
the world economy, and especially to increase the representation of African countries in 
the Fund.  (IMFC 2002a: 5-6) In the September meeting, the Chinese delegation pointed 
out that the relative size of the Fund’s quotas had decreased to its lowest level in nearly 
30 years and it may cause a liquidity shortage.  Therefore the delegation urged, again, the 
IMF to make a decision on quota increase during the 12th General Review of Quotas, in 
order to fulfil the Fund’s core role in safeguarding the stability of the international 
monetary system.  (IMFC 2002b: 7)  
 
China continued to call for reforms in IMF quota formulas and voting shares to reflect the 
rapid economic growth of developing countries.  In IMFC April meeting in 2006, the 
Chinese delegation also emphasized that the Fund’s governance structure should be 
enhanced through an appropriate increase in basic voting rights to boost the voice and 
representation of small and medium-size developing countries, particularly African 
countries.  (IMFC 2006: 5) IMF staff accordingly proposed an ad hoc quota increase 
package that was passed by the members at the IMF Annual Meetings in Singapore in 
September 2006.  Members agreed to a package of reforms to be completed over a two-
year time frame on the meeting, which comprised the following elements:  
 
1. An initial ad hoc increase in quota for the most underrepresented members: China, 
Korea, Mexico, and Turkey; 
2. A new quota formula to guide the assessment of the adequacy of members’ quotas in 
the IMF; 
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3. A second round of ad hoc quota increases based on the new formula; 
4. An increase in the basic votes that each member possesses to ensure adequate voice for 
low-income countries, as well as protection of the share of the basic votes in total voting 
power going forward; and  
5. Allocating additional resources for the two Executive Directors representing African 
members, as they stand for a fairly large number of countries. (IMF 2007c)  
 
The first element was implemented in 2006, due to which the quota shares of China, 
Korea, Mexico and Turkey increased by 1.8 per cent in total.  All the other components 
of the package were endorsed by the Executive Board on March 28, 2008.  During 2006-
2008, China continued to call on all parties to strengthen consultations to complete the 
second-stage of the reform within the agreed timeframe. The Chinese officials pointed 
out that the first round ad hoc increase only moderately alleviated the underrepresentation 
of China, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey, which still remained the most severely 
underrepresented.  Therefore, they contended that the second round ad hoc increase 
should be based on the post-Singapore level and an overall increase of at least 12.5 per 
cent was appropriate.  The Chinese officials also argued that the new quota formula 
should be simple, transparent, and easy to implement; and it should include four 
variables- GDP, openness, variability, and reserves.  They called for giving GDP the 
greatest weight, using a blended GDP variable with at least 25 per cent Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) weight.  They also supported a slightly lower weight for openness and a 
higher weight for variability, which would better reflect members’ potential need for 
financial resources from the IMF.  They also added that there should be a built-in 
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mechanism for periodically reviewing and adjusting members’ quotas to reflect timely 
changes in the global economic landscape.  Finally, the Chinese officials called for 
stronger political will from the authorities of the advanced economies to facilitate smooth 
implementation of the quota and voting-share reform.  (IMFC 2007b: 4-5)  
 
In April, 2008, the IMF Board of Governors approved the proposal of a package of 
further quota and voting shares reforms that responded partly to China’s specific 
requests. The package included a single quota formula- substituting the old five formulas- 
based on four updated variables: a blend of GDP (30 per cent weight) and PPP (20 per 
cent weight), openness (30 per cent weight), variability (15 per cent weight) and reserves 
(5 per cent weight). The measurement of GDP in PPP terms would consequentially 
increase the weight of developing countries whose GDP measured at PPP is much higher 
than their GDP measure at the market rates. The modified variables of openness and 
reserves would also be favourable to the emerging market economies that are 
increasingly open to the global market and accumulating a large amount of foreign 
reserves. The reform package also intended to strengthen the representation of the poor 
countries via the changes in the administration of the constituencies chaired by two 
African executive directors, the tripled basic votes measure, and a realignment of quota 
and voting shares every five years in order to result in a further increase in the share of 
under-represented countries. (IMF 2008a) Finally, some emerging market economies 
such as Korea, Singapore, Turkey, China, India, Mexico, and Brazil would have their 
quota shares increased, although not by much. It took a rather long period of time for the 
reform to come effective, eventually on March 3, 2011. (IMF 2011g) Due to the 
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implementation, China’s quota increased from 3.718 to 3.996 per cent of the total quotas, 
and its voting shares increased from 3.651 to 3.806 per cent of the total voting shares, 
which did not substantially change China’s decision-making power in the IMF. (IMF 
2010b) The Chinese delegation complained that the 2008 ad hoc quota increase fell far 
short of the objective of the Singapore resolution, and thereby continued to call for a 
pragmatic approach to promote further progress on the reform, including further adjusting 
the quotas of under-represented members in the next general quota review and a regular 
mechanism for quota adjustment establishment. (IMFC 2008a: 3)  
 
Amidst the recovery from the global financial crisis, the increasing role played by the 
emerging market economies vis-à-vis the rebalance of the global financial economic 
system stimulated the urgency of a further IMF governance reform. On December 15, 
2010, the IMF Board of Governors approved a proposal of further governance reforms 
that was described by the Fund Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn as ‘the most 
fundamental governance overhaul in the Fund’s 65-year history and the biggest ever shift 
of influence in favour of emerging market and developing countries to recognise their 
growing role in the global economy.’ (IMF 2010c) When this proposal is implemented, 
the IMF promises a significant shift of more than 6 per cent of quota shares to dynamic 
emerging market and developing countries while protecting the quota shares and voting 
power of the poorest countries. With this shift, China, Brazil, Russia and India will be 
included in the Fund’s 10 largest shareholders. In particular, China will have 6.394 per 
cent of the total quotas and 6.071 per cent of the total voting power and become the 
Fund’s third largest member. On the other hand, the advanced European countries will 
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reduce their combined Board representation by two chairs at the latest by the time of the 
first election after the reform comes effect. A comprehensive review of the current quota 
formula was scheduled to be completed by January 2013, and the 15th General Review of 
Quotas will be brought forward to January 2014. (IMF 2010d)  
 
The IMF undoubtedly made a remarkable step toward the rebalance of the member 
countries’ representation in the Fund through the 2010 Reform. However, the official 
agreement on the reform reached by the Board does not necessarily guarantee an 
effective and efficient implementation. A recently published report on the outcome of the 
quota formula reviews concluded the Executive Board decided that achieving broad 
consensus on a new quota formula will be integrated and moving in parallel with the 
discussion on the 15th Review. The report showed there were divided opinions among 
IMF staff toward the four variables of the current formula and a potential new variable of 
‘financial contribution’. Despite the disagreements, it did not sound like a very different 
quota formula that favours the emerging market economy and developing countries will 
be generated later. (IMF 2013c) Moreover, the Fund’s as well as the member countries’ 
institutional features further hampered efficient implementation of the 2010 Reform. 
Implementation of the 2010 Reform Package requires a pass of the member countries’ 
domestic legal approval processes before being implemented, which is usually time 
consuming.  
 
The Fund has been pushing forward the implementation; especially the IMF Managing 
Director Christine Lagarde has urged the member countries to complete the necessary 
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legislative procedures to implement this agreement within the agreed timeframe for 
several times throughout 2012. On the World Bank- IMF annual meeting in October 
2012, both Lagarde and the G-24 Chairman Palaniappan Chidambaram indicated that 
they were confident with the implementation of the 2010 reforms by January 2013. 
Lagarde specifically pointed out that it would take only one or two countries to press the 
yes button for the governance reform to be implemented. (IMF 2012e) However, The 
IMF website updates on the matter on February 5, 2013 indicated that at least 14.61 per 
cent of the voting power was still to be needed in order to reach the 85 per cent of the 
Fund’s total voting power for the reform to enter into force.49 It is worth pointing out that 
the US, as the IMF’s biggest member with 16.7 per cent of the total voting power, had yet 
not accepted the 2010 reforms. (IMF 2013d) In other words, just like in many other cases, 
the IMF needs the US to press the yes button so that it could proceed and eventually 
implement the 2010 reforms. The complex US domestic policy process makes the 
implementation of any IMF decisions even more difficult. In fact, the 2010 reform has 
not been implemented until the thesis is submitted.  
 
Overall, IMF quota and voting shares reforms include long and complex processes. Every 
procedure of each round requires the Fund’s advanced economy members50 to agree on 
and implement the decisions that would potentially reduce their own decision power in 
the Fund. Some of the Fund’s advanced economy members were reluctant to forego their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 In order for the proposed amendment on reform of the Executive Board to enter into force, acceptance by 
three-fifths of the Fund’s 188 members (or 113 members) having 85 per cent of the Fund’s total voting 
power is required. As of February 5, 2013, 132 members having 70.39 per cent of total voting power had 
accepted the amendment. For the list of the countries that have accepted the amendment, please check 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/misc/consents.htm  
50 Such as the Us, Japan, Germany, France and the UK  
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decision power, which together with their complex domestic legal approval system made 
the implementation of IMF reforms even more difficult. Despite the bureaucracies, the 
actual impact of IMF governance reforms on China’s and other emerging market 
economy and developing country members’ representation and voicing power in the 
Fund remains debatable. When the 2010 reform comes effective, the US quota share will 
be reduced to 17.407 per cent from 17.670 per cent that was agreed under the 2008 
reform, but return to the pre-2006 reform level. Meanwhile, with a slight reduction, the 
US will keep 16.479 per cent of the total voting power that ensures the ‘veto’ right is 
retained.  The EU countries will forego around 2.7 per cent and 3.1 per cent of total 
quotas and voting power respectively compared to the pre-2006 reform level, which are 
insignificant compared to the proportion retained: 30.2 per cent and 29.4 per cent 
respectively. The G7 will secure 43.4 per cent of the total quota shares, which still 
surpasses the 42.3 per cent held by all the emerging market and developing countries 
added together. The G7’s voting shares will fall behind those of the emerging market and 
developing countries’, although not by far.51 Therefore, the increase of China’s quota and 
voting shares, although contributes significantly to its own decision-making power 
growth in the IMF, does not put China in any position to challenge the dominating power 
of the Fund’s advanced economy members. China’s increasing yet relatively weak 
decision making power indicates that it remains a relatively weak principal compared to 
the US and the fund’s other advanced economy member states in the Fund’s formal 
governance.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 The data of IMF quota and voting shares are from IMF(2010) IMF Quota and voting shares table 
[Online] Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pdfs/pr10418_table.pdf [Accessed 
December 21, 2012] 
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3.2   China’s Informal Governance Power 	  
The quota and voting share is the most essential index of a member state’s formal 
governance power in the IMF; however, the informal governance of the IMF reveals the 
hidden structure of the Fund. As argued by Stone, ‘the formal rules specify voting rights 
and legitimate procedures that embody a broad consensus of the membership, while the 
informal rules allow exceptional access for powerful states to set the agenda and control 
particular outcomes.’ (Stone 2011: 13) Therefore, to understand China’s decision-making 
power in IMF governance, we need to find out China’s role in Fund informal governance.  
 
The US has kept the biggest voting share in the Executive Board, yet its share has 
declined since the Bretton Woods conference as new members joined the IMF. The US 
has always controlled a minority of shares, stopping it from directly controlling Fund 
policies, although the veto power enables it to block adoption of any new policies. 
However, the US has relatively direct control in the Fund’s informal governance, 
especially on the non-general structural and policy decisions, such as lending decisions. 
For the IMF’s general structural and policy issues, the EB delegates a large degree of 
authority to IMF management, which in turn delegates detailed decision making to staff. 
On the other hand, when the issues are important to major shareholders, the informal 
governance starts to operate. The decision-making of such issues are moved outside the 
EB to forums that better reflect the international distribution of resources, and 
management’s formal proposal power is exercised informally by individual shareholders, 
which shape proposals before management brings them to the board. (Stone 2011: 55) 
The G7 is the most obvious example of such informal governance forums/groups.  
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As mentioned earlier, the IMF management and staff to a large degree (if not by all 
means) control the proposals. They negotiate with the affected countries and initiate the 
proposal accordingly. They would only submit the proposals to the EB knowing it would 
likely to be passed. However, informal participation allows influential shareholders, 
mostly the G7 members and especially the US, to shape the agenda and craft proposals 
before they are brought to the Board. It is mostly because the US has large organizational 
advantage over other countries as they have extensive diplomatic corps, especially 
influential private financial institutions, advantages in gathering information, and of 
course the advantage of having the IMF located in Washington, DC. The rest of the G7 
members usually keep their voices consistent with that of the US’. For example, the US 
ED always requested a special briefing before a country item regarding a Latin American 
country came to the Board. In some important cases, including Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico for example, the US ED requested meetings to debrief the chief of mission before 
and after each trip abroad.  Via such briefings, the US ED was able to effectively monitor 
the progress of negotiations. In addition, the G7 EDs are sometimes briefed before the 
other countries. (ibid: 51-79)  
 
Moreover, Woods and Lombardi did a research on the importance of informal 
arrangements in IMF governance, in terms of the lobbying and agenda-setting roles 
played by the informal coalition groups outside the EB, such as the G7, the group of EU 
representatives to the IMF (EURIMF), the G11, the G24, the Asia-Pacific Group, and so 
on. Each chair of the EB is a member of one or more informal groups. The purpose of the 
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informal arrangements is to leverage preferential access to IMF senior management and 
staff in order to affect the institutional agenda at an early stage, before it is formalized in 
specific policy proposals. The coalition groups serve as a forum for discussing issues and 
deriving a better sense of the institutions, its agenda and the implications of items on the 
agenda. They also serve to assist in finding collective solutions and to leverage access 
and input into knowledge and research. (Woods and Lombardi 2006; Lombardi 2011: 
169) These informal groups are formed by the chairs from the same region, or with 
common interests, gathered to discuss related policy issues.  For example, the Chinese 
representatives are in the Asia-Pacific Group with the representatives from Japan, Korea, 
Thailand, and India. Woods and Lombardi’s research pointed out that the leverage of the 
Asia-Pacific group had a limited effect on Board dynamics compared to that of the G7 or 
the EU, because of its relative diversity and limited total voting shares. (Woods and 
Lombardi 2006) Therefore, China, together with other emerging market and developing 
countries, are lagged behind in informal IMF governance.  
 
According to an senior IMF official in an interview52, he said 20 years ago, not many 
officials at Fund meetings would come to the Chinese representatives; yet now more and 
more officials, especially those from emerging market and developing countries do 
actually come to the Chinese representatives and hoping to get approval and support from 
China on various policy issues. The Chinese representatives are increasingly developing 
networks within the IMF; however, till it becomes a strong player in the informal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Interview conducted in the IMF Headquarter in Washington, D.C. The interviewee (Interviewee 3) is a 
senior IMF official of the IMF. 
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governance, it will continue to request for a larger say in the formal IMF governance, that 
is via the quota and voting share increase.  
 
4   IMF Staff Autonomy and Chinese Nationality 
 
Studies of International Organizations often focus only on the role of states or 
international organizations as whole units. Those analyze the role of international 
organizations often focus on the international organizations’ functions, structures and 
governance. Staff of international organizations are sometimes ignored, or simply 
counted into the structures of the organizations. However, international organization staff 
should be examined as an organism whose characteristics, including their structure, 
competence, legitimacy and culture, can significantly affect the operation of international 
organizations. People who work in international organizations to a large extent determine 
the organizations’ capability to accomplish their tasks and to fulfil their promised duties.  
As Xu and Weller argued, ‘…their [international civil servants]53 power is derived from 
shared values of multilateral cooperation, their expertise, competence and continuity and 
their capacity to shape the institutions and behaviour of the states involved.’ (Xu and 
Weller 2007:37) International organization staff become more influential if they have a 
larger degree of autonomy. Xu and Weller introduced five sources of autonomy: control 
of information, longevity, technical expertise, leadership, and legitimacy. Examination of 
staff characteristics and their autonomy is crucial in the case of IMF, especially if we 
want to investigate to what extent Fund staff determine IMF policies.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 ‘International Civil Servants’ represent the same concept of what I call staff of international organization 
staff here.  
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IMF staff have gained a rather large degree of autonomy from its principals over time. 
Several scholars have explored the development of IMF staff autonomy. Susan Strange 
particularly remarked on one event as the sign of ‘important shift of responsibility from 
the US to the Fund’, that was when members stopped discussing their prospective 
requests for drawings directly with the US ED prior to submitting a formal request in 
1956. She added that IMF consultations and the need to make decisions in a timely 
manner further contributed to greater staff autonomy. (Strange 1973: 267-279) Miles 
Kahler argued that the US supported expansions of staff autonomy, in part as it did not 
have a choice, because the programs required a degree of expertise and information that 
EDs and their staffs could not provide. (Kahler 1990: 96) Margaret Garritsen de Vries 
argued that frequent staff-ED communication meant that staff could convey information 
informally to EDs, so that explicit oversight was unnecessary; and that over time EDs 
came to be more confident with the staff. The staff also gained autonomy as they 
accumulated expertise. Keith Horsefield argued that moving the venue of negotiations 
from Washington to members’ capitals significantly enhanced staff autonomy. Although 
some EDs originally objected this policy change, the informational demands of drafting 
effective programs eventually convinced the EB to delegate this authority to IMF staff.  
(Horsefield 1969: 270)  The consequence of these reforms in the IMF is ‘a strong 
management/staff and an Executive Board that acted largely on Management 
recommendations’. (Southard 1979: 9)  
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IMF staff work is crucial to keep the whole system running. It is particularly important to 
the work of the EB, because the EB’s work is largely based on the memos and papers 
produced by the staff. For example, it is the IMF staff that are taking charge of releasing 
IMF resources to member states and the primary conduit for conditionality.  The country 
wishing to access to IMF resources usually negotiates a stand-by arrangement with IMF 
management and staff. The staff then pass the arrangement to the EB to be approved. 
Once the arrangement is approved, it allows the country to draw on Fund resources on a 
specified schedule, under certain conditions that are included in the Letters of Intent 
attached. This procedure reflects the relative influences of the EB and the staff and 
management. The EB cannot approve a program without a proposal from the staff, which 
confers on the staff a large degree of agenda-setting power. The EB holds the power to 
make the final decision to either accept or reject staff proposals. In other words, IMF staff 
take the control of the initial plans and arrangement s of all lending programs.  
 
As an IMF report showed real debates over policy and issues are rarely conducted in the 
Board, controversial cases and stand-off issues are even more rare. The ‘peaceful’ 
atmosphere of the EB is also due to ED’s protectiveness towards the countries they 
represent, and their consequent expectation of similar deference from their colleagues.  
Hence, in the words of the IMF External Evaluation, what is supposed to be ‘peer 
pressure’ in fact becomes ‘peer protection’. (Woods 2001: 87-88; IMF 1999) If the staff 
anticipate that the EB would disapprove its proposal of a potential program, it could 
refuse to present it to the EB in the first place, which confers IMF staff the ‘gatekeeping’ 
power. Once the program is in place, the staff continue to use the agenda-setting power to 
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assess whether the borrower country has met the conditions of the loan and make 
recommendations about whether to release the next stage of the drawing. (Martin 2006: 
147-149)  
 
IMF staff have strong knowledge about macroeconomics and significant experience in 
dealing with the financial difficulties of member states. The staff’s ability to use expertise 
and knowledge is the Fund’s crucial source of autonomy. The staff’s technical 
knowledge, solid credentials in monetary policymaking, and experience in the field have 
made the Fund ‘an authority’ and a credible source of policy advice. (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004: 50) IMF staff’s expertise enabled it to access to the member states’ 
domestic economic governance. For example, the IMF staff drew from their economic 
training to develop models that created new intellectual connections between domestic 
economic stability and balance-of-payment position. The Fund created a unique model to 
tackle the member states’ balance-of-payment problems, which identified a unique 
relationship between domestic credit and international reserves.54 Unsurprisingly, the 
model had normative implication. By its structure and assumptions, the model framed the 
problem as one in which both the case of and the solution to balance-of-payments 
problems lay in the deficit state. This shows how IMF programs shape the economic 
norms in the member states and the international economy. Meanwhile, the Fund’s staff 
also offer technical assistance, together with the conditionality, enable the Fund to move 
from a limited focus on balance-of-payments lending to even deeper structural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 For more details of the approaches, please see Polak, J (1997) ‘The IMF Monetary Model and Forty’, 
IMF Working Paper, April, Washington, D.C and Frenkel, J, Goldstein, M and M, Kahn (1991) ‘Major 
Themes in the Writings of Jacques J. Polak’, in Frenkel, J and Goldstein, M (eds.) International Financial 
Policy: Essays in Honor of Jacques J. Polak (Washington, D. C: International Monetary Fund)   
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interventions in members’ economies and societies.  This standpoint is also consistent to 
the socialization proposition that the IMF seeks to socialize member states into accepting 
the Fund’s advocated norms via various interactive mechanisms.  
 
Knowing the IMF staff autonomy enables the Fund to expand its authority over its 
member states, we now go back to the origin of the staff autonomy. Barnett and 
Finnemore described it as ‘expertise authority’, and they pointed out: 
 
‘What makes the prescriptions of the Fund so authoritative is that they are undergirded 
by a body of economic analysis that is accepted by a large number of economists in many 
countries. The Fund’s expertise creates some amount of agreement that certain basic 
features of the Fund’s model and stabilization programs are right and true in some 
objective way. Widely shared agreement among economists across borders on certain 
modes of analysis and perceived truths is one component of the deference paid to the 
Fund’s recommendation.’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 68)  
 
The solutions provided by IMF economists are not purely technical and value-neutral; 
they aim to reconstitute the member states’ economies to conform to the market-
dominated models that are at the core of the international neo-liberal economic norms. 
IMF economists and other staff together are a crucial component of the Fund’s 
‘organizational culture’; and the ‘organizational culture’ sustains staff autonomy facing 
the Fund’s member states. Constructivist scholars use ‘organization culture’ to explain 
the origin of staff autonomy. It comprises ‘shared ideologies, norms, and routines that 
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shape staff members’ expectations about how agendas are set, mandates are 
operationalized, projects are implemented and evaluated and what staff behaviour will be 
rewarded or punished in promotions and demotions.’ (Nielson, Tierney and Weaver 
2006: 109) The IMF’s organizational culture is characterized by neoliberal economic 
theory and a technocratic approach to problems. Such cultural provides the IMF staff 
with guidance for its operations of policies and programs. It strengthens the IMF staff’s 
autonomy, and consolidates the staff’s judgments and decisions in any Fund program.  
 
Hence, it’s the IMF staff running this big institution. They operate research on economic 
development of the member countries and the global market in order to provide them 
with advice. They also meet the policymakers and private sectors of the member 
countries in order to produce Article IV consultations. They prepare all sorts of proposals 
and documents for the Executive Board and Board of Governors to make a decision on. 
They organize various formal meetings and informal forums for the international 
policymakers to gather to exchange views and discuss issues of common interest. Other 
than those, they also attend the meetings of other related institutions such as the UN, 
World Bank, and G20 in order to promote policy coordination and cooperation in the 
global sphere. In a sense, the IMF final policy decisions and advice on world economic 
development are transformed from the staff’s expertise, knowledge and opinions.  
 
Therefore, the degree to which IMF staff acquire an accurate and comprehensive 
understanding of the member countries’ domestic economy determines the effectiveness 
of the Fund program. In particular, in order to operate accurate analysis and offer 
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appropriate advice to the emerging market and developing countries, the IMF ought to 
employ the staff with accurate and comprehensive understanding of the involved 
countries and regions. The staff members originally from the emerging markets and 
developing countries presumably have better knowledge of their own countries and 
regions; therefore increasing the recruitment from these regions will bring more concerns 
about the specific countries and regions to Fund policy-making and decisions.55 In 
addition, the staff originally from emerging market and developing countries would bring 
some new concepts and ideas, encouraging the Fund’s organizational cultural to 
gradually include the economic ideologies and norms from these areas.  
 
For both intellectual and legitimate reasons, the IMF has increased the recruitment from 
emerging market and developing countries in the recent years under its ‘Diversity’ 
principle; however, the share of these regions in all the staff, especially the senior B-level 
staff (senior staff positions with managerial responsibilities) remain considerably low. In 
China’s case, the data shows an obvious increase in the number of IMF staff with 
Chinese nationality in the recent years, yet among which the share in the B-level staff is 
surprisingly low. According to IMF annual diversity reports, the number of staff with 
Chinese nationality jumped from 51 in 2007 to 72 in 2009, followed by a continuous 
increase to 109 in 2012. (IMF 2008b, 2010e, 2012f) However, the IMF 2007 Diversity 
Report pointed out that the share of Chinese staff in the Fund (1.9 per cent) remained far 
below the country’s quota (3.7 per cent), and thus made the world’s largest and fastest 
growing emerging market economy underrepresented in the Fund. (IMF 2008b: 33) What 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 No matter which countries the Fund staff members are from, they do not represent the interests of their 
state governments or any domestic interest groups.  
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made it worse was China’s severe underrepresentation at the Fund’s senior staff level. 
The number of Chinese B-level staff has not gone beyond 4 since 2004; and the 2011 
Diversity report indicated that 3 Chinese nationals made 0.94 per cent of all Fund B-level 
staff by April 30, 2012. (IMF 2012f: 37) Moreover, the data also showed that the Chinese 
staff had relatively low rates of promotion and poor career advancement in the Fund. 
Only 2 Chinese staff member was promoted to the B-level in the seven years from 2000-
2007 (IMF 2008b: 26); and none was promoted in 2011-2012 as the latest data shows. 
(IMF 2012f: 15) The 2011 report indicated that ‘diversity’- although essential in the 
general recruitment policy- does not drive promotion; (IMF 2012f: 14) in other words, 
Chinese staff would not get promoted because their country is underrepresented in Fund 
governance.  
 
Since the strategy to achieve greater diversity was formalized in 1996 under the 
Managing Director’s statement on ‘Measures to Promote Staff Diversity and Address 
Discrimination’, the Fund has increasingly institutionalized its ‘diversity’ principle in 
recruitment and management.56 The Fund considers ‘diversity’ in staff nationals as a sign 
of strong organizational environment that generates diversity in thoughts. Nevertheless, it 
is challenging to transfer the principle into practice by adapting the Fund’s organizational 
culture to accommodate the new thoughts that may clash with orthodox IMF norms. 
Despite the efforts made toward diversity, the IMF remains highly western-dominated.  
The 2011 Diversity Report showed more than half of Fund staff members were from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 These measures include initiating various diversity workshops and seminars, introducing related Code of 
Conduct, introducing diversity-sensitive interview methods and training, carrying out staff surveys, 
adopting enhanced Diversity Action Plan with quantitative benchmarks, creating a Diversity Council and 
several Diversity Reference Groups, implementing diversity scorecard, recently implementing new policy 
measures to strengthen senior-level diversity, and so on. 
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Fund’s 24 industrial country57 members out of 188 in total. In particular, among all the B-
level staff, those from the industrial country group amounted to 70 per cent. (IMF 2012f: 
34) In particular, in the Asia-Pacific area department, 42.1 per cent of all B-level staff 
members are from Europe, Canada and the US. It is thus questionable whether the Asian 
national staff in the Asia-Pacific department could sufficiently use their language, 
knowledge and experience advantages in their research, and whether the result of their 
research could accurately reflect the economic and social development in the region.  
 
Moreover, the result of the investigation of Fund staff’s education background further 
proved the western-domination characteristic of IMF staff.  In 2011, among all the Fund 
staff, around 63 per cent of PhDs, half of the Master’s degrees and 40 per cent of 
Bachelor’s degrees were obtained in the US; and the UK, France, Canada, Germany and 
Italy were other important education sources of Fund staff. Although China was also 
among the top ten countries of education of Fund staff, its data is almost negligible 
compared to that of the US- only 0.6 per cent of PhDs, 1.1 per cent of Master’s degree, 
and 2.6 per cent of Bachelor’s degree were obtained from China. (IMF2011h: 27-28) It 
means most of the staff with Chinese nationality left China before their Master’s degrees. 
In this case, the Fund staff with Chinese nationality may not acquire thorough 
understanding of China’s domestic economy and therefore unable to contribute to the 
more country-sensitive advice that better serves China’s specific policy insufficiencies.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The Industrial Country Groups includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Province of China, United Kingdom, and United States of 
America.  
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In summary, IMF staff have a large degree of autonomy, based on which they could 
affect Fund programs and domestic economies of the member states. However, China is 
excluded from this mighty staff authority. IMF staff includes a rather small proportion of 
members with Chinese nationality.  Among the IMF staff members with Chinese 
nationality, the majority were educated in the western institutes, which prepared them for 
working in the IMF that is guided by the neo-liberal economic norms. Employing more 
staff with Chinese nationalities – or more precisely, with better understanding of the 
Chinese economy- does not mean these staff members will serve the interests of the 
Chinese state, yet it at least brings in better knowledge of China’s domestic economic 
structure and social-political regime. During an interview, an IMF staff who originally 
came from China and finished her bachelor and masters degrees in China was asked if 
‘the Chinese voice has increased within the Fund’, and she said ‘I want to clarify that 
there is no Chinese voice in the IMF, because we all work as international civil servants 
and we do not represent the voice of any state.’58 It is certainly a good thing that IMF 
staff work on a neutral and non-political basis; and this Chinese IMF staff’s answer 
should certainly be regarded as a positive statement. However, based upon the neutral 
and non-political assumption of IMF working environment and the assumption that the 
staff originally from China have a better understanding of China’s domestic economic 
development, lacking staff members with Chinese nationality does not help the IMF 
develop an accurate understanding of Chinese economy. Neither does it help China gain a 
larger decision making power in the Fund. Lacking staff members with Chinese 
nationality in the IMF proves China’s weakness in the staff authority. It makes China a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 The interview was conducted in IMF Headquarter, Washington, D.C. The Interviewee (Interviewee 4) is 
a staff member in one of IMF research departments.  
 259 
less influential principal with regard to the issues that are subjected to the maneuver of 
Fund management and staff. On the other hand, is the IMF really neutral and non-
political? With its prevailing neo-liberal economic norms, it is quite likely not so.  
 
In addition, the selection process of IMF managing director has incurred criticism from 
its emerging market economic and developing country members, especially the BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) country members.  There is a ‘latent’ rule 
in the IMF and World Bank that, the managing director of the Fund is usually from a 
Western European country and the president of the Bank from the US.  Protesting against 
this rule, several international agreements called for a truly transparent, merit-based and 
competitive process for the selection of IMF managing director and other senior positions 
in the Bretton Woods institutions, to replace the obsolete unwritten convention that 
requires that the head of the IMF be necessarily from Europe. Even some European 
policymakers announced that IMF managing director does not need to be European.  For 
example, in 2007, during the selection of Dominique Strauss-Khan as the new IMF 
managing director, Jean-Claude Junker, president of Euro group declared that ‘the next 
managing director will certainly not be a European’ and ‘in the Euro group and among 
EU finance ministers, everyone is aware that Strauss-Kahn will probably be the last 
European to become director of the IMF in the foreseeable future’.   
 
However, in early 2011, some high-level European officials reversed the tune and made 
some public statements to the effect that the position of IMF managing director should 
continue to be European that triggered the BRICS statement.  The IMF EDs representing 
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BRICS countries made a statement on May 24, 2011, complaining about the IMF 
managing director appointment system.  They stated that ‘… if the Fund is to have 
credibility and legitimacy, its managing director should be selected after broad 
consultation with the membership.  It should result in the most competent person being 
appointed as managing director, regardless of his or her nationality.  …that adequate 
representation of emerging market and developing members in the Fund’s management is 
critical to its legitimacy and effectiveness.’  They further called for that the next 
managing director should not only be a strongly qualified person, with solid technical 
background and political acumen, but also a person that is committed to continuing the 
process of change and reform of the institution so as to adapt it to the new realities of the 
world economy.  (IMF 2011i) However, about half a month after the BRICS’ statement, 
on July 5, 2011, Christine Lagarde from France became the new appointed managing 
director of the IMF.   
 
5   Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I examined the Chinese representatives’ statements at IMFC meetings in 
the period from 2001 to 2011, in order to generate an analysis of the Chinese 
government’s preferences regarding IMF policy decisions and policy processes. The 
Chinese representatives often call on the IMF to correct its western-dominated 
governance structure and policy propositions and make more policy decisions to 
compensate the economically disadvantaged developing countries.  Hence China tends to 
be in line with the interests of the Fund’s emerging market economy and developing 
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countries, which makes China a non-traditional principal of the Fund. It may discourage 
China to delegate tasks to an IMF whose preferences are closer to those of its western 
advanced state members, at least until China perceives less preference contradictions. It 
could also potentially create difficulties for China to obtain more voicing power in an 
IMF that has been dominated by the western advanced states for a long history.  
 
However, a state’s preferences do not fully explain its delegation decisions and actions. 
China’s IMF-related delegation decisions and effectiveness are largely determined by 
China’s decision making power in the IMF’s formal and informal governance. China’s 
quota and voting share- that represent its decision making power in the IMF’s formal 
governance- have increased for several times since 1980, especially in the past decade. 
Yet, China’s current quota and voting share still implies China’s state of ‘under-
representation’ in the IMF. On the other hand, the US maintains an absolute dominant 
position in the Fund’s formal governance sphere by keeping the only veto power that is 
held by one single state. Adding EU countries’ voting shares together also generates a 
veto power. This situation makes China a relatively weaker principal among the Fund’s 
state members. Similarly, China does not have a prominent influence in the IMF’s 
informal governance either. Compared to the US and other western advanced states, 
China lacks skills and experience in negotiating with other states in the forums outside 
the EB or influencing IMF staff before they submit policy proposals. Therefore, China’s 
weak decision making power in IMF governance may prohibit its intention to delegate 
tasks to the Fund, or discourage it to grant IMF staff more autonomy if the delegation has 
already undertaken.  
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Finally, the proportion of IMF staff with Chinese nationality indicates the extent to which 
IMF policies reflect China’s real interests. The logic behind this causal relationship was 
explained in this chapter: IMF staff with Chinese nationality are more likely to have a 
better understanding of China’s domestic social political and economic environments and 
hence more likely to take into account of China’s real needs in Fund policy designs. The 
staff’s influences in IMF policy products are made possible by the Fund’s strong 
organizational culture and the staff’s acquisition of distinguished economic expertise and 
analytical techniques. However, the result of the examination conducted in this chapter 
showed that the IMF has a small proportion of staff with Chinese nationality, especially 
in the senior managerial tier. It does not sufficiently prove that IMF policy products are 
ignorant of China’s real needs, yet it does make IMF policy products regarding China’s 
problems less convincing. In addition, hiring more staff with Chinese nationality in the 
IMF could also help build up a strong link between the IMF and China, which may 
attracts more attentions to Fund programs from the Chinese government. Hence the 
‘China influence’ is limited among IMF staff and in staff-driven IMF programs, which 
may also discourage the Chinese government to grant IMF staff more autonomy and 
prohibit the effectiveness of delegation. 
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Chapter 7 - China’s Role in the International Financial 
Economy: A Principal- Agent Framework 
 
1   Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the consequences of China’s delegation of multiple tasks to the 
IMF, which is also the last stage of the four-stage approach to analyzing the relationship 
between China and the IMF within a principal-agent theoretical framework. The results 
of the examination explain China’s relative position and strategic moves in the 
international financial economy.  
 
China has gradually specified its goals in the international financial economy, which are 
to strengthen its decision making power and create an environment that is more flexible 
for China’s economic advancement and financial stability. It was already explained in the 
previous chapters that China decided to delegate authority to the IMF so that the IMF 
could assist China to achieve its objectives more effectively. Hence delegating tasks to 
the IMF is China’s approach to a higher role in the international financial economy. It is 
also one of the most legitimate and supposedly effective approaches due to the IMF’s 
authoritative role in the governance of the international financial economy. The 
consequences of China’s delegation of tasks to the IMF tell us if the ‘IMF approach’ 
functions as a good option.  
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If China’s delegation generates satisfactory consequences, the state government may 
consider continuing to delegate or delegate more authority to the IMF, which proves a 
successful IMF option toward its objectives in the international financial economy. On 
the other hand, if China’s delegation leads to undesired consequences, which is referred 
as ‘agency slack’ in principal-agent theory, the state government may call off delegation. 
In this case, China could either deal with agency slack and mitigate the negative impact 
to the minimum, or seek alternative solutions other than participating in IMF programs, 
or both.  
 
So is the IMF a diligent agent or a slacker? The examination builds upon the analysis 
conducted in the previous chapters, and extends the factors of China’s delegation 
decisions and process to the eventual consequences of delegation. Some of the evidences 
were explained with details in the previous chapters, for example the impact of IMF 
technical assistance and Article IV Consultation, yet they are re-interpreted in this 
chapter from the perspective of principal-agent theory. It focuses on five causes59 of 
agency slack: IMF staffing rules, IMF structure of governance, preference deviation 
between China and the IMF, China’s reliance on IMF expertise and costly controlling 
mechanisms, and inadequate IMF resources.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Sometimes the causes of agency slack could be interpreted as the impacts of it.  For example, the IMF 
does not have enough financial resources, hence it cannot sufficiently play the role of ‘lend of last resort’ 
and fulfill the task of multilateral lending when crises happen; on the other hand, it is because the IMF fails 
the role of ‘lender of last resort’, member states loose faith in the IMF and stop contributing to the IMF 
financial resources.  
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The analysis shows neither China acts like a capable principal with powerful controlling 
mechanism, nor the IMF performs like a diligent agent with consistent interests and 
values. Agency slack explains why China is dissatisfied with IMF policy decisions and 
policy processes, and why China often attempts to gain more shares in the governance of 
the international financial economy in alternative ways. While China increases 
participation in IMF programs, it also develops bilateral links with other states and 
regions especially other emerging market economies, and gets more engaged with Asian 
regional financial cooperation mechanisms such as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), 
ADB, ASEAN10+3, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). China’s 
alternative approaches could be regarded as China delegating authority to other 
regional/international organizations in order to achieve its objectives in the international 
financial economy. They significantly justify China’s principal role facing international 
institutions. China’s alternative cooperative moves (other than through the IMF) are not 
the focuses of this research, hence they will only be briefly described in the last part of 
this chapter (in Section 4); however, they shed light on China’s multilateral view of the 
governance of the international financial economy.  
 
2   China’s ‘IMF Option’ 
 
China initially decided to rejoin the IMF in 1980; and since then it has been increasingly 
participating in IMF programs. China showed clear intentions and goals while making the 
decision on what particular IMF programs, and to what degree it would participate in. 
The Chinese authorities intended to learn from the IMF the methods and techniques in 
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running a modern financial system that meets the international requirements; to get 
information about other countries’ financial economy from the IMF; to get (re)- 
connected with foreign economic institutions via participating in IMF programs; to 
accelerate expulsion of Taiwan from the international political society by demonstrating 
its legal membership in the IMF; and to show to the world that it could be an eligible 
member of the international political society, which would significantly enable smooth 
economic cooperation with foreign states. Driven by these goals, China decided to 
delegate authorities to the IMF. Recalling the definition of delegation - ‘a conditional 
grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the latter to act on behalf of 
the former’ (Hawkins et al 2006: 7) - China delegated to the IMF because of the Fund’s 
specific functions that would enable China to achieve the goals in a more efficient way 
than it would have by taking the unilateral or other cooperative approaches. 
 
When China re-joined the IMF, the Chinese government was still considerably resistant 
to the western-dominated international political economic system. Nevertheless, China 
did become more open toward the IMF in the later years, via which it also established 
connections with other states. It made China develop more confidence in the Fund, which 
could be reflected from the Chinese government’s increasing delegations of various tasks 
to the IMF. Unlike other developing countries, China did not aim for utilizing the IMF as 
an emergent financial source, therefore delegating to IMF financial assistance mechanism 
was not an initial part of the plan. China did not delegate to IMF lending mechanism as a 
debtor in the later years either. Yet due to the IMF’s specific expertise and information 
advance, its agenda setting power and multilateral decision-making mechanisms, and its 
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capability to solve the controversial issues that cannot be solved by China on its own, the 
Chinese government made decisions to delegate authority to the IMF in several other 
programs.  
 
China delegated to the IMF the tasks of training its officials in various economic 
departments with internationally standardized methods and techniques in running a 
modern financial system. It increasingly delegated authority to IMF surveillance 
programs such as the Article IV Consultation, by submitting data and information to the 
Fund and expecting it to generate accurate technical analysis of the economies of IMF 
member countries. It delegated the tasks of multilateral lending to the IMF. Moreover, 
China also delegated the tasks of solving global imbalances to IMF Multilateral 
Consultation on Global Imbalances, by which China could discuss the solutions to the 
problem along with other essential economies. Furthermore, when China was facing the 
threats from the volatile dollar-dominated international monetary system, it sought to 
delegate to the IMF the tasks of strengthening surveillance on reserve currency issuer 
countries and diversifying the risky single currency based international monetary system.  
 
As an international organization agent, the IMF carries out multiple tasks that are 
delegated from its member states.  China does not simply delegate a task to the IMF for 
once and then let the IMF to perform as it wishes. It could later choose to re-delegate 
more precisely designated tasks and/or authorize new pursuits for the IMF (for example, 
it has increasingly delegated authorities to IMF surveillance and policy advice programs). 
It could otherwise choose to de-delegate authorities from the IMF because of undesired 
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delegation consequences (for example, banning the IMF from publishing the staff reports 
for the Article IV Consultation). Via such a dynamic delegation relationship between 
China (the principal) and the IMF (the agent), the IMF operates various programs with 
China’s participation in order to fulfill China’s goals.  
 
The tasks China delegated to the IMF are so far generic and (relatively) simple. They 
usually do not involve complicated political concerns of other states, for example in the 
delegations to IMF lending mechanism. The Chinese government does not usually add 
extra difficult conditions- apart from the general principle to ensure China’s (economic) 
sovereignty is not largely intervened- on the tasks delegated to the IMF. Neither does it 
have specific technical requirements on these tasks. In addition, Chinese EDs and related 
officials do not use complicated manoeuvre on IMF operations. The generic and simple 
delegation is mainly because China does not really ‘own’ the IMF in the same way as the 
US does. China is less familiar with IMF procedures and roles, although such 
understanding has gradually increased.  
 
These generic and simple tasks may not seem highly connected in terms of required IMF 
functions, yet they all serve one essential goal of China’s economic leadership: a larger 
role in the governance of international financial economy in the long term. The IMF 
performs the functions of a training centre for financial methods and techniques, an 
international policy advisory body, a lending agent with advanced risk assessment skills, 
a multilateral forum to solve controversial global issues, and a superior international 
institution to reform and govern the international monetary system. Via each of these 
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functions, the IMF provides China with the opportunity of collaborating with foreign and 
international economic institutions, which gives credit to China’s increasing role of a 
‘responsible’ international player. To China, as a principal, the IMF is an international 
organization agent that brings China to the front of international financial and economic 
policies. To become a successful agent, the IMF needs to assist China – by performing 
the functions mentioned above to fulfill the tasks delegated from the Chinese 
government- gain a larger influence and decision-making power in the governance of 
international financial economy.  
 
3   A Good Agent, Or A Slacker? 
 
Is the IMF a diligent and effective agent that enables China to access to a larger role in 
the governance of international financial economy? To judge if the IMF is a diligent and 
effective agent, we need to start from the assessment of delegation consequences. If IMF 
staff accomplishes the tasks as China expected, we say the agent has generated 
satisfactory delegation consequences, which may lead to re-delegation. If IMF staff could 
not accomplish the tasks as China expected, either they failed the tasks or did not fulfil 
them as China expected, we say the agent has generated undesired delegation 
consequences, which may lead to de-delegation. The staff’s actions that lead to undesired 
delegation consequences are defined as agency slack. Agency slack takes place often in 
state-international organizations interactions, because of institutional, preference, and 
other reasons. Hence, the more causes and factors of agency slack exist in the China-IMF 
interactions, the more likely the delegation will generate undesired consequences; and 
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vice versa. This section will assess the consequences of China’s delegation to the IMF, by 
looking into the reasons and impacts of agency slack. It represents a ‘first cut’ analysis 
that has been partly generated by drawing on insights into broadly similar cases in 
existing literature, and on observations from the case study.  
 
3.1   Staffing Rules 	  
The procedure affecting the type of personnel hired for the international organization’s 
administrative elements, determine whether and to what extent the international 
organizations develop preferences distinct from those of the member states. (Cortell and 
Peterson 2006: 259) The distinct preferences may lead the staff to perform the tasks in a 
way that is not expected and wanted by the principals. Such impact of staffing rules could 
be applied in the IMF case. The IMF staff members are mostly composed of international 
civil servants. Compared to the staff members sent by state governments, the 
international civil servants are more likely to form distinct preferences. Especially in the 
IMF case, a large amount of staff members are experts specialising in different economic 
fields. They share a common professional identity. They usually handle the IMF’s 
missions on the bases of their shared knowledge and techniques. March and Olsen 
suggested that they developed a similar ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 
1998), which significantly contributed to the IMF’s organization culture, including its 
concepts, ideologies and unique procedures and institutional rules.  
 
Cortell and Peterson argued the ‘logic of appropriateness’ associated with serving a 
particular international social purpose or normative value leads the international 
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organization to understand its job in ways that may run counter to states’ preferences. 
(Cortell and Peterson 2006: 260) In the IMF case, the ‘logic of appropriateness’ is 
associated with the promotion of universal international neo-liberal economic norms, 
which do clash with some developing countries’ preferences. The Chinese authorities’ 
reaction to the Fund Article IV Consultation’s comments on China’s exchange rate issue 
proved this kind of clash. With respect to the Consultation’s persistent suggestions on 
China to revalue its currency RMB, the Chinese authorities denied the RMB was as 
under-valued as the Fund thought. They claimed the IMF had inaccurate assessments of 
China’s exchange rate regime because it incorrectly based its assessment of the degree of 
undervaluation upon uncertain forecast of the future current account, and thus failed to 
take a broader view on the path of the real exchange rate. (IMF 2011b:19)  China has also 
continuously called on the IMF for developing a deeper understanding of the member 
states’ domestic environment, so that Fund programs especially its policy advices could 
be more country-sensitive.60 These appeals reveal China’s dissatisfied feeling toward the 
IMF’s ‘standard’ and ‘fit-for-all’ policy packages for its member states.  
 
In addition, international civil servants have bureaucratic incentives to advance the 
international organization’s mission. IMF employees peg their job prospects with the 
reputation and development of the Fund, but not any member state. Such inward focus 
may lead the staff members to ignore the member states’ interests while designing 
interactive programs for the Fund. However, it is difficult to judge if Fund staff’s inward 
career focus has caused sacrifices of the member states’ benefits.  This kind of causal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 The details about China calling the IMF for a better understanding of member states’ domestic 
environments at IMFC meetings were analyzed in Chapter 6.  
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relations is usually rather convert rather than explicit. Cortell and Peterson argued that 
although the international staff weighs the reputation and development of the 
international organization more important than those of the member states’, they are 
clearly aware that they are ‘dependent on states for the agency’s [international 
organization] existence and resources’. (Cortell and Peterson 2006: 260)  It is thus 
unlikely that IMF staff would ignore the principals’ preferences and insist on following 
its own convictions.  
 
3.2   IMF Governance Structure 	  
The governance structure of the International Organization determines the relationship 
between the principals and the agent. IMF governance could be divided to formal and 
informal governance. For the formal governance, the member state’ relative quota and 
voting share among all EB members, which compose the Fund’s collective principal, is 
the most direct sign of its decision-making power. The more IMF quota and voting share 
a state has, the more decision-making power it obtains in Fund formal governance. IMF 
informal governance takes place outside of the EB in various forums/groups that better 
reflect the international distribution of resources.  A state that is involved in more 
informal forums/groups, with better links with other states (or political aligns) and better 
knowledge about operation of the IMF (and the whole international monetary system) 
usually has a larger decision-making power in IMF informal governance. The larger 
decision-making power a state has, in both formal and informal governance, the more 
likely the IMF would carry out the delegated tasks in the way that is consistent with the 
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state’s expectation. In other words, the state with larger decision-making power 
encounters less agency slack.   
 
China is an increasingly influential player in IMF Executive Board, which makes it a 
significant part of the Fund’s ‘collective principal’. Nevertheless, China’s quota and 
voting share stay relatively low, especially compared to those of the US’. The long and 
eventful quota and voting share reforms analyzed in the previous chapter indicated the 
difficulties for a non-traditional controlling principal to gain decision-making power in 
the IMF. On the other hand, China’s influence in the IMF’s informal governance is also 
relatively small. China does not have the sort of organizational advantage that the US has. 
Neither does it have the same level of diplomatic links that other G7 states do. Unlike the 
US and other G7 members, China does not act like an experienced player, using its 
expertise and networks to shape IMF proposals before they are passed to the EB. The 
former IMF Managing Director Dominic Strauss-Kahn said when he was interviewed by 
China’s Caijing (Finance) Magazine, ‘…when you are talking at the Executive Board of 
the IMF, the strength of your voice is more dependent on your involvement in the 
institution that the quota itself.’ (Li 2008) Lacking decision-making power and real 
influences in the Fund formal and informal governance prevents the state from taking a 
strong control of IMF programs.  
 
IMF EB members make decisions on all the IMF structural and general issues via the 
formal governance. For example, all the Fund quota and voting share reforms are 
processed via the formal governance.  This explains why it is extremely difficult to push 
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forward the real changes in IMF governance structure, representing by moving quota and 
voting shares from the Fund’s developed to emerging market economy and developing 
country members. Because it means in order to let the Fund’s privileged advanced 
economies forgo their decision power in IMF formal governance, the IMF needs to let 
such reform proposals pass the same system that is dominated by these advanced 
economies. In other words, the IMF needs to convince the advanced economies to vote 
for taking away their power. For example, to implement the 2010 quota and voting share 
reform, it has to get the official approval from the US domestic political system; since the 
implementation of IMF governance reforms requires for 85 per cent of total member state 
voting power, and the US itself currently holds 16.7 per cent. It explains why China’s 
intention to push forward IMF quota and voting share reforms are so time-consuming and 
difficult.  
 
The western-dominated and unbalanced governance power in the IMF has created some 
problems in the Fund itself, as well as the international financial system. While the 
emerging market economies gradually accumulate stronger financial power, they became 
increasingly unsatisfied with the underrepresentation of their governance power in the 
IMF.  Plus due to a series of wrong IMF decisions and movements during the emerging 
market crises of the 1990s, the Fund has been suffering a crisis of confidence among its 
emerging market economy state members. Since the Asian financial crisis, several 
scholars thought that the IMF prescription seemed ‘unhelpful, excessively intrusive and 
overly influenced by the goals of American policy-makers. (Chin 2010: 697; Higgot 1998; 
Bowls 2002; Stiglitz 2002) Developing country officials thought the IMF had too often 
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placed the onus of adjustment on developing countries without having any changed from 
themselves or the financier countries. (Chin 2010: 697). The crisis of confidence in the 
IMF has caused the emerging market economies’ reluctance to use Fund facilities. 
Instead, the emerging market economies tend to pursue a policy of ‘self-insurance’ 
through large accumulation of foreign reserves. For example, China has several strong 
reasons to pursue ‘self-insurance’ instead of IMF assistance. China’s motivation to hold a 
large currency reserves including: 1, to sterilize incoming capital flows in order to 
manage the exchange rate; 2, to meet the enormous needs of economic security and 
national defence; 3, to ensure that the Chinese government’s sovereignty is not delegated 
to any other country or institutions, considering China’s great power position; and 4, to 
deter against potential attacks by private speculators or foreign officials on the RMB. 
(Chin 2010) Therefore, until the IMF enhances its legitimacy in terms of shifting more 
decision making power to emerging market economy and developing country members, it 
is very unlikely the Chinese government would consider the IMF as an alternative to the 
self-insuring accumulation.  
 
The rapid increase of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) among the non-industrial 
economies- prominently China, Kuwait, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE)- in the period 2007-2008 was seen as a sign of redistribution of the 
economic power and wealth away from the industrial economies toward rapidly growing 
emerging market economies, and of a loss of confidence in and diminished authority of 
the IMF. Anthony Elson argued that, ‘…the rise of SWFs must be seen as a reflection of 
an inadequate coordinating mechanism at the centre of the international economic system 
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and growing distrust on the part of many emerging market countries in the existing 
system centred in the IMF.’ (Elson 2008: 78-79) Xu argued that the rise of China 
Investment Corporation (CIC)61 was about ‘a shifting power relationship in the global 
economy’. (Xu 2009:2) Yet the IMF does not seem to be ready to adopt a change of 
economic power distribution like this in its own governance structure. In addition, the 
crisis of confidence in the IMF has also stimulated the proliferation of regional financial 
integration, for example the CMI in the Asian region.  
 
3.3   Preference Deviation 	  
The earlier analysis of IMF staff autonomy and organizational culture proved IMF staff 
have unique preferences that are beyond the simple assumption of maximization of staff 
budget and independence. IMF staff’s preferences are established upon the members’ 
common knowledge and ideologies on economic issues, accommodated in Fund 
institutional environment with specific procedures and rules and shaped by the Fund’s 
neo-liberal normative values. If the state principal’s preferences are converged with those 
of the IMF staff’s, its delegations to the Fund are likely to generate satisfactory 
consequences. In contrast, if the state principal’s preferences deviate from those of the 
Fund staff’s, agency slack is more likely to happen. (Gould 2006; Martin 2006)  
 
The Chinese government’s preferences for a stable international financial system are 
consistent with those of the IMF’s. The Chinese government also supports multilateral 
approaches to the regulations of the crucial issues in the international financial system. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 China Investment Corporation is China’s biggest sovereign wealth funds company.  
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China supports the IMF to lead the post-crisis reforms in the international monetary 
system.  However, apart from the convergence on the general interests about international 
financial stability and its governance, the Chinese government has distinct preferences on 
some specific details of Fund operation. China’s distinct preferences are reflected through 
its appeals and advice on IMF policies and activities, included in the Chinese officials’ 
statements for IMFC meetings. In those statements, the Chinese officials demonstrated 
several standpoints that are divided into three main themes. First of all, they pointed out 
that the Fund lacked comprehensive understanding of the unique state of the member 
states’- especially the developing states’- domestic economic policies, environment and 
weakness. The Chinese officials also pointed out that IMF staff should base its programs 
upon the real needs of the member states instead of the inherent knowledge and expertise 
they have with the institution. These two points showed the Chinese government did not 
have full confidence in the Fund’s west-centric policy-making and practices. The Chinese 
government considered the IMF programs should be more country-sensitive and demand-
based. Since it is usually the developing countries on the Fund’s demand side, those two 
standpoints were actually calling the IMF to design its programs by taking into more 
account of its developing countries’ real interests.  
 
Secondly, the Chinese officials emphasized that the IMF and its developed economy 
members should fulfill their responsibility toward the Fund’s poor developing country 
members. The IMF policies should be stricter for the economic activities of the 
developed economies; and meanwhile they should be more favourable toward the 
developing countries. In addition, China continuously criticized the IMF for its 
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unbalanced governance structure in which the emerging market economy and developing 
countries are severely under-represented. China has persistently pushed forward IMF 
quota and voting shares being transferred from its developed to developing country 
members; and it has also insisted that the IMF should employ more experts with 
emerging market economy and developing country origins. These strong standpoints 
evidenced China’s dissatisfaction toward the IMF’s policy inclination toward its western 
advanced economy members; and its eagerness for increases in, not only its own, but also 
other IMF emerging market economy and developing country members’ representations 
and decision making power in the Fund.  
 
And thirdly, the Chinese officials strongly stated- in a semi criticism and semi pre-
warning style- that the IMF should stick to its mandate and respect the member countries’ 
sovereignty and their domestic political, social and legal regulations. IMF policies should 
be implemented by the member countries on a voluntary basis. These standpoints 
demonstrated China does not want an IMF that aggressively impinges on China’s 
domestic policies.  
 
When the preference divergence is exacerbated, China’s delegation to the IMF is likely to 
encounter agency slack. It is proved in the Chinese authorities’ cold reaction to IMF 
Article IV Consultation’s suggestion on accelerating the pace of China’s financial 
liberalization. The Chinese government willingly delegated authorities to IMF 
surveillance and policy advice programs. Yet it holds a rather cautious and evasive 
attitude toward IMF advocacies on further domestic financial liberalization that affects 
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the interests of crucial domestic government sectors and interest groups. IMF suggestions 
include the use of more price-based tools of monetary policy, to further raise controls on 
the capital account, to broaden the range of alternative investment vehicles for savers, to 
remove the government’s restrictions on bank lending and allow lending decisions to be 
based on commercial goals, to improve the financial infrastructure and relevant legal 
frameworks, and so on.  
 
The Chinese authorities’ decisions on domestic financial reforms are mostly based on the 
relative benefits and influences of China’s domestic industries and financial institutions. 
The Chinese government is aware that a large revaluation of RMB, as the IMF and its 
western advanced economy members suggested, would harm China’s essential export 
industries. The liberalization of interest rates, again, as the IMF suggested, would reduce 
the profits of China’s powerful state-owned banks. The IMF’s policy advice that is 
largely based on its neo-liberal economic norms thus clashed with China’s preferences to 
protect its major state-owned sectors and domestic industries. In this case, the Chinese 
government firmly rejected the Fund’s advice to further liberalize its financial system, 
especially the advice on revaluing the RMB.  
 
In addition, the Chinese authorities did not want to give the IMF (and most of other 
international economic organizations) the impression that it could easily intervene in 
China’s domestic policymaking. Hence even if China was deeply engaged in financial 
liberalization, it refused to admit the processes were directly affected by any specific IMF 
policy advice. If the Fund insists on China accepting the advice, China may choose to 
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withdraw authority from IMF programs. For example, China banned the IMF from 
publishing its Article IV Consultation reports on China in the years from 2007 to 2009. 
The exact reason for the ban was unrevealed, yet one could guess it was partly because of 
the Fund’s overly rigorous criticism on China’s domestic economic policies.  
 
Nielson, Tierney and Weaver argued that when a state attempts to bring some reforms to 
the international organization, it would succeed if ‘the proposed reforms are adjacent to 
existing norms.’ In other words, the reformers need to articulate new ideas and goals (and 
incentives) to existing norms in ways that do not require the staff to largely forgo their 
pre-existing viewpoints and behavioural habits. (Nielson, Tierney and Weaver 2006; 
Kapur 2000; Hass and Hass 1995) It explains how the differences between China’s 
reference and the IMF’s western-dominated neo-liberalism based technocratic 
organizational culture prohibited China from pushing further forward the governance 
reforms in the IMF. China also urged the IMF to strengthen surveillance on its developed 
economy members, while making more favourable policies changes for the emerging 
market and developing country members. Such reforms require the IMF staff members 
who mostly read neoclassic economics and regard the western economic regimes as 
models to adjust its assessment criteria and change its inherent process methods. With no 
doubt, it would be extremely difficult to achieve.  
 
In spite of the rigid inertia, Hass argued that the organizational culture could be altered 
through adaptation and learning (Haas 1990). Cultural change occurs where members 
contest and debate the pre-existing norms including its language theories and methods in 
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an incremental process. (Bebbington et al. 2004; Leiteritz 2005) Nielson, Tierney and 
Weaver suggested that the organizational culture could be changed via changes of ‘the 
personnel and organizational structures’ and designs of ‘measurable career incentives’ in 
order to enable and encourage the organization’s staff members to learn and internalize 
new norms and values. They further explained that it could be done by hiring personnel 
who share the ‘new’ values; (the principal) hiring instructors and investing in training and 
education with an eye toward inculcating certain norms; and changing the personnel 
within an organization and forcing work-related contact between new and old staff 
members. (Nielson, Tierney and Weaver 2006: 114) However, in the IMF, according to 
the Annual Diversity Reports, the proportion of the staff with the apparent ‘new’ values - 
that are more sympathetic toward the emerging market economy and developing 
countries- is still rather low. Especially reflected in the IMF’s senior level staff, the 
personnel and organizational structure remain mostly western-dominated. It further 
explains why China was defeated in pushing forward policies and activities that are more 
attractive emerging market economy and developing country members in the IMF.  
 
3.4   Reliance on IMF Expertise and Costly Controlling Mechanisms  	  
IMF staff expertise is one of the most important reasons that lead the Chinese 
government to delegate authorities to the IMF. The staff’s expertise has enabled the IMF 
to fulfil a number of tasks delegated from the Chinese government. For example, IMF 
technical assistance programs provided the Chinese officials with advanced methods and 
techniques in financial operations. IMF surveillance and policy advice programs also 
provided the Chinese economic leadership with some valid advice on its domestic 
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economic reforms. 62  On the other hand, IMF expertise- especially its ‘expertise 
authority’- conferred on the Fund staff much autonomy that may lead to agency slack. A 
large degree of agency autonomy enables the IMF staff to control the contents of the 
proposals to be passed on to the EB as well as actual operation of Fund activities. For a 
relatively less strong and involved principal like China, the staff may drive Fund 
activities in a different direction from what China expected.  
 
In addition, China and other states rely on IMF expertise because control and monitoring 
are costly. Hawkins et al. identified five major mechanisms for controlling their agents in 
order to prevent and mitigate agency slack. First of all, the principal uses contracts to 
specify the scope of the authority delegated to the agent, the instruments by which the 
agent is permitted to carry out its task, and the procedures that the agent should follow in 
employing those instruments. (McCubbins and Page 1987: 412) Secondly, principals use 
ex post monitoring and reporting requirements, typically specified in the delegation 
contract, to reveal information about the agent’s actions.  Thirdly, via the screening and 
selection procedures, principals seek to reduce slack by selecting agents with preferences 
similar to their own. Fourthly, principals can structure agency relationships so that they 
contain institutional checks and balances that limit opportunistic behaviour by agents. 
And finally, principals can punish agents for undesired actions and reward agents for 
desired actions. (Hawkins et al. 2006: 26-31) Principals employ these mechanisms in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Despite the advice on China’s sensitive domestic economic issues that was rejected by the Chinese 
authorities, the IMF did successfully provide the Chinese government with some policy advice, which was 
discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.4: Policy Advice).     
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varying combinations to minimize agency slack. However, mechanisms are usually costly 
and imperfect; and principals rarely engage in controlling agents completely. (ibid: 31)  
 
Apart from the costs, it is sometimes difficult for principals to apply effective controlling 
mechanisms. Hawkins and Jacoby argued three reasons why principal controlling may 
not work. Firstly, principals can be ‘fooled’ into believing that they are monitoring 
something real and important about the agent that is actually not. Secondly, principals 
may not be able to agree among themselves on whether and how to change agent 
behaviour. And finally, the principals may still be relatively better off than without the 
agent- even that they are aware that they are relatively worse off than they would be with 
more effective monitoring instruments- and thus continue the delegation contract. 
(Hawkins and Jacoby 2006: 212)  
 
In China’s case, it does not employ rigorous controlling mechanism over IMF activities. 
It is because China is not greatly familiar with the inside details of IMF operations. In 
particular, since the Chinese government tends to determine to what extent it would like 
to engage in IMF activities from the beginning- and the decision is usually not to be too 
much involved in Fund activities- it does not feel the need to employ ex post rigorous 
controlling mechanisms. With regard to the last type of controlling mechanism, Broz and 
Hawes showed that the IMF appears responsive to the need for expanded budgets from 
the most important member of its collective principal. (Broz and Hawes 2006) In China’s 
case, it has increasingly contributed to IMF financial resources, which does earn it 
increasing negotiation and controlling power in the Fund. As an official of a Chinese 
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financial institution said in an interview, ‘now the IMF needs China more than the other 
way around, because it needs Chinese capital to fill into its financial resources.’63 Yet 
compared to the Fund’s other advanced economy members, especially the US, China 
does not yet obtain a strong creditor lever in the IMF.  
 
Gould argued principal-agent model predicts that if control and monitoring are more 
costly, then agent activity should conform less to principal preferences. (Gould 2006) The 
IMF is a particularly costly agent for the state principals to control. For example, the 
technical nature of IMF activities, the quick expansion in the amount of IMF activity, and 
related extension of the IMF’s hierarchy make diligent monitoring increasingly costly; 
and the secrecy surrounding IMF activity prevents intervention of their-party enforcers.  
(Ibid; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Martin 2002; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Lyne, 
Nielson, and Tierney 2006; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984) In particular, in the activities 
that are less observable, less measurable and more reliant on IMF expertise, then the costs 
of monitoring and enforcement would be even higher, and thus the possibility of agency 
slack would increase. Most of the IMF activities that China participates in do not refer to 
explicit ways of observation, measurements and evaluation; and they are mostly reliant 
on IMF staff expertise. It has further increased the possibility of IMF staff getting 
involved in agency slack in the programs with China’s participation.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The interview was conducted in Beijing. The interviewee (interviewee 1) is a government official who 
works closely with the IMF in a Chinese financial institution.  
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3.5   Inadequate IMF Resources  	  
The IMF’s scarce resources restricted its capacity to accomplish the delegated tasks as 
expected by the state. The scarcity of IMF resources is reflected in three aspects: 
expertise, financial, and institutional. First of all, in the Article IV Consultation for China, 
the IMF teams provided limited expertise, which lead to the analysis and evaluation on 
China’s economy that is lack of comprehensiveness and depth. It is because the 
consultation trips are usually too short for the IMF staff to see the whole picture of 
China’s domestic economy. Moreover, the members of consultation teams to China 
change almost every year. The frequent job rotations prevent the staff from getting a 
comprehensive understanding of China’s domestic economic, political and social states; 
and thus hinder them from providing accurate and thorough evaluation and advice on 
China’s economic policies. The problem of expertise resources inadequacy does not only 
exist in the above case, yet it is a general problem in the IMF.  
 
Vito Tanzi thinks that one of the important reasons of deficiencies in IMF multilateral 
surveillance is lack of staff that can operate accurate and advanced technical analysis. He 
argued that the IMF needed to generate accurate technical analysis, so that it could 
convince the relevant countries and the world to believe its judgment and advice are 
correct. In order to achieve that,  
 
‘…[the IMF] must have staff of clearly superior quality and reputation. That staff must 
be very good and must be seen as being very good. It must be able to sort out benign 
capital flows, promoted by differential rates of return to investments, or even by 
 286 
temporary factors such as the Iraq war, from less benign ones promoted by bubbles, 
speculation, poor information and others. The analysis must allow the IMF to reach 
strong conclusions as to the policies that those who import capital and those who 
accumulate reserves must adopt. … The Fund must also allocate a significant share of 
first-rate staff members to this activity, taking them away from bilateral surveillance and 
from other tasks.’ (Tanzi 2006: 399)   
 
Among a large amount of analysis run by other institutions that generate different results 
and propositions, the IMF must win the competition for the best analysis in order to 
promote its policy advice. However, it is worrying that if the IMF - competing with 
universities, central banks, the financial market, think tanks, national governments and 
other international organizations- would be able to attract top economists who can run the 
winning analysis for the Fund. Tainzi pointed out that in order to promote and develop 
excellent analysis, the IMF would need to have access to a lot of detailed information that 
it did not always have. For example, it did not receive information on the composition of 
foreign exchange (COFER) held by some important countries, because it could not force 
member states to submit information and data to the Fund. (Tanzi 2006: 399-401) 
 
Secondly, the IMF has limited financial resources to solve its member states’ balance of 
payments difficulties. The IMF financial resources are largely dependent on the either 
‘borrowers’ or ‘lenders’.  Hence the Fund faces challenges to ensure the financial 
resources are adequate and well used. It is unlikely China would seek IMF financial 
assistance, yet it does expect the IMF to solve the balance of payments difficulties of its 
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poor developing country members in order to maintain international financial stability. 
On the other hand, some emerging market economy and developing countries prefer 
‘self-insuring’ to IMF financial assistance. After experiencing several global and regional 
financial crises, some developing countries especially in the Asian region realized that 
the IMF was unreliable for rescuing them from the crises. The crises taught them a lesson 
that financial crises could be avoided only if a country has ample international liquidity 
and readily available lines of credit that allow it to correct external imbalances without 
having to reply on outside support. (Buira 2002: 25-26; Feldstein 1999)  
 
Woods questioned the IMF’s financial resources, even after the G20 promised to 
contribute $1 trillion in 2009. The new financing for the IMF was mostly credit lines that 
member countries had made available to the IMF if it needed them.  During the global 
financial crisis, these credit lines were coming from existing power shareholders, 
attempting to tie the IMF tightly back into its traditional pattern of power and influence, 
with G7 countries at the top of the pile. The promised fund did not add to the IMF’s own 
financial resources. On November 24, 2009, some Fund members reached an agreement 
on a new $600 billion New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) (from 26 countries which 
belonged to that arrangement before the crisis and 13 new participant countries) Yet the 
result represented a big boost to the ‘lender-dependent’ element- IMF focuses on the 
IMF’s needs at the height of a financial crisis when its own resources are not sufficient to 
give it enough lending power to meet the crisis, and when it uses arrangement to borrow 
from its wealthier members- of the Fund. The other $250 billion of the $1 trillion increase 
was a SDR allocation, which did inject some confidence into the international financial 
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system. After all, the increase of IMF financial resources achieved through credit lines 
and SDR allocation indicates a small increase in the Fund’s own resources. (Woods 
2010:51-63) Neither ‘borrower-dependent’- when the IMF relies on borrower payments 
to cover its own administration expenses- nor ‘lender-dependent’ expenses assists the 
IMF to achieve a real multilateral lending mechanism. The IMF needs to become a more 
financial independent institution in order to operating its lending facilities independent of 
its members.  
 
The inadequate IMF resources also explained why the IMF was not able to play an 
important role in correcting the single-reserve currency problem in the current 
international monetary system. 64  Following Zhou Xiaochuan’s 2009 proposal of 
increasing the use of the SDR as a super-sovereign reserve currency, some Chinese 
scholars regarded increasing participation in the IMF and international monetary reforms 
as an effective approach to more controls in the reformed system. However, there were 
some dissenting voices.  
 
First of all, the suggestion of broadening the use of SDR as a super-sovereign reserve 
currency was unrealistic. The SDR was not broadly issued and used in the private sector, 
together with the irreplaceable US dollar dominance based on the market choice, 
determined that the SDR was unlikely to become a major international reserve currency. 
Lombardi pointed out, ‘… SDRs have played a marginal role as international reserves, 
which is symptomatic of the decline in the IMF’s perceived importance.’ He argued that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 The Background of China’s concerns about the reforms of the international monetary system was 
explained in Chapter 6, Section 4.3: China Cannot Deal with it Alone. 
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the SDR reflects a passive role for the IMF, as decisions on allocations of SDRs are made 
by member states representing at least 85 per cent of the Fund’s voting power, and the 
IMF has no discretionary control over how the allocation is used. China’s purchase of the 
Fund’s SDR denominated assets may moderately increase the use of the SDR, yet not 
significant enough to effectively generate a diversification of the international monetary 
system. Even if the IMF plays a more prominent role by matching demand and supply of 
SDRs, the transaction remain mainly bilateral. (Lombardi 2011: 167) 
 
In addition, forming a super-sovereign currency based on the SDR will face many 
technical problems, such as the decision on the components of the basket, the set value of 
the currency, the ways in which the currency enters the market, the regulation 
responsibilities of the circulation, and the approaches to retain the currency’s vitality and 
security. (World Knowledge 2009) Moreover, the IMF is unlikely to have sufficient 
resources- both financial and personnel- to resolve the relevant technical problems.  The 
Fund was not designed to be, and neither does it intend to become the world’s central 
bank. Even if one day the IMF accumulates an enormous amount of resources to push 
forward the establishment of a super-sovereign reserve currency, the US would not give a 
pass to the implementation. (Zhao 2011) Considering the mighty US voting power in the 
IMF and its dominance in the financial market, the implementation of the super-
sovereign reserve currency will be arduous, if it ever happens. 
 
Therefore, Zhou’s proposal was turned down soon after it was brought forward. Zhang 
Yuyan, the director of the World Economics and Politics Research Centre of the CASS, 
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denied that Zhou’s proposal represented the authorities’ policy decisions and argued that 
the US dollar would not be replaced by either the SDR or any other currencies in the next 
20 years. (Reuters 2009) Even Zhou’s own attitude was much softened when he was 
asked by the media at the 2011 World Bank-IMF Annual Meetings about the RMB 
joining the SDR, and stated that the RMB’s status would be decided by the market. 
Although Zhou’s proposal was not realistic at the time, it did disclose some of Chinese 
economists and policy-makers’ strong will to get free from US supremacy and the danger 
it may cause in the international monetary system. The Chinese economists and policy-
makers did not have a high expectation on the capture of larger decisions powers in the 
international monetary system via devoting to SDR and IMF reform. (World Knowledge 
2009;) Therefore, the Chinese believed they should help themselves if the IMF was not 
able to. As an alternative approach, China ought to promote the RMB in the international 
market instead in order to achieve the goal of a diversified international monetary system 
as well as becoming a larger player in the reformed system.  
 
Around 2009-2010, there was a consensus among the Chinese economists that the 
authorities should promote the ‘internationalization of the RMB (renminbi guoji hua)’ as 
a principal strategy in their international financial policies.  It was believed that RMB 
internationalization would reduce the risks caused by exchange rate fluctuations of the 
US dollar and other related currencies for China’s foreign trade companies. RMB 
internationalization would also confer more flexibility to China’s interest rate and 
exchange rate policymaking, which enables the authorities to effectively control the 
domestic macroeconomic hazard and improve the management of foreign exchange 
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assets. Moreover, RMB internationalization would increase China’s influence in the 
international economy and consequently strengthen its voicing and decision-making 
power in the international financial governance. (Yu 2009, Gao 2009, Huang 2009) Most 
importantly, by increasing the use of RMB and gradually making it a reserve currency, 
China would be in a more proactive position to reform the international monetary system 
to a diversified one. However, it is naive to think the ‘RMB Internationalization’ 
approach toward larger voicing in the international monetary governance could be carried 
out as a convenient substitution to the approach via SDR and IMF reforms.  
 
The extent to which the RMB is accepted and used in the international trade and 
investment deals is not determined by the Chinese authorities- despite their enthusiasm 
for a diversified international monetary system and their favourable policies to promote 
the RMB- but by the market. ?Gao and Yu 2010) The popularity of one currency in the 
international market depends on various factors. First of all, the value of such a currency 
ought to be stable and predictable, which requires the central bank to have a strong 
capacity to control the inflation and regulate the mobile capital.  In China’s case, the 
People’s Bank of China currently does not have an independent and effective control of 
the monetary policies; and the exchange rate of RMB remains unpredictable.  
 
Secondly, an international reserve currency usually requires the currency issuer country 
to have a developed and dynamic domestic financial market. China’s financial market is 
still at a preliminary stage focusing on a few basic functions.  The state-owned 
commercial banks possess a large proportion of the market, leaving the competitions 
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partly open to the private banks and other financial institutions.  The banks still mostly 
depend for their profits on traditional business such as saving and lending; and the variety 
of financial products is limited. Without an open and innovative domestic financial 
market, China would not be able to attract foreign investors to hold RMB as a reserve 
currency. Thirdly, the RMB needs to be more accessible if it is to become an 
international reserve currency, which means the RMB should be convertible under both 
current and capital accounts. However, the capital account is still under strict control, 
although there have been IMF advocates calling for capital account liberalization and 
domestic voices claiming that China is ready for further opening, the authorities decided 
to stay cautious and keep the market partly closed till the domestic financial mechanisms 
are mature. (Zhang 2012)  After all, the RMB is not yet ready to operate as an 
international reserve currency; and ‘RMB internationalization’ is not a government-
directed measure but a long-term market driven process. 
 
Overall, there is a long way ahead before China reaches independence from the dollar 
containment and attains a stable leadership role in the international monetary system.  
Some Chinese economists hoped to achieve a diversified international monetary system 
via promoting the use of SDR and letting a stronger IMF to regulate the reformed system. 
Their naive hope was criticized by those who think the IMF would not make any 
substantial challenge to the US dominance in the international monetary system because 
of the traditional US dominance in the Fund. More Chinese economists tended to believe 
that seizing a proactive position in the reforms would more likely to lead China to a 
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larger governance role in the international monetary system; therefore called the 
government to promote the use of the RMB in the international market.  
 
In summary, the IMF’s inadequate resources and functions hinder it from fundamentally 
reforming and diversifying the international monetary system as some Chinese scholars 
and policymakers would expect. They proposed to get more deeply involved in Fund 
activities and build the Fund to a bigger and more influential institution, so that China 
could access larger decision-making power in the governance in international financial 
economy. On the other hand, some others argued it is more efficient to promote China’s 
own currency in order to access the decision-making power via direct market occupation. 
Yet each approach alone is shortsighted and highly utilitarian. In particular, promotion of 
RMB internationalization without matching domestic economic conditions, as an 
impetuous reaction to the current ill international monetary system, is highly risky. RMB 
internationalization is a long and complicated process that requires monetary policy 
coordination at the international level. Therefore, even if China takes a more proactive 
step toward the leadership of the international monetary system, it does not mean the IMF 
becomes irrelevant. China should still appreciate the IMF’s efforts to improve the 
environment of the international monetary system. This is why the Chinese delegations 
repeatedly urged the Fund to strengthen surveillance on the current major reserve 
currency issuer countries and put a constraint on excessive issuance and other measures 
that may damage the stability of the international monetary system. In this way, the IMF 
plays a subsidiary role in China’s access to larger voicing and decision-making power in 
the reformed international monetary system. 
 294 
 
The above case study shows the IMF’s role in China’s seeking of larger influence and 
decision-making power in the US-dominated international financial economy. 
Meanwhile, it also introduced the idea of ‘RMB internationalization’ as an ‘outside 
option’ other than the ‘IMF option’. Moreover, the internationalization of the RMB has a 
more implicit and strategic rather than explicit and utilitarian implication, in the sense 
that reforms of China’s domestic regimes will be accelerated accordingly during the 
process of promoting the RMB in the international market. (Xia 2011) In other words, the 
internationalization of the RMB may stimulate further liberalization of China’s financial 
sector, encourage improvements in the country’s industrial structure, and increase the 
domestic economic productivity. In fact, the Chinese economic leadership quite likes the 
idea of ‘outside option’, especially when the IMF staff engages in ‘agency slack’.   
 
4   China’s Outside Option- Multiple Agent Strategy 
 
As China’s involvement in the world economy deepens, it has increasingly developed 
economic links with multiple countries, regions and regional/international organizations. 
According to the analysis in the previous two sections, China sees participating in IMF 
programs and governance as an approach to a larger role in the governance of the 
international financial economy. It is due to the IMF’s unique functions as a training 
centre for financial methods and techniques, an international policy advisory body, a 
lending agent with advanced risk assessment skills, a multilateral forum to solve 
controversial global issues, and a superior international institution to reform and govern 
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the international monetary system. Driven by these functions, the Chinese government 
delegated various tasks to the IMF, hoping to become a more eligible, capable and 
influential actor in the international financial economy.  
 
However, due to various technical and structural reasons the IMF as an agent could not 
perform the tasks perfectly to fulfill China’s expectation. These reasons include the 
IMF’s international civil servants based staffing rules that lead to a large degree of 
agency autonomy; the IMF’s western dominated governance structure that undermined 
China’s decision-making power in the Fund; the divergence between China’s preferences 
and those of the IMF’s that lead to undesired delegation consequences; the costly 
controlling mechanisms and China’s reliance on IMF expertise which further lead to 
delegation consequences that are out of China’s control; and the IMF’s limited financial 
and expertise resources that hinder the Fund from provide sufficient financial assistance 
to the member states and correcting the risky single-currency based international 
monetary system. All these reasons lead to undesired delegation consequences, that is 
agency slack, which makes the IMF a less effective agent to fulfill China’s goal. In 
summary, the IMF has played a considerably important yet limited role in China’s pursuit 
of greater influence in the governance of the international financial economy.  
 
The IMF’s restricted role encouraged China to develop other links with the rest of the 
world economy, which are defined as China’s outside option, distinguished from its ‘IMF 
option’. Outside option is a termed borrowed from bargaining theory in economics 
(Binmore, Shaked and Sutton 1989; Muthoo 1999), scholars of international 
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organizations use it to explain powerful states’ bargaining power; as well as unsatisfied 
power’s bargaining leverage to push through institutional reforms. (Lipscy 2013) 
According to Stone, ‘powerful states are powerful by virtue of the fact that they have 
attractive outside options’. (Stone 2011: 21) The ‘opportunity cost’ of participating in an 
international organization is high when it can achieve its goals unilaterally. For example, 
in a case study mentioned earlier, the Chinese government seeks to promote the 
internationalization of the RMB as a unilateral solution-based outside option rather than 
relying on the IMF to diversify the international monetary system.  
 
When states have attractive outside options and that their preferences are strong, they can 
choose not to commit to an international organization. Hence, when strong states perceive 
their interests to be jeopardized, their benefits to be sacrificed and their objectives to be 
ignored, they refuse to be constrained by the international organization; and instead, they 
take the outside option. Alternatively, they use the outside option as a lever to renegotiate 
with the international organization the terms for possible changes. The research did not 
find explicit evidence of China using outside option to bargain with the IMF. Yet China 
is engaged in various economic activities outside the IMF that could be considered as 
outside options.   
 
4.1   China in Asia 	  
China’s rise in Asia coincided with the decline of the US influence in the region. The US 
was unable to offer any effective support through the Asian financial crisis, which 
heavily weakened its reputation in the Asian region. Especially after the 9/11 attack, the 
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Bush administration’s militarized anti-terrorist rhetoric and the advocated ‘war on terror’ 
evoked strong hostility against the US in Asia, especially in the countries with large 
Muslim communities. (Narine 2007: 215) On the contrary, China has been advocating the 
‘peaceful rise’ strategy in the region- despite some loose conflicts on the country’s east 
and south sea coasts- and it has mostly kept peaceful diplomatic relations with its 
neighbour countries in the region. In general, China has focused on devoting itself to 
Asian regional economic integration and seeking a regional leadership role in the regional 
trade and financial cooperation mechanisms. China’s growth has stimulated the Asian 
intra-regional trade and labour division, which also indicated a China-centred 
regionalism.  
 
More importantly, China has actively contributed to the regional financial cooperate 
institutions, such as the CMI and its later upgraded version Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralized (CMIM), the ADB, the ASEAN10+3, APEC, and so on. China has also 
engaged in bilateral financial cooperation with the neighbour countries, for example it 
signed several border trade settlement and cooperation treaties with the neighbours 
countries such as Russia, Mongolia, Nepal, Laos and Vietnam; and it also provided 
training programs for the Central Bank staff of other Asian countries via bilateral or 
ASEAN10+3 Mechanisms. (PBC 2002) 
 
Development and proliferation of the Asian financial cooperation mechanisms mentioned 
above were mostly caused or motivated by the painful experience of the Asian financial 
crisis. The IMF’s incompetent and mostly late intervention, especially their inappropriate 
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policy advice on financial liberalization that eased the outflow of capital and 
consequently deteriorated the crisis, completely destroyed the Fund’s credibility in Asia 
in the late 1990s. Still today, some Asian countries refuse to get further engaged in IMF 
programs. For example, only half of Asian IMF members have completed the FSAP, 
while all European member countries, 68 per cent of countries in the Western 
Hemisphere, 81 per cent in the Middle East and Central Asia, and 59 per cent in the Sub-
Sahara Africa had completed it by 2011. (IMF 2011j) The IMF’s failure in Asia 
indirectly stimulated the Asian financial integration. The regional financial mechanisms 
mentioned above have some similar functions as those of the IMF, such as facilitating 
cooperation and policy coordination, providing financial liquidity, regional surveillance 
and so on.  They were formed as a sort of rival to the IMF in Asia; and thus China’s 
participation and leadership in these mechanisms indirectly challenged IMF authority in 
the region. For example, China supported the upgrade of the CMI including a reduction 
of the proportion of funds that is subject to IMF review and approval from 90 per cent to 
80 per cent and a transformation of the CMI into a self-managed reserve pooling. (Chin 
2010: 703)  
 
Moreover, after the global financial crisis, the ADB took over a proportion of the 
commitments previously to the IMF, to finance the adoption of flexible, fast-disbursing 
and front-loaded instruments that could provide rapid assistance to Asia’s well-governed 
developing countries. The ADB approved a Countercyclical Support Facility on June 19, 
2009 to provide the crisis-hit Asian developing countries with budget support of up to 3 
billion US dollars. (ADB 2010: 4) China fully supported the ADB’s role in regional 
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financing programs, since when the IMF failed its crisis prevention responsibilities, the 
regional institutions such as the ADB could alleviate the harm of the crisis through 
increasing spending and boosting regional cooperation. (Xinhua 2009) Despite the threats 
perceived by the IMF, China has a strong faith in Asian financial integration. The 
advancement of Asian financial integration is inevitable, no matter how the IMF feels 
about it. Yu of the CASS argued the IMF should accept and respond well to such reality 
in its policy and management, in order to facilitate the emergence of a new world 
economic structure that is highlighted by a dynamic and fast growing Asia. (Yu 2009: 
520) Overall speaking, the Asian governments’ mistrust toward the IMF has limited the 
Fund’s role in regional financial cooperation and economic advancement. Only when the 
IMF genuinely understands the Asian countries’ domestic regimes, improves the Asian 
countries’ representation and decision-making power in the Fund, and seeks to 
complement Asian regional financial arrangements, will the Fund regain credibility and 
reputation in Asia. Till then, the IMF is playing a merely marginal role in the economic 
advancement and financial integration in Asia.  
 
4.2   China and Other Emerging Market and Developing Countries 	  
Apart from Asia, China also seeks to strengthen the economic (and political) connections 
with other emerging market and developing countries. China specifically feels 
sympathetic toward the other BRICS countries, because they all undergo high domestic 
pressure during the fast economic growing, as well as the suppression from the advance 
economies.  They are the glorious national heroes in economic development; but none of 
them alone is able to confront the containment from the advanced economies and direct 
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the reconstruction of the international economic order. Therefore, they feel the need to 
coordinate their views, combine their power, share the pressure and protect the benefits 
of the emerging market and developing country community as a whole in the 
international economic governance. Only in this way, they could break the traditional 
international economic order dominated by the advanced economies, and rebuild a fairer 
system that is managed by both advanced and emerging market economies. (Yao 2011: 
32) The Chinese authorities realized the unbalanced power distribution in the 
international political society, thus when they made requests and proposals in 
international organizations, they often called for consideration of benefits of other 
emerging market and developing countries.  
 
The Chinese delegations have often made such requests and advocacy that are in favour 
of emerging market and developing countries in the IMF.65 These requests did not always 
refer to specific cases or policy practices, but were argued based on the assumption that 
the IMF generally disregarded its emerging market and developing country members. 
The requests did not receive specific responses, apart from the ones on IMF 
representation issues that threatened the Fund’s own legitimacy and required to be 
resolved anyway. In addition, the IMF executive directors who represented the BRICS 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 For example, as explained in Chapter 6, they argued that the IMF should make policy decisions based on 
genuine understanding and concerns of each member country’s domestic political and social circumstances, 
especially if the targeted country is a relatively vulnerable and less developed one. (IMFC 2001:2; 2003:3) 
They also stated that the IMF should run stricter surveillance on the macroeconomic and financial policies 
of the major industrial countries and important financial centres due to their critical influences in the global 
system; and that if more surveillance are imposed on the developing countries, their representation in the 
Fund should be reflected accordingly. (IMFC2000:5, IMFC 2008b:3) Moreover, they maintained that the 
IMF should always fulfil its responsibility toward the poor developing countries and facilitate proper global 
allocation of major production factors. (IMFC 2009b: 4) Last but not least, to recall the previous text, the 
Chines delegations have devoted to calling for quota and voting shares shifts to the Fund’s emerging 
market and developing country members and encouraging the advanced economies to facilitate the smooth 
implementation of the Fund reforms. However, China’s request mostly sounded general and vague. 
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countries made a joint statement in May 2011 to complain about the latent rule of the 
IMF Managing Director being European. (IMF 2011i) It was the first time the BRICS 
countries’ executive directors made a joint statement; however, the IMF continued with 
their ‘European management’.  
 
Overall speaking, the IMF does provide a platform for emerging market and developing 
countries to strive for the rights and benefits they long for. However, these countries’ 
enthusiasm is often defeated by the IMF’s strong western dominated feature- both 
institutionally and culturally. Despite the achievements in IMF governance reforms, the 
Fund’s emerging market and developing country members yet still have relatively low 
decision-making power compared to those of advanced economies. Their representatives 
(Executive Directors and their teams) in the IMF have limited capacity in making valid 
proposals and negotiating with IMF staff; and the improvement of such capacity requires 
years of education and training for their financial sector officials, and experience of 
working with the Fund.  
 
On the other hand, China’s cooperation with other emerging market and developing 
countries are more frequent and prolific in other areas than those in the IMF. China has 
joined several cooperation mechanisms to promote the ‘south-south cooperation’.  Just to 
give a few examples, Chin joined the G20 of developing countries that pushed for more 
fairness in the opening trade in 2003; it supported initiatives for the ‘Global South’ 
through G77; and it also gained a partnership with the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) in the South-south Cooperation project in 2004.  China’s 
 302 
cooperation with other emerging market and developing countries are especially 
productive in the international trade market.  Via its trade with developing countries, 
China aims to secure access to the natural resources and commodities that are essential to 
the maintenance of China’s economic dynamism. Meanwhile, developing countries 
appreciate the profits from their business with China that is not attached by any political 
conditions. In the financial sector, China has deployed several arrangements in terms of 
currency swap with other emerging market economies, such as Brazil and Argentina. 
These swap agreements enhanced the efficiency of China’s foreign trade, as well as 
promoted the use of RMB in the global market. The recently established BRICS 
Development Bank provided an alternative source of finance for states in the developing 
world to that offered by the World Bank. (Mwase and Yang, 2012) In addition, Chinese 
outward foreign direct investment (FDI) to low income countries have increased in the 
past years; among all the LICs Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa became the major 
destination of Chinese FDI. 66 (Mlachila and Takebe 2011) All in all, instead of seeking 
larger decision-making power in the international political economy via cooperation with 
other emerging market and developing countries in a western-dominated organization 
like the IMF, China much prefers to base the cooperation on mutual economic profits.  
 
4.3   China and Europe  	  
China’s financial assistance to the crisis-hit Europe has strengthened its reputation and 
role in the governance of the international financial economy. Since the Eurozone crisis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 For more data about China’s FDI to LICs, see IMF Working Paper written by Monfort Mlachila and 
Misa Takebe.  
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started, China’s enormous foreign exchange reserves have become the most popular 
potential external sources of European bailout funds. Christine Lagard visited China in 
November 2011, calling the Chinese government for resolute decision to help the 
troubled Europe. Angela Merkel went to China for a three-day mission to reassure 
Beijing that Europe was able to tackle its mounting debt problems in early 2012. 
European leaders warmly welcomed China’s contribution to the crisis-hit Europe. On the 
other hand, Chinese officials also expressed their willingness to contribute to global 
efforts to bail out Europe. Chinese policymakers think that assisting Europe reflects 
China’s great power responsibility toward the global financial stability and economic 
revival, and therefore contributes to China’s reputation in the international political 
economy. Assisting Europe also earns China a proactive position in its relations with the 
EU, especially in the negotiation of China’s market economy status (Zheng and He 
2011), and discussions of removing trade barriers against Chinese products (Xue 2011). 
In particular, China has bought a considerably large amount of bonds issued by the 
European Financial Stability Facility and sovereign debts of various Euro-zone countries. 
The PBC governor Zhou Xiaochuan also ensured that China would boost its Euro 
holdings through various channels. (Financial Times 2012)  
 
In the beginning, the Chinese government acted like a conservative creditor. It preferred 
to assist Europe via multilateral channels rather than assisting Europeans countries 
directly. For example, the Chinese government bought the specific bonds issued by the 
EFSF and the IMF to help the crisis-hit European countries. In this way, the purchase was 
secured by the EFSF and the IMF. However, China did realize that the EU, the EFSF, and 
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the IMF are the main directors and capital sources in the Eurozone rescue projects. China 
could not directly join the rescue policy decision-making process, nor could it evaluate 
the assisted European countries’ financial balance and structural reforms. China acted 
like an external participant, not a leader, of the rescue projects, and that Beijing could not 
make any direct intervention to the specific policy decisions. In this case China may 
become less interested in getting involved in a game that is run by the IMF and the EU, 
where the rules don not seem accessible for China. On the other hand, China’s foreign 
direct investment in Europe has been increasing rapidly. There is no doubt that once the 
Chinese entrepreneurs obtain more knowledge about European business market, more 
private funds will enter Europe without going through the IMF and EFSF.   
 
China’s outside options should not be regarded merely as a bargaining leverage to push 
forward IMF institutional and governance reforms; neither merely substitutes to China’s 
delegation of tasks to the IMF. China has continued to endeavour to improve its influence 
in within the IMF- via pushing forward Fund governance, calling for Fund surveillance 
on advanced economies, voicing for emerging market economy and developing 
countries- so that agency slack could be overcome and tasks delegated to the IMF could 
be accomplished more effectively. Meanwhile, China’s outside options reflect its 
embracement of a multilateral governance of the international financial economy. China 
does not restrict itself in strengthening its decision-making power and influences in the 
international financial economy via the ‘IMF option’. Yet it develops multiple ways to 
stimulate its links with the rest of the world economy.  
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5   Conclusion: China and IMF- A Moderate Principal-Agent Relationship 
 
Examination of the consequences of China’s delegation to the IMF helps us gain a 
thorough understanding of the relationship between China and the IMF in a principal-
agent framework. Five factors point to agency slack in the interactions between China 
and the IMF.  First of all, the majority of IMF staff members are international civil 
servants. They share a common professional identity, and they base their research and 
judgment on the universal international neo-liberal economic norms. Some policy 
products turn out to be more country-sensitive, especially after the Fund’s painful failure 
during the Asian financial crisis, yet they have not escaped from the neo-classical 
economic framework. The neo-liberal economic norms contradict with some of China’s 
stability-driven economic policies that are in favour of state-owned industries and 
financial institutions. Such contradiction explains why China refuses to accept IMF 
policy advice and why China is cautious about submitting financial data to the Fund. 
Secondly, the IMF’s western-dominated structure of governance in both formal and 
informal spheres prevents China and other emerging market economies from exerting 
influences on Fund policy decisions. The underrepresentation states discourage these 
countries to borrow from the Fund and discuss solutions to the problems in their domestic 
economies with the Fund. Instead, they develop their own funding mechanisms, for 
example accumulation of foreign reserves and sovereign wealth funds. Thirdly, the 
preference deviation between China and the IMF has negative effects on the IMF 
programs China participates in general. Fourthly, China’s reliance on IMF expertise and 
costly control mechanisms make agent behaviour less predictable and agency slack more 
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possible. Finally, the inadequate expertise resources prohibit IMF staff from carrying out 
accurate analysis of the Chinese economy; the inadequate financial resources prevent the 
IMF from performing well the role of ‘lender of the last resort’. Lacking resources and 
authoritative influence among some of its members disabled the IMF to accomplish the 
task of correcting the problems in the US dollar-dominated international monetary 
system.  
 
These five reasons of agency slack in the IMF disclose the reasons why China has not 
become a strong principal of the IMF, and why the IMF cannot effectively assist China to 
achieve a higher role in the governance of the international financial economy. While 
China keeps trying to improve its role in the IMF by pushing forward IMF governance 
reforms and calling for better Fund governance that is more considerate toward its 
emerging market economy and developing country members, it also develops various 
bilateral economic relationships with other states and regions and connections with other 
regional/international institutions. The embedded inequality in the IMF and the 
international monetary system in general encourages China to proliferate alternative 
connections with the international financial economy. These alternative approaches are 
regarded as China’s delegation of authority to other institutions, in order to achieve its 
objectives in the governance of the international financial economy. China’s participation 
in Asian economic integration, including its contribution in the CMI (CMIM), ADB, 
ASEAN10+3, and APEC, challenges the IMF’s role in the region. China’s cooperation 
with other emerging market and developing countries turn out to be more dynamic and 
effective outside the western-dominated IMF. Finally, China’s assistance to the crisis-hit 
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European countries tends to be increasingly based on outward foreign direct investment 
instead of lending through the IMF. The ‘outside options’ compensate China’s weak 
principal role vis-à-vis the IMF; they work as complements rather than substitutes to 
China’s IMF option. In an interview with a leading Chinese scholar whose research 
focuses on Asian financial integration, she said ‘China never only focuses on one path, 
yet it keeps several options for itself. China’s efforts in the Asian financial integration is 
one of these options.’67 This statement explicitly reveals the Chinese government’s 
embracement of the concept of ‘multilateralism’ in global governance.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 The interview was conducted in Beijing. The interviewee (interviewee 5) is a leading scholar in Chinese 
and Asian political economy.  
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
 
 
1   Overview  
 
The research explores the relationship between China and the IMF since 1980, when 
People’s Republic of China gained its legal IMF membership that was previously held by 
Taiwan. It fills in the relatively thin literature of China’s relationships with international 
organizations, among which the one of China’s interaction with the IMF is particularly 
limited.   The inadequacy of the literature partly dues to the fact that China did not 
become active in IMF related programs and the general international financial economy 
until the recent years. The global financial crisis that started in 2007 further pushed China 
(and other emerging market economies) to the front of global financial and economic 
governance. The crisis also ironically consolidated the IMF’s central role in reforming the 
international monetary system and stabilizing global financial economy. Facing a crisis 
that originated in the world’s most developed regions, while the poor countries were still 
suffering from poverty, the IMF sought support from the dynamic ‘middle’- emerging 
market economies. As the biggest and most fast growing emerging market economy in the 
world, China’s cooperation is desired by the IMF. Although the worst moment has passed, 
the world economy has not entirely recovered; hence the IMF looks forward to a long-
term partnership with China (and other emerging market economies), like Lagarde’s 
proposal that was mentioned in the beginning of the introduction.  
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However, the real interactions between China and the IMF in the past three decades did 
not indicate a robust partnership between China and the IMF that would assist China to 
gain a firm leadership in the international financial economy. The research conducted in 
this thesis showed why the IMF cannot effectively assist China to achieve a larger role in 
the governance of international financial economy despite the increasing interactions 
between China and the IMF. The research looked into selected case studies of interactions 
between China and the IMF in order to explain why.  
 
The theoretical approach to analyzing the China-IMF relationship is crucial, because an 
appropriate theoretical approach can correctly explain the dynamic interactions between 
China and the IMF. The research adopts socialization theory to explain the IMF’s impacts 
on China’s domestic policymaking in the early stage since PRC joined the IMF, in the 
cases of IMF financial assistance to the China, IMF Statistics Department’s training 
programs for Chinese officials, and IMF Article IV Consultation and other surveillance 
for China. The research showed that socialization processes of mimicking and social 
influence took place in the interactions between China and the IMF; yet persuasion, the 
final process of socialization could not be proved. The obstacles for socialization were 
both institutional and political, which prevent the IMF from further socializing China into 
accepting the neo-liberal international economic norms. Hence, socialization theory 
turned out to be an inadequate theoretical approach to analyzing the China-IMF relation in 
the long run.  
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Principal-agent theory overcame some of the limitations in socialization theory- such as 
underestimation of states’ initial objectives, overestimation of the legitimacy of the 
international norms, and difficulties in measuring normative factors and separating them 
from the material ones- and was applied as the primary theoretical framework for the 
China-IMF relationship especially in the later stage. Yet principal-agent theory also 
recognized some propositions in socialization theory, for example, both theories argue 
that an international institution with a distinct organizational culture and large degree of 
autonomy seeks to influence the state members’ (principals’) policy decisions.  
 
Principal-agent theory has not previously been applied in analyzing the relationships 
between emerging market economies and international organizations. However, since the 
emerging market economies, especially China, have increasingly expressed their 
objectives and exerted more influences in international organizations, they are regarded as 
eligible ‘shareholders’ of international regimes. In China’s case, it has further specified its 
goals and interests regarding participating in the IMF in recent years; and China’s 
influence in the IMF has also greatly increased. These conditions further consolidated 
China’s principal role regarding its interactions with the Fund.   
 
More importantly, principal-agent theory explicitly reflects China’s objectives in the 
governance of the international financial economy. In the principal-agent theoretical 
framework, China and the IMF are located in a reciprocal relationship that is based on 
dynamic processes of delegation: based on its objectives, China delegates tasks to the IMF 
so that the IMF could accomplish these tasks more effectively than if China took 
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unilateral or other forms of international cooperative approaches. Principal-agent theory 
thus correctly reflects the Chinese government’s ‘pragmatism’ in the international affairs, 
particularly regarding the analysis of China’s driving forces for participation in 
international organizations. In addition, principal-agent theory is also applied to examine 
the consequences of China’s participation in IMF programs, which makes it a practical 
approach to the China-IMF relationship.   
 
In this thesis, the analysis of the relationship between China and the IMF in the principal-
agent theoretical framework was divided into four stages. First of all, I identified China’s 
role of principal, and the IMF’s corresponding role of agent. China is a relatively weak 
and inexperienced principal, whose influence in IMF governance is contained by the 
strong western-dominated institutional feature of the IMF. On the other hand, the IMF 
performs as an influential international organization, backed by its central role in the 
international financial and economic governance and a wide range of advanced functions. 
The IMF staff have a large degree of autonomy, which makes consequences of delegation 
more unpredictable.  
 
Secondly, I analyzed the reasons why China delegates specific tasks to the IMF, and what 
they are. Due to the IMF’s advanced information, expertise and other resources, China 
delegates the tasks of technical training, surveillance and policy advice, and multilateral 
lending to Fund staff. China’s participation in these IMF programs also reflects China’s 
commitment to benign international cooperation and thus contributes to China’s 
international reputation. Due to the IMF’s outstanding capacity in solving controversial 
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and complex international issues, Chines delegated authority to IMF Multilateral 
Consultation on Global Imbalances and attempted to solve the imbalance problems in an 
international platform provided by the Fund along with the US, Euro Area, Japan and 
Saudi Arabia. Finally, since China alone cannot confront the US dominant power in the 
international monetary system and effectively prevent its US dollar-denominated assets 
from devaluing, it sought to improve the international monetary environment via the IMF. 
For example, China pushed the IMF to strengthen surveillance on advanced economies, 
diversify the international monetary system, and create a favourable environment for the 
internationalization of RMB.  
 
Thirdly, I analyzed key factors of China’s decisions and actions on delegation to the IMF. 
The first factor is China’s preferences regarding the IMF’s policy decisions and policy 
processes. China’s preferences are reflected in the Chinese officials’ statements at IMFC 
meetings, because IMFC statements include the Chinese officials’ direct comments on 
IMF operation. The statements show that China is dissatisfied with the IMF’s policy 
inclination toward its developed economy members, and thus the Chinese officials called 
on the IMF to take into account the emerging market economy and developing countries’ 
benefits and real needs while it makes policy decisions. The statements also show that 
China does not support an overly robust IMF that goes beyond its mandate and intervenes 
in the member countries’ domestic affairs. China’s preferences thus deviate from those of 
the IMF and its major advanced economy members. The second factor is China’s role in 
IMF governance, including in both formal and informal spheres. It is one of the most 
important factors of China’s delegation decisions and the effectiveness of delegation in 
 313 
general. China’s quota and voting share reflect its formal governance power in the IMF, 
and therefore China’s inadequate quota and voting share (compared to China’s share in 
the world economy and the quota and voting share of the US) together with the slow and 
ineffective IMF governance reforms prove China’s frail influence among the members of 
the EB. In IMF informal governance, China lacks sufficient techniques and information to 
influence IMF staff and their policy decisions outside the EB. The third factor is China’s 
influence among IMF staff. Assuming IMF staff understand better the real needs and 
problems in the development of the regions they come from, lacking staff with Chinese 
nationality may not sufficiently indicate that IMF policies are ignorant of China’s needs 
and problems, yet it makes the Fund’s China-related policy decisions less convincing.  
 
Finally, I examined the causes of agency slack and assessed the consequences of China’s 
delegation of tasks to the IMF.  The assessment showed that the IMF’s western educated 
technocrat-based staff rule and its western-dominated governance structure created a less 
comfortable and tolerant institutional environment for China to exert influences in IMF 
policies. The preference deviation between China and the IMF makes it even more 
difficult to generate satisfactory consequences of delegation. Moreover, China’s reliance 
on IMF expertise and the costly controlling mechanism also make agency slack easier. 
Finally, the inadequate resources in the IMF explain why the IMF cannot play the role of 
the lender of the last resort; why IMF surveillance and policy advice mechanisms cannot 
provide China with more appropriate advice; and why the IMF was not able to play an 
important role in correcting the single-reserve currency problem in the current 
international monetary system. The assessment of the consequences of China’s delegation 
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to the IMF explains why the IMF cannot effectively assist China to achieve a larger role in 
the governance of the international financial economy. It also discloses China’s alternative 
approach to achieve its objectives via cooperation with a wide range of foreign 
governments and regional and international organizations in the international financial and 
economic sphere. These approaches significantly complement China’s ‘IMF’ option, 
especially if the Fund does not undertake more thorough governance and functional 
reforms to improve China’s role in the Fund in the near future. They also reveal China’s 
pursuit of ‘multilateralism’ in the governance of the international financial economy.  
 
2   Responding to Research Questions  
 
This section highlights the answers to the research questions that were brought up in the 
introductory chapter. 
 
1. How does socialization theory explain the IMF’s influences in China’s domestic 
policy?  
 
Socialization theory explains the relationship between China and the IMF in the early 
stage. In particular, it explains the IMF’s influences in China’s domestic economic 
policy-making via three major interactive mechanisms: the IMF’s financial assistance to 
the Chinese government while the Chinese government faced balance of payments 
difficulties, IMF staff providing technical assistance to the Chinese officials of various 
domestic financial institutions, and IMF surveillance and policy advice regarding China’s 
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financial system. Johnston’s three microprocesses of socialization- mimicking, social 
influence, and persuasion- were applied to assess the extent to which the IMF socialized 
China into accepting its norms via the interactive mechanisms mentioned above.  
 
Mimicking refers to the process by which China copies the behaviour of the IMF and the 
IMF’s advanced economy member countries. Mimicking is evidenced in the IMF’s 
technical assistance to China, as it is the first step of the Chinese officials’ learning 
processes in various training programs. Mimicking also exists in IMF surveillance and 
policy advice for China, as before the Chinese officials fully understand the essence of 
IMF policy advice, they simply do what they are told to or copy what other members do 
in order to maintain its position in the IMF. Social influence refers to the process by 
which China, motivated by the potential impacts on its status in the international political 
society, adopts the policies and policy processes that are consistent with IMF norms. 
Social influence is evidenced in China’s implementation of IMF policy advice, for 
example the changes in its exchange regime and banking system in the 1980s and 1990s. 
China implements such advice to fulfil its commitment to the Fund’s supervision on 
orderly economic growth and reasonable stability of price and exchange rates, which 
contributes to its reputation as a cooperative actor in the international political economy. 
Persuasion refers to the process by which China is convinced by IMF norms, and 
consequentially redefines its own interests and reform its policies among which IMF 
norms (that have been accepted by China as its own) are embedded in. Persuasion is the 
ultimate process of socialization, as it involves the power of ‘mind controlling’. 
However, there is little evidence showing that China has redefined its interests and 
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principles in the domestic financial and economic governance directly because of 
interactions with the IMF. On the contrary, China refused to accept IMF advice on RMB 
revaluation, as implementations of this would harm the benefits of China’s influential 
domestic (usually state-owned) industrial groups and financial institutions. The Chinese 
government’s interests and economic norms therefore remain distinct from the IMF’s 
neo-liberal international economic norms.  
 
Hence socialization theory shows the IMF has not fully socialized China into accepting 
its norms. The IMF has had moderate impacts on China’s macroeconomic policy and 
institutional reforms, for example devaluation of RMB in the mid-1980s, unifying 
exchange rate rates at official and swap market in 1994, allowing foreign invested 
enterprises full access to the interbank market for foreign exchange and comply with the 
Article VIII of IMF Articles of Agreement; setting up domestic institutions to 
coordination with the IMF; and legislative implementations such as the Commercial 
Bank Law; the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China, 
and so on. However, the IMF still has some fundamental contradictions with the Chinese 
government’s propositions – for example to prioritize the domestic institutions’ benefits- 
which prevents the IMF from exerting further influences in China’s domestic policies.   
 
2. Why did China get engaged with IMF programs? What are China’s objectives in 
the governance of international financial economy?  
 
China’s motivation to get engaged with IMF programs: 
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• China wanted to learn from the IMF the methods and techniques in running a 
modern financial system that meet the international requirements.  
 
• China wanted to get information about other countries’ financial economy from 
the IMF.  
 
• China wanted to get (re)-connected with foreign economic institutions via 
participating in IMF programs.  
 
• China wanted to accelerate the expulsion of Taiwan from the international 
political society by demonstrating its legal membership in the IMF.  
 
• China wanted to show to the world that it could be a friendly member of the 
international political society, which would significantly enable smooth economic 
cooperation with foreign states.  
 
Along with China’s economic expansion and the developing trend of the international 
financial economy, China’s objectives in the governance of the international financial 
economy have changed since it regained its IMF membership in 1980. China pursues a 
larger share in the governance of the international financial economy and improve the 
environment of the international monetary system so that it can accommodate and 
stimulate free development of emerging market economies. Since the IMF is the most 
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influential intergovernmental organization in the international financial and economic 
system, the Chinese government attempts to achieve its objectives via participating in 
IMF programs. China’s further participation in IMF programs are motivated by the IMF’s 
distinct functions:   
 
• China wants to utilize the IMF’s expertise and information advance, and let these 
specialized resources contribute to China’s pursuit of becoming a more 
knowledgeable and legitimate actor in the global financial governance. 
 
• China wants to utilize the IMF’s agenda setting power to solve multilateral issues. 
The example applied in the thesis is the IMF Multilateral Consultation on Global 
Imbalances, which brought together five countries/regions that were in the centre 
of the global imbalances problem. The Multilateral Consultation was expected to 
provide these countries with a transparent forum where multilateral decision-
making is enabled.  
 
• China wants the IMF to solve the controversial issues that cannot be solved by 
China on its own. The example applied in the thesis was China’s advocate for 
enlarging the use of the SDR, strengthening IMF surveillance on the major 
reserve currency issuer countries, and reforming the US dollar dominated 
international monetary system. China wants the IMF to fulfill this task because 
China alone lacks the strength to confront the US in the international financial 
economy.  
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3. How has the interactions between China and the IMF progressed? 
 
The thesis highlighted some key events in the interactions between China and the IMF 
since 1980. China’s participation in the IMF has increased while Chinese officials 
learned and accumulated related techniques and skills in handling IMF affairs. Principal-
agent theory emphasizes China’s evolving delegation of tasks to IMF staff due to the 
specification and advancement of its own objectives in the governance of international 
financial economy. China’s interactions with the IMF are constrained by various factors 
according to principal-agent theory, including China’s preferences with regard to IMF 
operation, the staffing rule of the IMF, China’s relative role in IMF governance, China’s 
influence among IMF staff, the IMF’s expertise and financial resources, and China’s 
capacity in controlling IMF practices and the costs of controlling. Generally speaking, 
China’s interactions with the IMF have become more frequent and complex; yet China 
does not welcome an IMF that overly intervenes into the member states’ domestic affairs, 
neither does China have sufficient power of governance in the Fund. Therefore the 
interactions between China and IMF remain moderate.  The situation may change in the 
future when China becomes more familiar with the international economic affairs and if 
it acquires more governance power in the IMF and the international financial and 
economic system. Yet for now, neither China’s nor the IMF’s performance fully meets 
the expectations of the other.  
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The People’s Republic of China regained the legal IMF membership that previously 
belonged to Taiwan in 1980. In the first a few years, since China was unfamiliar with 
international economic affairs and IMF regulations and rules, it did not participate in 
many IMF programs. China has only ever borrowed from the IMF once- in 1984. Yet 
China received a considerable amount of technical assistance from the Fund, in terms of 
training courses in IMF institutes, IMF experts’ and lecturers’ visits to China, and 
periodical posts in IMF headquarters for the Chinese officials sent by the state’s financial 
institutions. The Chinese officials from China’s most crucial financial institutions such as 
the PBC, CBRC, MOF and the NBS have learned from the Fund some important 
techniques and skills in financial governance, and it has increasingly committed to the 
IMF GDDS program. In addition, the IMF also runs surveillance and policy advice 
programs for China, among which the most important one is IMF Article IV 
Consultation. It provides China with annual assessment of economic development and 
financial stability and advice on China’s economic policies. However, China refused to 
accept the IMF policy advice that refers to essential domestic economic stability and the 
interests of powerful domestic interest groups, such as revaluing the RMB and 
liberalizing interest rates.  
 
China’s participation in the IMF has advanced both in terms of techniques and varieties 
of programs. China participated in IMF Multilateral Consultation on Global Imbalances 
along with the Euro area, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and the US, which highlighted China’s 
crucial role in global financial stability and China’s capability to utilize the IMF as a 
mediator of China’s discussion and negotiation with other states. Some Chinese officials 
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and scholars’ propositions during the global financial crisis reflected the Chinese 
government’s intention of relying on the IMF to reform the international monetary 
system. Zhou Xiaochuan the Chinese Central Bank governor called for enlarging the use 
of the SDR and diversifying the US-dollar dominated international monetary system. 
Meanwhile, the Chinese officials sent to the IMF have improved their capability to 
express their opinions accurately and strongly, as seen in the statements and speeches of 
various Chinese officials at IMF meetings over time. In addition, China has become an 
important creditor to the IMF, and provided the IMF with considerate financial 
contributions during and after the crisis. The IMF also endeavours to convince China to 
continue to contribute to the IMF’s financial resources.  
 
However, not all participation in IMF programs generated desired consequences for 
China. The Multilateral Consultation on Global Imbalances did not result in many 
effective and practical policy changes in the involved countries, as the Multilateral 
Consultation was not part of the IMF’s traditional functions and it involved too much 
uncertainty and ambiguity in the whole program. Moreover, The IMF did not respond 
directly to China’s proposal for a larger SDR (that would include the RMB), tougher 
regulations for the Fund’s advanced economy member states, and eventually a more 
diversified and flexible international financial economy for China and other emerging 
market economies. China also advocates governance reforms in the IMF that are in 
favour of the emerging market economies.  However, although the IMF has demonstrated 
its updated goal to increase the emerging market economy members’ representation and 
urged the US to strengthen regulation in its financial and monetary system, the IMF’s 
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western-dominated nature in both governance structure and organizational culture makes 
fast and effective switch of policy preferences from the advanced to emerging market 
economies almost impossible.  
 
4. What is China’s governance role in the IMF? How has it progressed?  
 
China’s role in IMF formal governance is represented by its quota and voting shares in 
the Fund. China was initially assigned a quota of SDR 1.2 billion in July 1980. After 
some adjustments, China’s quota reached SDR 6.4 billion in January 2001. Three major 
IMF governance reforms that were initiated in 2006, 2008 and 2010 improved China’s 
representation in the IMF. These three reforms mostly shifted governance power from the 
Fund’s advanced economy state members to the emerging market economy and 
developing country members. The 2006 reform included a quota share increase of 1.8 per 
cent to the most under-represented members: China, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey. It also 
included some other minor adjustments that were conducive to the representation of other 
emerging market economy and developing countries. China was satisfied with the 2006 
reform and continued to call for further reforms that conferred on China more decision-
making power in the IMF. The 2008 reform included a new single quota formula 
replacing the old five formulas, which increased the developing countries’ weight among 
all members. When the 2008 reform came to effective on March 3, 2011, China’s quota 
increased from 3.718 to 3.996 per cent of the total quotas, and its voting share increased 
from 3.651 to 3.806 per cent of the total voting shares. The Chinese delegation was 
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disappointed with such a tiny increase of quota and voting shares and continued to call 
for further reforms.  
 
The 2010 reform promised ‘the biggest ever of influence in favour of emerging market 
and developing countries’ according to Strauss-Kahn, by which China, Brazil, Russia and 
India will be included in the Fund’s 10 largest shareholders, and China’s quota and 
voting shares will be increased to 6.394 per cent and 6.071 per cent respectively and 
making China the third largest member. Although the 2010 reform represented a 
significant power shift from the IMF’s advanced (especially European) economy to 
emerging market economy state members, the implementation of the reform has become 
extremely difficult. The IMF planned to implement the by January 2013, yet it has not 
been implemented one year over the promised deadline. The US is the biggest obstacle of 
the implementation of the 2010 reform. The reform will not come effective until the US 
press the yes button. Nevertheless, even if the 2010 reform does come into effect, China’s 
governance power still remains relatively inadequate to challenge the dominant role of 
the US and other advanced economies in the IMF. The US remains the veto power to 
reject any changes to the status quo, and so do the EU countries combined68.   
 
The Chinese government has repeatedly called for further IMF governance reforms in 
several international occasions, and the IMF has also expressed its determination in 
improving the decision making power of emerging market economy and developing 
countries. However, the reality is different from the rhetoric, as the IMF’s traditional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 The EU countries usually have converging preferences and policy decisions in the IMF; hence they can 
sometimes be regard as a unified force in some policy areas.  
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advanced economy member states would not easily let go the governance power in the 
IMF and the western-dominance nature is deeply embedded in the IMF’s organizational 
culture.  
 
China’s role in IMF informal governance refers to the Chinese delegation’s capability to 
negotiate with those of other member states in the forums and informal groups outside the 
EB and to shape the agenda and craft proposals before they are brought to the Board. A 
member state’s informal governance power depends on its experience in handling IMF 
affairs and its networks and real impacts in the international political society. China lacks 
both of the above features, and it is kept out of the discussions of the crucial informal 
groups such as the G7 and the EURIMF. The Chinese representatives have learned to 
develop networks in the IMF especially with other emerging market economies, yet it 
will take a long time to acquire a promising social status and refined diplomatic skills of 
the western advanced economies. Since it takes time to acquire larger decision-making 
power in IMF informal governance, China will continue to request more formal IMF 
decision making power represented by quota and voting shares in the IMF.  
 
5. How does the IMF assist China to achieve its objectives in the governance of 
international financial economy? How does principal-agent theory explain it? 
 
China’s participation in IMF programs leads China to get closer to its objectives in the 
governance of international financial economy. According to principal-agent theory, 
China delegates various tasks to the IMF so that the IMF could accomplish the tasks in a 
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more effective way than other forms of cooperation or unilateral solution. The IMF has 
outstanding functions that attract states to delegate various tasks to Fund staff, including 
outstanding expertise, political skills, and resources to perform the tasks; agenda-setting 
power to induce an ‘equilibrium’ among states on controversial issues; capability to 
govern decision-making in situations where the contract is not explicit; capability to solve 
time-inconsistency problem; and capability to ‘lock-in’ the validity of the political 
winner’s advocated policies. These five functions are utilized to different degrees in the 
IMF’s implementation of the tasks delegated from China.  
 
IMF staff have taught Chinese officials a great number of techniques and skills in 
financial governance through various technical assistance programs, where China’s 
financial system has become more and more compatible with the international standard. 
IMF staff have provided China with policy advice, although some of it contrasts with the 
domestic political and economic preferences and thus not fully accepted. Yet China’s 
participation in IMF surveillance reflects China’s commitment to the internationally 
standardized good behaviour. The IMF provided China with a forum where it can discuss 
controversial issues with other states. Moreover, IMF lending programs assess lending 
risks and design loan contracts with better techniques than state governments, thus they 
play the role of guarantor for China’s multilateral lending. Since active participation in 
multilateral lending as a creditor contributes to China’s image of a responsible great 
power, the IMF indirectly assists China to acquire a better reputation in the international 
financial economy.  
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It was mentioned previously (in answer to question 3) that some of China’s participation 
in IMF programs did not generate desired consequences, for example, the Multilateral 
Consultation on global imbalances did not lead to effective policy changes in the involved 
countries; the Chinese officials’ request for more strict surveillance on the Fund’s 
advanced economy member states were ignored; the Chinese policymakers’ request for a 
larger SDR and a thorough reform of the international monetary system toward a more 
diversified one. These undesired consequences of China’s participation in the IMF are 
regarded as results of agency slack according to principal-agent theory. Agency slack took 
place for several reasons: 1 the IMF’s international civil servants-based staffing rules lead 
to a large degree of agency autonomy; 2 the IMF’s western dominated governance 
structure undermined China’s decision-making power in the Fund; 3 the divergence 
between China’s preferences and those of the IMF; 4 the costly controlling mechanisms 
and China’s reliance on IMF expertise which further led to delegation consequences that 
are out of China’s control; 5 the IMF’s limited financial and expertise resources hindered 
the Fund from providing sufficient financial assistance to the member states and 
correcting the risky single currency-based international monetary system.  
 
3   Some Issues for Future Studies 
 
This thesis has contributed to the literature on the relationships between China and 
international organizations with the analysis of the China-IMF interactions since 1980. It 
has also unprecedentedly used the combination of the socialization and principal-agent 
theory to assess the relationship between an emerging market economy and a traditionally 
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western-dominated international institution. The research conducted in this thesis 
indicates a few issues that require further studies in the future.  
 
First of all, China’s role in the IMF will continue to change in the future. Although the 
extent and scale of IMF governance reforms remain moderate, the general trend of IMF 
governance comprises a rising emerging market economy group and declining advanced 
economy group. China will gradually gain more governance power in the IMF via both 
increases in the quota and voting shares and improvements in China’s networking and 
negotiating skills in the Fund. Hence the issues of power redistribution and power struggle 
continue, and this may get more difficult since the existing dominant states in the Fund 
will be asked to let go more decision making power in the EB. IMF governance reforms to 
strengthen the role of emerging market economies and developing countries continue to 
be an important factor of these countries’ cooperation with the IMF.  
 
In addition, China continues to contribute to the IMF’s financial resources. China may not 
become a major creditor of the IMF within a short period of time, yet its financial 
potential has attracted much attention from the Fund. IMF leaders continuously encourage 
China to contribute financially to the Fund, which has received positive responses from 
China’s economic leadership.  China’s increasing role of creditor contrasts with its usual 
object against standardized conditionality for the poor developing countries. While China 
gets more involved in IMF lending programs as a creditor, it increasingly considers about 
the return and effects of its capital, which forces China to soften its ever strong claim on 
economic sovereignty. Moreover, other than the lending programs, China also gets more 
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involved in other functional parts of the Fund, which requires updated assessment of 
China’s dynamic role in the Fund.  
 
Furthermore, other international institutions also call for China’s participation and/or 
financial contribution, such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the crisis-hit 
European governments, and the Asian regional financial institutions like the CMI and 
ASEAN10+3. China’s presence has extended to a wide range of economic cooperation all 
over the world. As mentioned in the last section of Chapter 7, China now sees its position 
in a wider picture of the global economic regime. China’s economic leadership willingly 
devotes itself in multilateral governance of the international financial economy with 
diversified cooperative mechanisms. China’s interaction with the IMF should be regarded 
as a fraction of its dynamic participation in the international financial economy, by which 
it continues to promote a multipolar and diversified global economic regime. China’s 
interactions with other international financial and economic institutions require updated 
analysis following this logic.   
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Appendix 
 
 
List of Interviewees 
 
 
Interviewee 1 (as marked in the footnotes of the thesis) is a government official that 
works closely with the IMF in a Chinese Financial Institution. The interviewee was 
conducted in Beijing in December 2011.  
 
Interviewee 2 (as marked in the footnotes of the thesis) is a leading scholar in China’s 
political economy. The interview was conducted in Beijing in December 2011.  
 
Interviewee 3 (as marked in the footnotes of the thesis) is a senior IMF official of the 
IMF. The interview was conducted in IMF headquarters in Washington D. C in October 
2012. 
 
Interviewee 4 (as marked in the footnotes of the thesis) is a staff member in one of the 
IMF’s research departments. The interview was conducted in IMF headquarters in 
Washington D. C in October 2012.  
 
Interviewee 5 (as marked in the footnotes of the thesis) is a leading scholar in Chinese 
and Asian political economy. The interview was conducted in Beijing in December 2011.  
 
Interviewee 6 is a leading scholar in China’s international relations. The interview was 
conducted in Beijing in December 2011.  
 
Interviewee 7 is a leading scholar in China’s international relations. The interview was 
conducted in Beijing in September 2011.  
 
Interviewee 8 was a senior IMF staff when the interviewed. The interview was conducted 
in Beijing in September 2011. 
 
Interviewee 9 is a staff member in one of the IMF’s research departments. The interview 
was conducted in IMF headquarters in Washington D. C in October 2012.  
 
Interviewee 10 is an expert of China’s economy who works in a leading US think tank in 
Washington D. C. The interview was conducted in Washington D. C in October 2012. 
 
Interviewee 11 is an expert of the IMF who works in a leading US think tank in 
Washington D. C. The interview was conducted in Washington D. C in October 2012.  
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